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## **Andean - United States Dialogue Forum**

### **The Fourth Plenary Meeting**

August 2-3, 2011  
Lima, Peru



## **Andean – United States Dialogue Forum**

### **Fourth Plenary Meeting**

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## **Andean – United States Dialogue Forum: Fourth Plenary Meeting Participant Biographies**

### **BOLIVIA**

**Ricardo Calla Ortega** works as a consultant to international organizations, as an academic, and as a researcher. He graduated with honors in sociology at Washington and Lee University in the United States. He completed an MA in Social Sciences at the Latin American Faculty for Social Sciences (FLACSO) in Mexico, obtaining the Academic Recommendation for the publication of his graduate thesis. He later continued with graduate courses in Anthropology at the Goldsmiths College, London University, United Kingdom. He specializes in political anthropology and Andean research and is the author of numerous publications on these topics. He has been the rector of the Cordillera University (Post-graduate Program in Social Sciences) and a consultant on indigenous matters for the Inter-American Bank for Development (IDB), the Women and Development Unit of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), the United Nations (UN), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Bolivia. Between 2004-2005 he acted as the Minister for Indian Affairs and Aboriginal Peoples and as Adjunct Consul General of Bolivia in Santiago de Chile between 2005 and 2006.

**Germán Choque Condori** is a professor at Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (UMSA) and at the Simon Bolivar Teachers Training College. In his career, he was a Congress Representative for La Paz (2003-2005), founded the Indian Tawantinsuyu University in 1999, and co-founded the National University of the XX Century in 1986 and the Alto Public University in 1999. As a member of the Aymara Indian community, Choque founded the Julián Apaza University Movement (MUJA) at UMSA, designed the present Wiphala (1979), and pioneered the return of the Aymara New Year, Tiwanacu (1979). In October of 1992, Choque was named the Inka Chukiwanka on behalf of the return of the State of Oollasuyu. He has also authored several books: “Origin and constitution of the Wiphala” (“Origen y constitución de la Wiphala”); “Warrior Wiphala” (“Wiphala guerrera”); “Putting Stones together” (“Juntando piedras”); “National Colonialist Anthem,” (“Himno Nacional Colonialista”); “The new Kipu” (“El nuevo Kipu”).

**José Luis Exeni** is the Coordinator of the area of Communication and Information of the Legal Union Specialized in Constitutional Development (UJEDC). He was the president of the National Electoral Court (NJE) until 2009, when he renounced his position. Additionally, Exeni has authored several books, such as *Mediocracia de alta intensidad* (2011); *Democracia (im)pactada en Bolivia* (2008) y *Media Morfosis: Comunicación política e in/gobernabilidad en democracia* (2006), as well as many articles. He has a doctorate in Political Science from the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Mexico and a multidisciplinary post-graduate degree in Development Sciences from the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés.

## COLOMBIA

**Ricardo Ávila Pinto** has worked as the director of the leading Colombian business and economics newspaper, *Portafolio*, since 2007. He also works as the Assistant Director of the opinion section for the newspaper *El Tiempo*. He was Economic Advisor and Private Secretary to the Presidency of the Republic, Deputy Minister of International Economic Affairs of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, and Head of Cabinet of the Office of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States in Washington. On several occasions he has acted as a consultant for the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Andean Development Corporation (CAF). Ávila was also a member of the Ecuador-Colombia Binational Dialogue Group.

**Eduardo Herrera Berbel** is the retired General of the Republic and Rector of the Military University. He holds a professional degree in Military Sciences, a master's degree in Security and National Defense from the Higher School of War, and a specialization in National Defense Analysis and Conflict Resolution from the Military University of Nueva Granada. He served as the Dean of the Department of International Relations, Strategy, and Security at the Military University of Nueva Granada. He was Director of the Higher School of War, Commander of the Brigade and of Institutes of Military Education.

**Rodrigo Pardo** is currently the director of *Cambio* magazine. He worked as the editorial director of *Semana* magazine, deputy director of the newspaper, *El Tiempo*, and director of the newspaper *El Espectador*. He has been a professor of international politics at Los Andes University. His career also includes posts in government. Pardo has acted as Minister of Foreign Relations (1994-1996) and Ambassador of Colombia in Venezuela (1992-1994) and France (1997-1998). He studied Economics at Los Andes University and International Relations at Johns Hopkins University.

**Socorro Ramírez Vargas** is currently a columnist for the Colombian newspaper *El Tiempo*. She is also a member of the Andean-U.S. Dialogue Forum, sponsored by International IDEA and The Carter Center and is a former professor at the Universidad Nacional in Colombia. Among other titles, she has a post doctorate at the Institut des Hautes Études de L'Amérique Latine, a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Sorbonne University, a Masters in International Relations from the Sorbonne University, and a Masters in Economic and Political Problem Analysis from the International Institute of Development.

## ECUADOR

**Susana Cabeza de Vaca González** is the Executive Director of the Ecuador Fulbright Commission (1998-2007 and 2009). During her career, Cabeza de Vaca has also been Coordinating Minister of Production and Competition during Rafael Correa's presidency and has also held several positions in Ecuador, Brazil, Portugal and the United States, including Dean of the Development Administration Department at the San Francisco University in Quito. She was Corporative Director and Director of Human Resources for the corporation Textiles Nacionales. Additionally, she has been a board member of the Quito Chapter of Fundación Natura, of the Ecuadorian Foundation for Women and Development, Sacha Jatún Foundation and the Antisana Foundation. She has also worked training rural micro companies and has also written and published academic articles, poems and stories. She received her MA in Hispanic Literature at Michigan State University, is currently a PhD candidate in Hispanic Medieval Studies. She completed her university studies at Kalamazoo College on a Fulbright scholarship.

**Eduardo Egas Peña** is currently the Executive Vice President of the Corporation to Promote Exports and Investments (CORPEI), as well as a commercial engineer with studies in economics. He has worked with the Ecuadorian government during President Rafael Correa's administration as Vice Minister of Foreign Commerce, Integration and International Negotiations. Additionally, he has extensive experience in the area of business and international relations, as well as regional and local development. In the academic arena, he has been professor of economics and dean of the Economics, Administration, Auditing and International Management Department at the Catholic University of Santiago de Guayaquil.

**Patricia Estupiñán de Burbano** is a journalist with a Masters degree in Political Science and Philosophy, specializing in International Law, Comparative Politics, and Political Philosophy. Since 1985, she has worked at *Vistazo* magazine, which is part of the ECUAVISA Group (mass media) where she has been the Head of Editorial Staff, Managing Editor, and General Editor. She has won four Jorge Mantilla journalism prizes, and in the year 2000, she received the second place in the Ortega y Gasset prize for the information coverage of the 1999 banking crisis in Ecuador. She has been a correspondent for "Business Latin America" of the *Chicago Tribune* and *Poder* magazine. She has conducted interviews with the presidents and vice presidents of Ecuador; the presidents of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela; and the Secretary Generals of the OAS. She was a member of the Binational Dialogue between Ecuador-Colombia.

## PERU

**Cecilia Blondet** is a historian who works as the Executive Director of the National Council for Public Ethics (PROÉTICA), the Peruvian chapter of Transparency International. She is also a main researcher at the Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP). Earlier in her career, Blondet served as Peru's Minister of State in the Ministry of Promotion of Women and Human Development, General Director of the Institute for Peruvian Studies, and President of the Ethics Tribunal of the Peruvian Press Council. At present she is a member of the Board of Advisors of the Open Society Institute; the Advisory Council of the International Project for Children of the Millennium, sponsored by Save the Children UK; the Directive Board of the TRANSPARENCY Civil Association, and of the Board of the Ancash Association of Antamina Mining Company. She is a consultant for international cooperation and the private sector on social and community matters.

**Felipe Ortiz de Zevallos** is a columnist, lecturer, and independent board member to several important financial and mining corporations and non-profit organizations. In his career he has been an engineer, an entrepreneur, a journalist, an educator, and a diplomat. From 2006 to 2009 he served as the Peruvian ambassador to the United States and helped manage the ratification of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Peru. Ortiz de Zevallos acted as head professor and Vice-Chancellor of the University of the Pacific in Lima. Additionally, he founded Group APOYO in 1977 and then served as the group's president. He has been recognized with the Peruvian Institute of Public Administration Award (1990), the Jerusalem Journalism Award (1998), and the Manuel J. Bustamente de la Fuente Award (2008). In 2009, the Lima Chamber of Commerce distinguished him for his contribution to the social and economic development of the country. He studied at the UNI in Lima for engineering, the University of Rochester in New York, and the Business School of Harvard University.

**Jorge Ortiz-Sotelo** is a naval captain who studied history in the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Perú and graduated in 1985. He completed specialization courses in maritime history and the British Empire at Queen Mary College of the University of London and received his doctorate in maritime history from the University of Saint Andrews in Scotland. Dr. Ortiz Sotelo has researched and published extensively on

topics of his specialty, such as *Apuntes para la historia de los submarinos peruanos* and *Monitor Huascar: una historia compartida (1985-2005)*.

**Ricardo Vega Llona** is currently President of the Board and Director for several companies in various sectors, such as Unimed Peru and Eldenor S.A., as well as an advisor to many businesses. He has been President of the School for Stock Exchange Agents, President of the Exporters Association (ADEX), and President of the National Confederation of Private Entrepreneurial Institutions (CONFIEP). In the public sector, he has been a Senator of the Republic, Executive Director of the Investment Promotions Agency (PROINVERSION), Executive President of Counter Drugs with the rank of Minister of State, and President of the High Level Commission and Summit (Latin America and the Caribbean – European Union). Additionally, the Government of Peru bestowed upon him the decoration Order of Merit for Distinguished Service in the grade of Grand Cross in July 2008. He studied Economic and Commercial Sciences at the Catholic University of Peru. He carried out higher courses of study at the Higher School for Business Administration for Graduates (ESAN in Spanish) and of Business Management at the International Labor Organization (ILO) in Milan.

**Antonio Zapata Velasco** is currently a columnist for the *La República* newspaper, a professor of History at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Peru and a professor at the Diplomatic Academy of Peru in the areas of political and social history of the republican era. He is also an associate researcher for the Peruvian Studies Institute (IEP) and has been an advisor to the Congress of the Republic in the field of anti-corruption. Additionally, for nine years he was the conductor of the television program specialized in history “Sucedió en el Perú” (It Happened in Peru), Peru National Television. He has a doctorate in the History of Latin America from Columbia University.

## **UNITED STATES**

**Hattie Babbitt** is an attorney in Washington, D.C. where she provides counsel at the intersection of law, policy, and public interest. From 1997 to 2001 Babbitt served as Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. As the second most senior official for U.S. foreign assistance programs, she oversaw programs in the fields of democratization, humanitarian relief, women’s empowerment, climate change, economic growth, education, health, and the environment. Her responsibilities included oversight of USAID efforts to assist post-conflict reconstruction in the Balkans and East Timor. She represented USAID on the President’s Management Council (PMC) and chaired the intra-USAID management committee. Babbitt served at the Department of State from 1993 to 1997 as U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States. Babbitt also served as a Senior Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and spent almost 20 years as a litigation attorney in Arizona. Babbitt serves on a number of not-for-profit and for-profit boards. She is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

**Rex Lee Jim** works as the Vice President to the Navajo Nation Council, the legislative body of the Navajo Nation. As a member of this governing body, he served on the Judiciary Committee, striving for access to a fair judicial service for the Navajo people and also chaired the Public Safety Committee, fighting for public safety services: police, fire and rescue, corrections, medical and emergency response, criminal investigations, and highway safety. He started teaching at the Rock Point Community School by teaching Navajo to students K-12. He also developed curriculum for K-Graduate programs, ones that are culturally and pedagogically appropriate for Navajo students. Later, while teaching for Dine College, the first Native American college to be established and run by a native nation, he fundraised for and organized student and faculty trips to the countries of South America. He helped work on the drafting and final passing of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples at the United Nations level and

continues to work with the Expert Mechanism, which is charged with the study and implementation of the declaration. He is also working on the drafting of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Americas with the Organization of American States. Additionally, Jim has published in Navajo and also wrote and produced plays entirely in Navajo.

**Coletta Youngers** is an independent consultant, a Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), and an Associate with the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC). She is an analyst of human rights and political developments in the Andean Region and of U.S. foreign policy toward the Andes and an expert on U.S. international drug control policy. She is co-editor of *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy* (2005). Youngers was the Director of WOLA's Drug Policy Project from July 2001 to May 2004 and was a Senior Associate at WOLA from June 1987 to June 2003. Prior to joining WOLA in 1987, Youngers was a project manager at Catholic Relief Services and on the editorial staff of *Latinamerica Press/Noticias Aliadas* in Lima, Peru. She holds a Masters in Public Affairs from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. She is also the author of a book on the history of WOLA, *Thirty Years of Advocacy for Human Rights, Democracy and Social Justice* (2005) and on the history of the Peruvian human rights movement, *Violencia Política y Sociedad Civil en el Perú: Historia de la Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos* (2003). She has published numerous book chapters, reports and articles on the impact of U.S. antinarcotics policy on human rights and democratization in the Andes, among other topics.

## **VENEZUELA**

**Eleazar Diaz Rangel** is the Director of *Últimas Noticias*, Venezuela's most distributed newspaper. He is the former President of the Venezuelan Journalists Association, Director of the National Workers of the Press Union and founder of the Latin-American Federation of Journalists. In addition, he was the Director of *Diario Punto* and the magazine, *Tribuna*. Further, Rangel was the Director of the School of Mass Communication of the Universidad Central de Venezuela

**Orlando Maniglia Ferreira** is a delegate to the Presidential Commission for the Delimitation of Marine and Submarine Waters of the Gulf of Venezuela and other Subjects with the Republic of Colombia (CONEG). He is also a lecturer and professor on various topics of his expertise. He speaks four languages, and has served as General Commander of the Navy (2003-2004), Inspector General of the National Naval Forces (2004-2005), and Minister of Defense (2005-2006). He has been recognized for his service not only by the Venezuelan government, but also by the governments of France, Italy, and Russia. In 2010, he began his second radio show, called "Between Lines." Maniglia earned his master's degree in Maritime Strategy at the Higher School of Naval War of Venezuela after earning diplomas at the Universidad Central de Venezuela, the School of Joint War in Venezuela, and also the Interarms College of Defense in Paris, France.

**Ana María San Juan** is the Coordinator on Security, State, and Democracy for the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF). She is also a social psychologist and a professor at the Universidad Central de Venezuela. San Juan founded the Colombia, Latin America and Caribbean Professorship at the university. Additionally, San Juan is a member of the Binational Colombia-Venezuela Academic Group and the Center of American Studies, as well as a consultant on governability, security and international relations issues for the CAF, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) International, and The Carter Center.



**Maryclen Stelling de Macareño** is a sociologist who specializes in the analysis of modes of social communications. She teaches at la Universidad Católica Andrés Bello and la Fundación Escuela de Gerencia Social. Currently, she is working as the Executive Director of the Rómulo Gallegos Center of Latin American Studies (CELARG), as well as the General Coordinator of the Venezuelan chapter of the Global Media Watch. She also hosts a weekly radio show, which airs on Radio Nacional Venezuela, and is a columnist for the newspaper, *Últimas Noticias* (Venezuela).

## **SPECIAL INVITEES**

**Alberto Adrianzén** is a member of the Andean Parliament, elected by Gana Perú. He is also a sociologist at the Universidad Católica and has worked as a journalist for various news sources since 1980. Adrianzén currently works as a weekly columnist for the newspaper, *La Republica* and is a member of their Board of Editors, as well as a working for International IDEA since 2007. Additionally, he has been a professor at the Universidad Católica and the Academia Diplomática del Perú. In recent years, he has worked as a political advisor for the Andean Community (CAN) and was elected International Overseer in the selection and designation of the Supreme Court of Justice in Ecuador, for which he was decorated by the Ecuadorian state. Also, Adrianzén worked for many years as the principal researcher of national and international politics for the NGO DESCO, and later for el Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana. Later, he worked for the Congress of the Republic and was an advisor to President Valentin Paniagua during his transition government. Adrianzén studied political science at the Colegio de México.

**César Gaviria Trujillo** is a member of the Global Commission on Drug Policy and the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy. He has also been the National Director of the Partido Liberal de Colombia (PL) since 2005. From 1994 to 2004, he acted as the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), and, beforehand, was the president of Colombia from 1990 to 1994. During his presidency, he created the National Constituent Assembly and ratified the Constitution of 1991, which strengthened the democratic system and promoted open economic policy. He enacted many other reforms: in security, in modernizing legislation, in structural changes to governmental institutions, and in foreign policy. Before rising to the presidency, Gaviria was the Minister of Government under Barco (1987-1990), Minister of Finance (1986-1987), Governor of Pereira (1975-1976), and member of the Colombian House of Representatives (1974-1990). He studied economic at the Universidad de los Andes.

**Rafael Roncagliolo** is the Minister of Foreign Policy of Peru during Ollanta Humala's presidency. He is also a sociologist, journalist, Peruvian university professor, and He is the Senior Political Advisor for Andean Countries for International IDEA (2009). In his career, he has been the Director of Andean Countries, International IDEA (2005-2009), President of the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters in Peru (AMARC) (1995-1998), Vice President of the International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMRC) (1982-1986), and Professor at the National University of San Marcos in Peru and the University of Lima and the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru. In the latter he was also head of the Social Sciences Department. He has also been a visiting professor at the University of Quebec in Montreal, the Ibero-American University of Mexico and the Pontifical Catholic University of Ecuador. Roncagliolo has counseled quick count and election observation groups in the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. He has also published numerous books and articles on communications, political systems and electoral analysis. He is member of the Editorial Councils of specialized magazines in Canada, Ecuador, Holland, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Spain and the United States.

## THE CARTER CENTER

**Karin Andersson** is a Program Associate for the Carter Center's Americas Program. As a Swedish national who has lived and worked in Europe, Latin America, Central Asia and the U.S. with multi-lateral organizations and non-governmental organizations, mostly in the field of conflict prevention, she has extensive project management experience, most recently from UNDP Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia, where she was a project manager for a participatory process to analyze root obstacles to peace at local and national level. She has worked thoroughly on issues related to UN reform and inter-agency coordination within the UN. She has also worked intimately on issues related to national public policy to strengthen bi-national border integration, national development strategies for conflict prevention and local development plans. Holds a M.A in Political Science and a B.A. in development studies from the University of Lund, Sweden and did her field work for her Master thesis in Guatemala on women's empowerment and property rights.

**Camila Lanusse** is the Project Coordinator for the Carter Center in Ecuador. She graduated in Political Sciences and Public Administration from the Central University of Chile. She has a Master in Political Sociology granted by FLACSO. She was linked to Quantum Consultants in the area of crisis management and public matters. She was also in charge of the political analysis section of the Quantum Report in Ecuador. She has participated in several social, political and public opinion studies for Habitus Investigations.

**Jennifer McCoy** is the Director of the Carter Center's Americas Program and Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University since 1984. Among her responsibilities as the director of the Americas Program, she directs the Carter Center's Friends of the Inter-American Democratic Charter group and previously directed the Carter Center's project on Mediation and Monitoring in Venezuela from 2002-2004. She has directed election monitoring missions for The Carter Center in Bolivia, Nicaragua, Panama, Mexico, Venezuela, Jamaica, and Peru, and has participated in election delegations to Indonesia, Haiti, Suriname, and Guyana. Dr. McCoy's academic career has included extensive fieldwork in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and in Uruguay, where she conducted research as a Fulbright fellow in 1991 and 1992. A specialist on democratization, international collective protection and promotion of democracy, and Latin American politics, Dr. McCoy's most recent book is *International Mediation in Venezuela* (with Francisco Diez, forthcoming 2011). She is also editor and contributor to *The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela*, (with David Myers, 2004); *Do Politicians Learn from Political Crises?* (2000); and *Venezuelan Democracy Under Stress* (1995).

**Hector Vanolli** is the Carter Center representative in Venezuela. Originally a journalist in Argentina, he has extensive experience in institutional strengthening, democratization and electoral assistance. He worked with the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington D.C. for several years at the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy. He served as Chief of Mission of the OAS Observer Mission in Nicaragua (1998); Deputy Chief of Mission in Guatemala (2001); and Special Advisor in Venezuela (2004 Recall Referendum), among other responsibilities. He has also served as Coordinator of OAS special projects on political party system support and development in Guatemala. He holds a Masters degree in International Relations and Communication from Boston University, and has been Fulbright and Ford Foundation scholar. As a journalist, he was Fellow in the 1986 American Society of Newspapers Editors exchange program for outstanding journalists around the world. He has co-edited the book *Economic Reform in Latin America* (1997).

## IDEA INTERNATIONAL

**Alfonso Ferrufino** has served as the Political Advisor at the International Institute for Democracy and

Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) in Bolivia since October 2007. He holds degrees in Sociology and Law from the University of Lovaina-Bélgica. He served as a Congressional representative from 1982 to 1997. He was Vice President of the Chamber of Deputies from 1993 to 1997. Ferrufino served as Minister of Government from 2003 to 2004 during the administration of President Carlos Mesa. He coordinated the multi-party parliamentary coalition that developed the Law on Political Parties and the Electoral Code (1996-1997). He was the Executive Director of the Foundation for Support of the Parliament and Citizen Participation (Fundación de Apoyo al Parlamento y a la Participación Ciudadana, FUNDAPPAC) from 1997 to 2003 and Coordinator of the Democratic Strengthening Program, a joint project between International IDEA and UNDP Bolivia, from 2005 to 2007. He has written essays and articles on the Parliament and political parties.

**Kristen Sample** has worked with the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) since 2004 and is currently the Head of Mission for the Andean Region. She is also IDEA's regional coordinator for gender issues and democracy and development. She is editor or author of a number of publications including "Thinking Politics: Think Tanks and Political Parties in Latin America", "La política y la pobreza en los países andinos," "From Rhetoric to Deeds: Best Practices for Women's Participation in Political Parties" and "Democracia en la Region Andina: los telones de fondo". She has a Masters' degree in public policy from Harvard University and a Bachelors' in International Relations from the University of Southern California. Before her career with IDEA, Kristen had worked in Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala and Chile in various positions involving strengthening of democracy and support for civil society.



## The Andean-United States Dialogue Forum Members

### Bolivia

Ricardo Calla Ortega	Researcher; International Consultant; Former Minister of Indigenous Affairs
Germán Choque Condori	Founder of Indigenous Tawantinsuyu University; Former Member of Congress from La Paz
José Luis Exeni	Coordinator for Communication and Information of the Specialized Judicial Unit for Constitutional Development (UJEDC), Former President of the National Electoral Court
Fernando Mayorga Ugarte	Director, Center for Higher Education, Universidad Mayor de San Simon
Lourdes Montero Justiniano	Professor in Development Studies, Universidad de San Andrés; Executive Director, Gregoria Apaza Center for the Advancement of Women

### Colombia

Ricardo Ávila Pinto	Director, <i>Portafolio</i>
Francisco de Roux Rengifo	Head of the Jesuit Community in Colombia; Recipient of the 2001 Colombian National Peace Prize
Eduardo Herrera Berbel	Retired General; Rector, Universidad Militar Nueva Granada
Rodrigo Pardo García-Peña	Journalist; Former Foreign Minister; Former Ambassador to Venezuela and France
Socorro Ramírez Vargas	Former Professor, Universidad Nacional de Colombia; Expert in International Relations
Luis Carlos Villegas Echeverri	President, National Association of Colombian Businessmen; President, National Business Council

### Ecuador

Adrián Bonilla Soria	Director, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Ecuador
Susana Cabeza de Vaca González	Executive Director, Fulbright Commission in Ecuador; Former Minister of Coordination for Production
Manuel Chiriboga Vega	Director, Foreign Trade Observatory; Researcher, Latin American Center for Rural Development (RIMISP)
Eduardo Egas Peña	Executive Vice-President, Corporation for the Promotion of Exports and Investment (CORPEI)
Carlos Espinosa Fernández Córdova	Coordinator, Department of International Relations, Universidad de San Francisco in Quito
Patricia Estupiñán de Burbano	General Editor, <i>Vistazo</i> magazine
María Paula Romo Rodríguez	Member, National Assembly for <i>Acuerdo País</i>

Juan Fernando Vega Cuesta Priest; Former Member of the Constitutional Assembly; Professor of Theology

**Peru**

Cecilia Blondet Montero Executive Director, National Council for Public Ethics (*PROÉTICA*)  
Jorge Ortiz Sotelo Executive Director, Peruvian Institute of Economics and Politics  
Felipe Ortiz de Zevallos Former Peruvian Ambassador to the U.S.; Founder and President, Grupo APOYO; Professor, Universidad del Pacífico, Lima, Peru  
Ricardo Vega Llona Businessman; Former President of the National Confederation of Private Enterprises (CONFIEP); Former Senator  
Antonio Zapata Velasco Professor of History, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos; Former Advisor to the Peruvian Congress

**United States**

Hattie Babbitt Attorney; Former Deputy Administrator of USAID; Former U.S. Ambassador to the OAS during the Clinton Administration  
Eric Farnsworth Vice-President, Council of the Americas  
Kristen Genovese Senior Attorney, Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL)  
Rex Lee Jim Delegate, Navajo Nation Council; Member of UN expert group on the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; Member OAS Working Group to consider the draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples  
Stephen Johnson Director, Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies  
Jim Kolbe Former U.S. Representative (R-AZ); Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States  
Marcela Sánchez-Bender Communications Officer, External Affairs for Latin America and the Caribbean, World Bank  
John Walsh Senior Associate for the Andes and Drug Policy, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)  
Coletta Youngers Senior Fellow, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA); Independent Consultant; Associate, International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC)  
**Observers:**  
Fulton Armstrong Professional Staff Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Democratic Minority Staff  
Peter Quilter Professional Staff Member, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Democratic Minority Staff

**Venezuela**

René Arreaza Villalba Former Coordinator for the Vice-President of Venezuela; Former Foreign Ministry Official  
Eleazar Díaz Rangel Journalist, Director of “*Ultimas Noticias*”  
Orlando Maniglia Ferreira Former Minister of Defense; Retired Admiral  
Ana María Sanjuan International Consultant; Professor, Universidad Central de Venezuela  
Maryclen Stelling de Macareño Coordinator, Venezuelan Chapter of Global Media Watch



## **Andean – United States Dialogue Forum**

### **Project Description**

#### ***The need for a civil society dialogue between the Andean countries and the U.S.***

Challenges to the national interests of the five Andean countries (Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela) and the United States are clear: illegal armed actors, drug producers, and criminal elements do not respect national boundaries; environmental damage spills across borders to affect neighboring countries; internal turmoil and conflict in individual countries produce displaced peoples and refugees; broken diplomatic relations and ideological divides restrict trade; and migration continues to be one of the most difficult issues facing all six nations. Strained relations between countries impede cooperation to achieve greater security and economic well-being for all citizens. Despite the evident need for a shared agenda between the United States and the Andean countries to address these challenges and opportunities, divergent approaches and priorities have prevented adequate cooperation to date.

#### ***The Andean – U.S. Dialogue Forum***

While formal diplomatic efforts are important, The Carter Center and International IDEA are supporting an Andean – U.S. Dialogue Forum that serves as a platform for dialogue at the civil society level. Formed in January 2010, the Dialogue Forum strives to increase mutual understanding among societies and governments in the region; create collaborative initiatives around issues of mutual concern; and promote cooperation and exchange of information between individuals, organizations, and governments in the United States and the Andean nations.

#### ***The power of individuals dedicated to dialogue***

Forum members share a common concern for human welfare and the prosperity of their nations and the hemisphere. They are united by their common characteristics as individuals with direct access to high level decision makers in their government; as experts in their fields, and with influence over public opinion. The group includes leaders of civic organizations, social movements, academic institutions, media organizations, the military, the private sector, parliaments and former government officials.

#### ***Achievements of the Forum***

##### **Trust, mutual understanding and personal relationships fomented**

Forum activities to date have led to several important accomplishments. Groups committed to dialogue between the countries have been formed in all six nations. Mutual understanding, trust and personal relationships among the members have been strengthened through three dialogue

sessions in Atlanta, Lima and Washington, D.C. Pairs of U.S. Forum members have visited all the Andean countries to gain a deeper understanding of each country's unique political and economic situation. Communications and information channels have been put in place with the governments of each participating country.

### **Towards a Common Agenda for the Andean countries and the United States**

As an initial product of the Forum, members have developed a report toward a common agenda among the six countries. Based on public opinion polls and elite interviews in all six countries, the report identifies convergences and divergences in priorities among the Andean countries and their citizens and the United States. It is designed to improve understanding of the internal dynamics in each country and reduce the stereotypes that impede working together to resolve mutual challenges. Finally, the report presents priorities for a common agenda for cooperation. The report will be widely disseminated to national governments and civil society in all six countries. The objective is that the dissemination will lead to policy impact; the building of relationships; impact on the public opinion, as well as contributing to mutual understanding between the six countries.

### **Proposing innovative solutions to problematic issues facing the countries**

Members have formed working groups to explore issues of drug policy and organized crime, environmental policy, polarized media, and inclusive trade and development. As a result, members from the various countries are engaging and working together on a variety of issues, ranging from bilateral dialogues between Colombian and Venezuelan journalists, editors and newspaper directors to analyze and promote a wider understanding of the role of the media and journalists in generating or reducing tensions, to advocacy efforts to extend the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), to national consultations to assess the impact and results of current drug policy and propose innovative changes.



## **Andean – United States Dialogue Forum First Dialogue Session in Atlanta**

The first dialogue session took place in Atlanta, Georgia, on Feb. 23-24, 2010, and brought together approximately 30 participants from the United States and the five Andean countries. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter joined the participants in the dialogue, as did Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs of the U.S. State Department Christopher J. McMullen.



Former President Carter initiates the first dialogue session of the Andean-U.S. Dialogue Forum at The Carter Center in Atlanta, Ga.

During this first meeting, the forum was established as a space for dialogue and deemed by the members as an important, strategic, and promising new initiative given the current political, economic, and social dynamic in the Andean sub-region and broader hemisphere. A significant result of the first session was the formation of working groups based on the identification of high-priority trans-national policy issues, including the need for cooperation on drug policy; climate change, and development; the role of the media in inter-country relations; and differing conceptualizations of democracy.

### **The Development of a Common Agenda**

During the dialogue, misperceptions and misunderstandings among the six forum countries were identified by the members as obstacles to collectively responding to shared challenges. As a result, the forum members committed to developing a Common Agenda that would identify the points of convergence in current perceptions and expectations regarding relations. Members agreed to conduct consultations in their respective countries with key government, civil society, academic, and private sector representatives to map the current perceptions and expectations regarding relations among the forum countries within their respective countries.

### **Different Conceptualization of Democracy and Human Rights**

The dialogue session highlighted the competing and sometimes conflicting conceptualizations of democracy and human rights among the countries as a source of misperception and an obstacle to cooperation. The debate touched upon the questions of how to strengthen democracy and make it more meaningful and



Forum members from the five Andean countries and the United States come together to take part in the first dialogue session.



inclusive for citizens across the region, as well as how to deliver high quality citizenship that protects not only civil and political rights but also economic and social rights. An ongoing trend in some of the Andean countries is to stress economic, social, and collective rights and new forms of participation. At times, however, this trend has come at the expense of democratic procedures emphasized in liberal democracy, such as the separation of powers or individual political and civil rights. The participants and President Carter discussed the important question of how the United States can relate its foreign policy to these developments.

### **Role of the Media in Creating Positive and Negative Perceptions of Other Countries**

Polarized and politicized media as well as "microphone diplomacy" have often inflamed misperceptions and misunderstandings among the six countries. Forum members concluded that the media plays an unrivaled role in providing information to the domestic public, which contributes to the positive or negative perceptions among the general public. The participants pointed out how the media in all six countries sometimes distort information related to bilateral and regional policy concerns and thus create an obstacle to a constructive dialogue among the Andean countries and with the United States.



Susana Cabeza de Vaca presents the recommendations on the main priorities for the Andean-U.S. Dialogue Forum.

**Policy Issues of Concern** The forum identified several transnational policy issues to prioritize for future work, including cooperation on drug policy, climate change, and conceptualizations of integral and sustainable development. The members agreed to meet again for a second dialogue session on June 1-2, 2010, in Lima, Peru.



## **Andean – United States Dialogue Forum**

### **Second Dialogue Session in Lima**

The second session of the dialogue forum took place in Lima, Peru, on June 1-2, 2010.

Two days of discussion provided an opportunity for the members to report on the progress made since the first dialogue session in Atlanta and to present concrete proposals for the second phase of the project. The meeting achieved a greater level of confidence between the members, the consolidation and validation of a civil society space for positive dialogue, and a deepening of analysis on issues of mutual interest.

The working groups that had formed during the Atlanta meeting discussed their priorities and presented work plans for their next activities and planned the visits by U.S. forum members to the Andean countries to further deepen the understanding of each national context and to foment the personal



All of the forum members together on the last day of the second dialogue session in Lima, Peru.

relationships between forum members. Ambassador Néstor Popolizio, Peru's vice minister of foreign affairs, addressed the forum members on behalf of Peru's President Alan García and extolled the benefits of the initiative and the work of its members. The Head of Foreign Relations of the CAN Camila Polo Flórez participated as an observer. The forum members also had the opportunity to interact with representatives from the Ecuadorian, Peruvian, and U.S. Governments during a dinner at the Club Nacional.

### **Common Agenda Report**

A first draft of the Common Agenda Report was presented and discussed by the participants. The Common Agenda Report presented an initial mapping of the perceptions and expectations each of the six countries had for relations with the United States and the other Andean countries. Forum members agreed to undertake more

consultations with key actors in their respective countries, to carry out a public opinion survey, and to include a short background analysis of each country.

### **Role of the Media in Creating Positive and Negative Perceptions of Other Countries**

The participants proposed meetings of journalists that would bring together media professionals from the forum countries to engage in a dialogue on how the media contributes to mutual understanding or negative perceptions between the countries.

### **Drug Policy and Organized Crime**

The working group on drug policy identified the need to reframe the issue of drug policy, which is seen as an important obstacle to increased cooperation and understanding among the forum countries. The group expressed its belief that substantive change is taking place in the overall political, economic, and social landscape related to drug policy. In this situation they deem it important to promote the debate around the results of traditional policy and the search for alternative approaches. The group identified the need to contribute to a debate about the costs and benefits of new approaches, as well as multilateral approaches and confidence-building measures for security and defense. The group proposed a meeting with national experts on organized crime and drugs during each country trip that the U.S. members would undertake to the Andean countries.



The Forum's Working Group on Drugs and Organized Crime discusses potential strategies and ideas to move forward on assessing current and alternative policies in the Andean subregion and the United States.

Each thematic working group decided to advance on their work plan according to the consensus reached in Lima, and the group decided to meet again for a third dialogue session in Washington, D.C., in September, 2010.



## **Andean – United States Dialogue Forum**

### **Third Dialogue Session in Washington, D.C.**

The dialogue forum between the Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela), and the United States held its third meeting in Washington, D.C., on Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 2010. The three-day meeting was structured in the following way:

#### **Sept. 30, 2010:**

Separate meetings of the Andean-U.S. Dialogue Forum's thematic working groups were held with U.S. based actors from think tanks and U.S. Congress to exchange views and information on inclusive development, climate change, drugs and organized crime, and role of the media in inter-country relations.

#### **Sept. 31, 2010:**

Dialogue sessions were held with the Andean and U.S. members to analyze the draft report toward a Common Agenda and prepare messages for Washington audiences and the Andean governments. This report is a result of elite interviews carried out with representatives from all sectors of society as well as public opinion surveys



The Andean-U.S. Dialogue Forum meets with President Carter for the third dialogue session in Washington D.C.

administered in all six countries, a political analysis of each country, and thematic briefs of key transnational issues that have been identified by the forum members. The report is a tool for the forum to help prevent a simplistic "us versus them" perspective, persuade opinion-makers about why the United States should care about the Andean region and vice-versa, to demonstrate why the Andean countries

should care about each other, and to describe how it is possible to improve relations and cooperation by identifying common ground among them and showing progress within the six countries.

During the meeting, the report was analyzed by all members and consensus was built around the recommendations for the governments and key sectors in the six countries. Some initial recommendations included:

- A diversified agenda beyond drugs and security is needed, with a focus on social issues.
- The United States needs to recognize efforts in the Andes to protect the wellbeing of all citizens without exclusion. The United States should acknowledge the efforts toward social progress and reducing inequities being carried out in the Andes, and the commitment to democracy outlined in the Democratic Charter of the OAS signed by all countries. All countries should work through multilateral institutions to defend and promote democracy.
- Andeans should better understand U.S. political processes, and recognize significant changes and challenges in the United States (election of biracial president, but also growing polarization) and diversity in U.S. society, and the current efforts to transcend the mistakes of the past.

Forum members analyzed how to use lobbying and advocacy to strategically promote proposals that are developed by the forum.

This analysis was further nurtured by an exposition on lobbying and advocacy by a Washington expert.

Forum member Congressman Kolbe gave an exposition on the structure and role of the U.S. Congress. The members met with the Ambassadors from each Andean country, representatives from the U.S. State Department, representatives from



Dr. Jennifer McCoy, director of The Carter Center's Americas Program welcomes the members of the Forum and the Ambassadors from each Forum country.

USAID, and Congressional aides during lunch and dinner.

### **Oct. 1, 2010:**

President Carter joined the dialogue and presided over meetings with Patrick M. Ward, deputy director of the Office for National Drug Control Policy, and Maria Otero, the under-secretary for democracy and global affairs of the U.S. Department of State. President Carter and the forum members presented their recommendations. Upon President Carter's departure, the next steps for the Report on a Common Agenda were planned.

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## **Andean – United States Dialogue Forum**

Towards a Common Agenda for Andean Countries and the  
United States

Final Dissemination Report

## **Introduction:**

This report aims to summarize efforts to disseminate the report “Toward a Common Agenda for Andean Nations and the United States” (hereafter, Report) through activities conducted in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, the United States and Venezuela – member countries of the Andean-U.S. Dialogue Forum (hereafter, Forum). This report also outlines the main issues that were addressed and evaluates (to the extent possible) the impact achieved during the February to June 2011 period.

## **1. Guidelines for the dissemination reports**

After consulting with the Forum’s country coordinators, a series of basic guidelines on how to collect information were agreed upon and adopted (See Annex I). This objective aimed to provide recommendations on what information would be important to collect from each country based on the qualitative and quantitative indicators suggested during coordinator discussions.

## **2. Strategy (political context and resources)**

The dissemination strategy was discussed and adjusted in accordance with each country’s political context and the resources available for activities. It was suggested that the Common Agenda Report first be presented to high-level government officials in each of the six countries. Another recommendation by the coordinators was to try to strengthen activities with institutions that share the Forum’s goals and have convening capacity and a large audience in order to maximize the scope of the dissemination efforts.

Due to the unique political context of each country, certain questions were taken into consideration during the dissemination phase, for instance:

- In Bolivia, the group decided to have a meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs David Choquehuanca prior to pursuing any course of action in order to discuss their plans for dissemination and get official feedback. This level of prudence is directly related to the current sensitivity surrounding Bolivia’s relations with the United States. Additionally, there is distrust among government bodies toward the role of foreign non-governmental organizations. Ultimately, efforts were made to avoid possible adverse reactions from the government or other sectors and to minimize potential risks.

- In Ecuador, the Report’s dissemination served to create a rapprochement between the Ecuadorian group and the government. In the end, this objective was significant due to the reserve with which the Ecuadorian government initially treated the initiative. After reestablishing good rapport, the programmed activities were initiated, mainly consisting in distributing the Report among media outlets, civil society organizations and international organizations. Later, these activities were interrupted following the diplomatic impasse between the Ecuador and the United States – a decision made by the group given that this standstill coincided with elections. In any case, even though relations have not been totally restored, the group decided to move forward with the seminar on U.S.–Ecuador relations in Flasco, which will take place after this Report is submitted.

- In the case of Peru, the group expressed that dissemination would face the challenge of a two-round presidential election, reducing the margin of possibilities to draw attention to the initiative. For this reason, it was decided that dissemination would currently be limited to the political figures elected to the Andean Parliament.

### **3. Events held and issues addressed**

In all cases, the different actions and events conducted were formulated according to the priorities expressed beforehand by each country's group.

Two kinds of events were used to disseminate the Report: presentations on the Common Agenda Report as a whole and events in which questions relevant to the Agenda's issues or of interest to the Forum were analyzed. As an example of the latter, a public forum on Venezuelan–U.S. relations was organized by the Venezuelan newspaper *Ultimas Noticias*.

#### **Bolivia**

##### *Meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs David Choquehuanca*

First, the Report was presented to the country's Minister of Foreign Affairs, David Choquehuanca, and the question of how to best disseminate it in Bolivia was discussed. Mr. Choquehuanca expressed his enthusiasm with the Carter Center's continued presence in Bolivia and in particular with the Forum's progress as demonstrated through Common Agenda Report. He also mentioned President Carter's call for dialogue, emphasizing the value of dialogue as a necessary element in improving relations between the United States and Bolivia.

##### *Work meeting with experts*

Another of the activities conducted was a work meeting with numerous renowned figures, including analysts, diplomats and journalists, to whom the Bolivian group presented the Report (See Annex II, section A). Members of the Bolivian group directed the issues addressed during this meeting. As a result, there was an emphasis on the need to build trust and eliminate stereotypes between the two countries – as mentioned in the Report – in order to build new channels for interaction in addition to traditional government and diplomatic relations. In order to make this a reality, the Forum stressed the importance of opening up communication channels with the government, mentioning their meeting with Foreign Minister Choquehuanca as an example.

Germán Choquehuanca, member of the Bolivian group, shared his experience as a group member and highlighted the importance of having an area such as the Forum where ideas on key issues can be exchanged to the region's advantage. He also mentioned that the plenary meetings that had been held were conducted with a spirit of respect and a desire to achieve mutual understanding. In reference to the Common Agenda Report, he said that it marked a step forward for the countries involved since the Report provides a more precise representation of each country's strengths and weaknesses. According to Choquehuanca, the resulting dynamic of being able to agree



on certain criteria fostered greater trust and respect among participants. Finally, he said that the resulting document is an important foundation for dialogue and that governments should be familiarized with it.

On behalf of the Bolivian group, Ricardo Calla gave a presentation on the Report and the overall experience of the Andean-U.S. Forum. During his speech, he emphasized the dynamic that helped build trust among Forum members. He also emphasized the aspects that Andean countries share and the need to strengthen inter-country ties in order to address external relations as a unified region. He continued by saying that while Andean relations are critical, so are their relations with the United States and alluded to the importance of reaching agreements that would help build a relationship with Bolivia based on mutual respect and understanding.

In discussing the Report's contents, the question of drugs was mentioned, including the possibility of seeking alternative ways to confront this problem in order to free up attention for other issues on the bilateral agenda that have consequently been overshadowed. The changes in the discourse on drugs that have taken place in the government and U.S. Congress were highlighted as very positive.

In terms of bilateral relations, the Report's release was considered very opportune given that a framework agreement is currently being discussed in Bolivia and the United States.

## **Colombia**

### *Meeting with the vice minister of foreign affairs*

The first activity in Colombia was to present the Common Agenda Report to the government. In a meeting at the office of the vice minister of foreign affairs, members of the Colombian group formally presented the Report and discussed the progress and proposals of each thematic working group in the Andean-U.S. Forum: drugs, media and development (See Annex II, section B). The vice minister expressed his government's agreement with the Report's conclusion to strengthen border areas through socio-economic development projects. As for creating national groups, he demonstrated interest in the members of the Venezuelan group and their advocacy in national government.

Included among the issues addressed during the meeting were President Juan Manuel Santos' proposed ideas on the question of drugs and the relevance of these proposals for the international community given the renewed debate on drug policies. For instance, these ideas could be particularly relevant to the bill underway in U.S. Congress where a commission is being created to evaluate the government's current drug policy.

To demonstrate the progress made by the Forum's Media Working Group, the two meetings with journalists (Caracas in November 2010 and Bogota in February 2011) were mentioned. Numerous representatives from diverse Venezuelan and Colombian media outlets participated.

### *Dinner at the vice president's private residence*

The second activity was a dinner hosted by Colombian Vice President Angelino Garzón at his private residence. The purpose of the dinner was to present the Report “*Toward a Common Agenda for Andean Countries and the United States*” and the annexes prepared by the Andean–U.S. Dialogue Forum. (See Annex II, section C)

The Forum’s political coordinator for Colombia presented the Report, after which the vice president, on behalf of the Colombian government, commended the Carter Center’s work in reestablishing relations with Ecuador. He further confirmed the relevance of the Dialogue Forum initiative in identifying issues common to Andean countries and their relations with the United States.

In reference to the proposal by the drugs working group, the vice president commented on the progress that the Colombian government has been making together with other Latin American countries in the area of bilateral cooperation for security and defense. This progress is based on Colombia’s accumulated experience in military and police intelligence and tactical and operational capability acquired over years of fighting drugs and kidnapping. He also highlighted how these cooperation processes have strengthened their relations with other countries, in addition to the relevance of this issue in reestablishing relations with Ecuador and the recent interest in restoring relations with Venezuela. The Vice President warned that it would not be sufficient to limit these initiatives to Andean nations and that they must be instituted in a more general discourse on security.

In response to the developments of the Media Working Group, the Vice President highlighted the importance of approaches to understanding the complex internal situations of each country and the role that these play during moments of crisis. As an example, he mentioned the process of restoring relations with Ecuador and Venezuela and confirmed the Colombian government’s priority to diversify the cooperation agenda as well as strengthen relations with Andean countries and the Latin American region at large. Lastly, the Vice President believed the development group’s proposal to center efforts on socio-economic projects in border areas to be very appropriate and he acknowledged the importance that the Foreign Affairs Minister gave the matter.

### *Public presentation of the Report*

As a third activity, a public event was held at the Universidad Javeriana in order to present the Report along with the progress and proposals of each thematic working group in the Andean–U.S. Forum: drugs, media and development. (See Annex II, section D)

The members of the Colombian group led the presentation. They addressed the process of building the Common Agenda, giving a detailed explanation of the issues proposed in the Report and the progress made by the thematic working groups on drugs, media and development, and highlighting how this diplomatic initiative – which springs from civil society – has been in constant dialogue with the governments of the countries concerned.

When he spoke, Father Roux pointed out the significance of focusing efforts on socio-economic development in the Andean countries' border areas as a means of bringing about better conditions and thus dispelling the idea that these are dangerous areas. He proposed using the experience of Magdalena Medio as an example of how this could be done.

Meanwhile, General Eduardo Herrera stressed the importance of building trust between Forum members. Though the Forum cannot solve problems, he emphasized that it contributes to understanding and being able to share different points of view with governments regarding the Andean region's current perceptions of their relations and possible solutions.

In reference to the Report's contents, Professor Ramírez presented the chapter on public attitudes and perceptions of Andean countries and the United States, sharing the unexpected results that were obtained.

During question and answer session, Héctor Helí Rojas, Vice President for Colombia in the Andean Parliament, intervened, highlighting the importance of the support that The Carter Center and International IDEA contribute to this initiative. He also asked why the Andean integration process was not included as an item in the Common Agenda and commented on the efforts that the Andean Parliament has been making to strengthen integration. Finally, he stressed the preeminence that the drug issue has had in the Andean agenda with the United States and acknowledged the need to diversify the international cooperation based on the recommendations provided in the Report.

Professor Consuelo Ahumada, from the Department of International Relations at the Universidad Javeriana, noted how the perspectives of academics and specialists in Andean relations overlap. She also asked why the issue of migration was not mentioned since this has become a key issue for Andean countries and their relations with Europe and the United States.

Dr. Claudia Dangond, Dean of Political Sciences and International Relations at the Universidad Javeriana, noted the importance of addressing the debate on drugs from an Andean perspective, forming a Latin American position in the debate with the United States.

Carmen Muñoz Sáenz, Coordinator of the CINEP Escuela de Paz y Convivencia Ciudadana, expressed her agreement with the Forum's proposals, especially with reference to border areas, calling for an approach to socio-economic problems that goes beyond national capitals. She also remarked that the projects mentioned should be carried out locally and through civil society, not exclusively through national politics.

Gloria Flórez, Andean Parliamentarian for Colombia, proposed that the Andean system be placed at the service of the border areas through the use of mechanisms such as border integration assemblies and civil society participation. Finally, she recommended including a perspective of peace in the Andean agenda as well as projecting Andean-Amazonian integration efforts to call on an additional actor such as Brazil.

## **Ecuador**

### *Meeting with Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kintto Lucas*

At the meeting with the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which members Adrián Bonilla, Carolina Portaluppi, Ernesto Aranibar and Camila Lanusse participated, the Report was presented to the Ecuadorian government and issues of interest regarding its foreign policy with the U.S. were addressed. The members of the Ecuadorian group emphasized the ways that the Forum could support advocacy and citizen diplomacy and explained the methodology used to prepare the Report.

Adrián Bonilla stressed that the Agenda proposes non-traditional foreign policy issues with recommendations that they be incorporated into the agendas, in addition to suggesting new approaches to recurring issues in Andean–U.S. relationship, such as commerce and drug policy. Carolina Portaluppi insisted on the need to have a dialogue between the Forum and the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry in order to establish communication with group members and take advantage of the channels for citizen diplomacy that the Forum offers. The letter sent by President Jimmy Carter and Representative Jim Kolbe promoting the renewal of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) was also mentioned to the Vice-Minister.

### *Meeting with Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade Francisco Rivadeneira*

During the meeting, Vice-Minister Rivadeneira identified the issue of trade, specifically the ATPDEA, as Ecuador's primary area of concern in its relations with the United States. He said that Ecuador was not only interested in the renewal of the ATPDEA but also in taking advantage of it to move toward the establishment of a trade agreement with the U.S. (this apparently reflects the president's thoughts as well). The Vice-Minister also stated that any advocacy in favor of renewing the ATPDEA would be very relevant for Ecuador. The letter sent by President Jimmy Carter and Representative Jim Kolbe to various U.S. representatives and government officials and the positive reactions that it elicited was also mentioned to the Vice-Minister.

### *Meeting with the CONSEP*

Ecuador's National Council to Control Drugs (CONSEP) is the governing authority on the nation's drug policy. The Report was presented to CONSEP authorities during a meeting to obtain information for the drug policy report that is currently being prepared by the Forum group on drug policy and organized crime.

### *Meeting with the Ecuadorian–American Chamber of Commerce*

At the meeting with the executive director of the Ecuadorian-American Chamber of Commerce, the Report was presented by Christian Espinosa and the Forum who discussed its development, stressing topics of interest for Ecuador and the Chamber, such as the letter from Jimmy Carter and Jim Kolbe to renew the ATPDEA. Espinosa, who praised the initiative and expressed enthusiasm with the Report, stated their interest in sharing the Report among the principal businesspeople and members of the Chamber.

### *Meeting with USAID*

Camila Lanusse met with Lucrecia Tola, the USAID official in Ecuador in charge of democratic issues. During the meeting, the Report was discussed and the most important issues addressed were trade relations and renewing the ATPDEA. To a lesser extent, drug policy was also discussed.

## **United States**

### *Public event at the Council of the Americas*

The first event carried out in the United States was open to the public and took place at the Council of the Americas office in Washington, D.C. The desired objective was to present the audience with the Report by analyzing the role of dialogue in improving relations between Colombia and Ecuador as well as Colombia and Venezuela and the implications that this could have for U.S. policy. It was attended by 35 participants, namely U.S. government officials, professionals in the field of diplomacy, academics, and members of organized civil society – all of whom received a copy of the Report. (See Annex II, section E). Three Andean members of the Forum were invited to participate: Ricardo Ávila (Colombia), Adrián Bonilla (Ecuador), and René Arreaza (Venezuela).

After the Forum's presentation, led by Jennifer McCoy and Eric Farnsworth, Hattie Babbitt summarized the Report and Marcela Sánchez opened the floor to discussion by addressing the period of change taking place in Colombia.

Ávila discussed Ecuador–Colombia relations since 2008 and Colombia–Venezuela relations under President Santos, putting particular emphasis on issues related to trade and security.

Meanwhile, Bonilla talked about the inter-dependence between Andean countries and the importance of unifying to be able to cooperate on issues that affect the entire region.

Arreaza stated how the Forum managed to create a space to reach greater mutual understanding on topics such as democracy, human rights, and drugs, stressing Venezuelans' interest in improving relations with the United States, as demonstrated by polls (71% of those surveyed expressed interest in improving bilateral relations).

The Ecuadorian Ambassador to the United States, Gallegos Chiriboga, highlighted the importance of the Report given the prevalent misperceptions of U.S. policy and the need for greater mutual understanding.

A discussion was also started regarding the strength of improving relations between countries in the region. On this topic, participants discussed the surprising and beneficial role played by President Santos to resolve pending issues with Ecuador and start anew with Venezuela.

Coletta Youngers, a Forum member, stated that the withdrawal of Colombia's objection to remove the prohibition on the coca leaf improved relations in the region.

For Steve Johnson, a Forum member, the question of preferential trade tariffs has become obsolete since commercial issues are conditional upon compliance with the goals of the war on drugs.

#### *Meeting with the Senate*

The second event was a meeting held with the advisors in the office of Senator Menendez. Participants included Adrián Bonilla, Ricardo Ávila, Jennifer McCoy and the advisors of several senators: Jodi Herman and Arnold Vela (Senator Menendez), Emily Mendrala and Meaghan Giulino (Committee on Foreign Relations), and Marin Stein (Senator Bill Nelson). The advisors who participated in the meetings work on Andean issues. The discussion focused on trade agreements, Chavez's influence in the region, social programs in Colombia, and how to change U.S. drug policy.

#### *Meeting with Congressional advisors*

The meeting was held with Peter Quilter, Ricardo Ávila, Adrián Bonilla and Jennifer McCoy. The main issue addressed was the Obama administration's attitude toward pushing forward trade agreements in 2012.

#### *Meeting with the Department of State*

The fourth meeting was held with four officials from the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs at the U.S. Department of State: Jeffrey DeLaurentis (Deputy Assistant Secretary), Kevin Whitaker (Director, Andean Affairs Office), Margy Bond (Director, Venezuela Office), and Moisés Behar (Foreign Affairs official). Ricardo Ávila, Adrián Bonilla and Jennifer McCoy were the Forum representatives who attended. The officials expressed their support for the process and highlighted the need to have dialogue at all levels. They also addressed the need to create new institutions or reinforce existing institutions and the failure of the wars on drugs.

### **Peru**

#### *Meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs José Antonio García Belaúnde*

Minister of Foreign Affairs José Antonio García Belaúnde, who was sent by President Alan García, received the members of the Peruvian group (See Annex II, section F). When this meeting took place, there was conflict between Ecuador and the United States as a result of leaked classified documents, known as "Wikileaks." Those present at the meeting stated the importance of bodies like the Forum in finding solutions to conflicts such as these and the respect accorded to former President Jimmy Carter that aids in improving relations between governments.

One of the new developments that the Peruvian group told Minister Belaúnde about was the letter that had been presented to U.S. authorities to renew the ATPDEA. Belaúnde responded that a body like the Forum could serve as a medium to discuss alternative paths to renewing the ATPDEA, suggesting permanent free trade agreements among the Congresses in order to focus on trade issues from a more long-term perspective.

### *Breakfast with the Representatives Elected to Andean Parliament*

Five Peruvian representatives elected to Andean Parliament attended the breakfast (See Annex II, section G). The main focus of analysis during the meeting was the role of Andean Parliament in integrating and reflecting on the Common Agenda Report. In this vein, the current limited interest of citizens (civil society) in integration and a body like the Andean Parliament was discussed. Additionally, Parliament Members have few initiatives to connect with civil society. According to public opinion polls, around 75% of those surveyed do not know that the Andean Parliament exists. In elections for Parliament Members, blank and null ballots summed to almost 40% of the polled results. In light of this reality, the need to create a plan to strengthen the Andean Parliament was discussed.

Issues, such as immigration, which are not typical of an agenda, should have a greater presence in discussions on common challenges. Furthermore, it was agreed that the task is to build an Andean agenda to approach relations with the United States as a group since all Andean countries border the Amazon and all produce cocaine. Closer relations are critical in facing these common challenges.

### **Venezuela**

#### *Meeting with Ambassador Bernardo Álvarez*

The Venezuelan group held a meeting with the Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States, Bernardo Álvarez, who emphatically praised the initiative, pointing out its usefulness and relevance in promoting dialogue among the Andean countries and the United States. Ambassador Álvarez recommended distributing the Report as widely as possible among the country's political actors from both ruling and opposition parties.

#### *Forum “Venezuela–U.S. Relations: Review and Prospects”*

The main activity to disseminate the Report in Venezuela was a public forum to analyze Venezuela–U.S. relations under the title of “Venezuela–U.S. Relations: Review and Prospects.” This activity was held as part of a series of forums (“Cultivating Paths to National Dialogue”) organized by the newspaper *Ultimas Noticias*, with the cooperation of the Andean–U.S. Dialogue Forum, The Carter Center, and International IDEA.

The following people helped with this activity: academics Miguel Ángel Contreras and Carlos Romero from the Universidad Central de Venezuela; former Defense Minister Orlando Maniglia; former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Milos Alcalay; and businessmen José Agustín Campos (President of Confagen) and Carlos Fernández (President of Consecomerio). Additionally, Jennifer McCoy, Director of the Carter Center Americas Program, attended as a special guest.

Fifty people attended the event, including journalists from the country's media, academics, members of NGOs, members of chambers of commerce, and diplomatic representatives (including representatives from embassies, the European Union and the OAS) – all of whom received a copy of the Common Agenda Report. In addition to those who attended in person, the forum broadcasted live to 300 people through a

website set up by the *Ultimas Noticias* especially for this event. (See Annex II, section H).

*Ultimas Noticias* is Venezuela's most well circulated newspaper and is also considered one of the most influential media outlets in the country. The public forum was well covered by the media. (See Annex III). Both print newspapers and online editions dedicated ample space to the event, quoting substantial portions of the discussions held during the meeting. In print, the forum made the front page and two entire inside pages and was thus broadcast as one of the most important issues of the day.

The event was reported in both official state media and private media. The two main television channels in the country – state-run Venezolana de Televisión (VTV) and the opposition Globovisión – prepared ample reports on the meeting and showed a substantial part of the debate during primetime. Journalist Tania Diaz, anchorperson for the VTV program “Dando y Dando,” conducted a primetime live interview with the newspaper's director, Eleazar Diaz Rangal – also a member of the Andean–U.S. Dialogue Forum – who spoke extensively about the Forum's objectives and results.

#### **4. Complementary Actions**

In order to complement the meetings with high-level government officials and other organized events, in some countries the Report was sent to influential public figures and media professionals.

In Bolivia, for instance, the Report was sent to 96 people. (See Annex IV, section A). In the United States, it was distributed to a list of pre-selected people who did not attend the event and copies were also sent to the offices of senators, representatives, and personnel at the United Nations, OAS and National Office on Drug Control. (See Annex IV, section B). In Peru, the Report was given to various experts with reference to the issue on drugs. (See Annex IV, section C)

In Ecuador, it was decided that the Report would be given to the media through the contacts of each group member and coordinator. Manual Chiriboga took charge of giving the Report to the newspaper *El Universo*, where he is a columnist; Patricia Estupiñán submitted it to the magazine *Vistazo* and *Ecauvisa*; and Fernando Vega distributed it to newspaper columnists in Cuenca. In Quito, the project coordinator spoke personally with several editorial writers and handed them copies of the Report: Gonzalo Ruiz (Deputy Assistant Director of newspaper *El Comercio*), Ana María Correa (columnist at *El Comercio*), Vicente Albornoz (columnist at *El Comercio*), Gonzalo Maldonado (columnist at *El Comercio*), Thalia Flores (columnist at *Diario Hoy*) and Diego Araujo (Editorial Director at *Diario Hoy*). The Report was also sent to Grace Jaramillo, columnist at *El Comercio* and former member of the Ecuador–Colombia Binational Dialogue Group.

Important additional actions include the publication of articles and editorials written by members of the Forum (See Annex III). Furthermore, the Forum's convening institutions – International IDEA and The Carter Center – have made the Report available on their respective websites after announcing its publication through press releases. Lastly, the Report was distributed among Colombian, U.S., and Venezuelan



journalists who participated in the Trilateral Media Dialogue Meeting held in the Carter Center office in Atlanta June 13-14, 2011.

## 5. Degree of impact achieved

The criteria used in most countries was to hold meetings with high-level government officials, such as vice presidents, foreign affairs ministers, vice-ministers of foreign affairs, and other ministers. During these meetings the Report's main points were presented and discussed.

<b>Country</b>	<b>Government Official Visited</b>
Bolivia	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Colombia	Vice President and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ecuador	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice Minister of Foreign Trade
Peru	Minister and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
United States	Senate and House advisors, officials from the Department of State
Venezuela	Ambassador to the United States

Several different kinds of events, both public and closed, were held in most countries in order to reach a previously determined audience of people involved and interested in the Report's issues. At these events, the issues discussed were recorded as well as the people who attended, along with their respective job titles or institutional affiliation. Copies of the Report were distributed to all participants.

<b>Country</b>	<b>Type of Event</b>
Bolivia	Work event with experts
Colombia	Public event at the Universidad Javeriana
Ecuador	Visits to different institutions.
Peru	Breakfast with Andean Parliament Members
United States	Public event at the Council of the Americas
Venezuela	Forum with the newspaper Ultimas Noticias

In some cases, complementary actions were conducted, such as mailing out the Report to a list of pre-selected people. Also, some Forum members wrote opinion columns on issues addressed in the Report for relevant media.

## 6. Conclusions

The dissemination was conducted using the guidelines discussed and agreed upon by Forum members and coordinators but depended on the existing resources and situations in each country. The guidelines were used as a frame of reference to disseminate the Report.

The efforts to disseminate the Forum's most important product – the Report – and foster debate about its content and its proposals can be considered quite successful, given the government officials and targeted public who were presented with the document and participated in different events. The activities conducted helped reach the target audience and made the Forum's Report known, though some additional reinforcement activities should be carried out in the coming months.

While these complementary actions greatly contributed to dissemination, it is recommended that Forum members with access to popular media use opinion columns and articles to provide continued coverage on the Report in order to achieve a greater presence in the media.

The activity that got the most media attention was the forum held in Venezuela by the newspaper *Ultimas Noticias*. Though the focus was not exclusively on the Report, the event analyzed relations between Venezuela and the United States through public activities. The quality and quantity of coverage of the Report were very significant and deserve to be taken into consideration as an example to replicate in the future when other dissemination activities are conducted.

Lastly, the fourth and last Forum meeting to take place in Lima should be taken advantage of as an opportunity to present the Report to officials of the new government administration in Peru, as well as other key public figures and international officials based in Lima. Additionally, it would be ideal to open the debate among members of the Forum on different actions that could be taken to complement and strengthen the progress made in disseminating the Report.

## **Annex I**

### Guidelines for Reports on the Dissemination of the Common Agenda Report

*The following guidelines aim to provide a basic format of the main aspects to keep in mind when presenting reports on the dissemination of the Common Agenda Report in each country.*

*The criteria for the dissemination report are the indicators agreed on by the coordinators after discussion.*

As a guide for presenting the report, the following aspects must be kept in mind in order to systematize the reports:

#### 1. Type of event conducted

This includes information on the kind of event carried out, the main objective, and whether it was successful. For instance, if a breakfast is held with editors in order to get some of the agenda items to appear in the media, it should be made clear whether there was a positive result – i.e., whether the item appeared in the media through an editorial column.

#### 2. Issues addressed during the event

Mention the issues that were dealt with and the exchanges and/or debates that ensued following the presentation. This is valuable information in order to know those aspects of the Common Agenda Report that are of greater interest.

#### 3. Number of meetings and people involved

The number of meetings held for dissemination is important to include. For instance, a visit with a government official or ambassador to present the agenda is not necessarily a proper “event,” but it still needs to be quantified by providing details on the person/people (job title/position) who participated at the meeting. The same criteria apply for the events – we must have lists of the people who participated and their title or position.

#### 4. Participants’ level of influence

Just as it is of interest to know the job title or position of the person attending an event or meeting, it is also important to determine if they form part of the advising group that was initially formed; whether they received and responded to the elite questionnaire; participated in some activity during the Americans’ visit to the country; whether they’re academics specializing in regional issues or one of the Forum’s three thematic working groups; and if they’re involved with social organizations, unions, or international and/or regional institutions. (On having this information, we can evaluate the level of impact.)

#### 5. Proposal and policy formulation

While it is possible that new proposals and policies will arise at different levels during the dissemination of the Common Agenda Report, this will most likely occur after its presentation. If proposals or policies are suggested during the Report’s dissemination, it is important to see how they flourish and whether they produce changes in certain government policies. In the event this happens after presenting the Report, please

follow up and include this information in the regular report prepared by the Forum coordinators.

6. Articles and media coverage

In the event that articles are published in the media – including those written by the Forum’s members – they should be summarized and must also include the date published, media outlet it appeared in, and link (if possible). If the article was published after this report is submitted, please include this information in the regular report prepared by the Forum coordinators.

## Annex II

### A. *List of participants at the Bolivia work meeting*

- 1) Susana Gutiérrez, newspaper *El Diario* (on behalf of its director, Jorge Carrasco)
- 2) Carola Capra, political analyst and Director of the weekly publication *Nueva Economía*
- 3) Gregorio Lanza, Director of the Political Observatory at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés and expert in drug policies
- 4) Erin Sweeney, Policy Officer at the U.S. Embassy (he read the Agenda and wrote a report for his superiors at the Embassy)
- 5) Armando Loaiza, former Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs
- 6) Ronald Grebe, President of the National Association of Bolivian Journalists (Asociación Nacional de Periodistas de Bolivia)
- 7) Gustavo Aliaga, international relations expert
- 8) Abdel Padilla, newspaper *La Razón* (on behalf of the newspaper's director, Claudia Benavente)
- 9) Yerko Ilijic, political analyst and panelist on the political analysis program El Pentágono on the PAT network
- 10) Ricardo Calla, member of the Andean Forum
- 11) Germán Choquehuanca, Andean Forum
- 12) Alfonso Ferrufino, International IDEA
- 13) Viviana Zamora, Carter Center
- 14) José María Paz, Carter Center

### B. *Participants at the meeting held in the office of Colombia's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs*

- 1) **Dr. *Mónica Lanzetta Mutis, Vice Minister of Foreign Relations***
- 2) **Dr. Carlos Arturo Morales, Americas Director in the Foreign Affairs Ministry**
- 3) Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Director of the Carter Center's Americas Program
- 4) Socorro Ramírez, political coordinator for Colombia
- 5) Ricardo Ávila, member of the Colombian group
- 6) Dionisio Lizarazo, administrative assistant with the Dialogue Forum

### C. *Participants of the dinner held at the private residence of Colombia's Vice President*

- 1) Dr. Angelino Garzón, Vice President of Colombia and member of the Binational Dialogue Group (Grupo Binacional de Dialogo, GBD Colombia–Ecuador)
- 2) Monserrat Muñoz, wife of the Vice President
- 3) Dr. Augusto Ramírez Ocampo, former Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, member of GBD Colombia–Ecuador and current Director of the Human Rights and International Relations Institute of the Universidad Javeriana
- 4) Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Director of the Carter Center's Americas Program

- 5) Socorro Ramírez, Colombian political coordinator
- 6) Dionisio Lizarazo, Administrative Assistant with the Dialogue Forum

*D. List of participants at the public event in Colombia*

- 1) Socorro Ramirez, Professor at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia
- 2) Francisco de Roux, Society of Jesus Provincial Superior
- 3) Eduardo Antonio Herrera, Rector at the Universidad Militar Nueva Granada
- 4) Hector Helí Rojas, Vice President of the Andean Parliament
- 5) Carmen Muñoz Sáenz, Coordinator for the School of Peace and Citizen Coexistence (Escuela de Paz y Convivencia Ciudadana), CINEP Programa por la Paz
- 6) Andrés Acosta, School of Peace and Citizen Coexistence, CINEP Programa por la Paz
- 7) Consuelo Ahumada Beltrán, Professor in the International Relations Department at the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
- 7) Andrea Gutierrez, Management Assistant, Human Rights and International Relations Institute of the Universidad Javeriana
- 8) Adriana Isabel Torres, Assistant Chair, Fundación Pies Descalzos
- 9) Luisa del Río Saavedra, Andean Parliament, Partido de la U
- 10) Andrés Matuk, Assistant, Andean Parliament
- 11) Mónica Junca, Assistant, Andean Parliament
- 12) Gloria Flórez, Andean Parliament, Polo Democrático Alternativo
- 13) Adriana Carrillo, Assistant, Andean Parliament
- 14) Nicolás Torres, Professor at the Universidad del Rosario
- 15) Claudia Dangond Gibsone, Dean of the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
- 16) Padre Vicente Durán Casas, S.J., Vice Rector, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
- 17) Oscar Sánchez, independent consultant
- 18) Juan Pablo Fula Sotelo, independent consultant

*E. List of attendants at the public panel at the Council of the Americas*

- 1) Isabel Albonoz, Councilor at the Ecuadorian Embassy
- 2) Hattie Babbitt, Jennings Strouss Attorneys at Law
- 3) Norman Bailey, international consultant in business and development
- 4) Diego Bassante, Third Secretary at the Ecuadorian Embassy
- 5) Efraín Baus, Minister, Ecuadorian Embassy
- 6) Miguel Benito, organization Asuntos del Sur
- 7) Major Rafael Candelario, U.S. Marine Corps
- 8) Giuliana Carducci, Department of Democratic Sustainability, OAS
- 9) Adam Center, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, U.S. Congress
- 10) Sarah Danish, Freedom House
- 11) Jordan Dansby, Catholic University of America
- 12) Richard Dawson, Dawson Associates International, Inc.
- 13) Lorenzo Diaz, Minister Counselor, Venezuelan Embassy
- 14) Caitlin Dimino, George Washington University

- 15) Christian Espinosa, Second Secretary, Ecuadorian Embassy
- 16) Javier Espinoza, Minister Counselor, Bolivian Embassy
- 17) Eric Farnsworth, Council of the Americas
- 18) Antonio Fidalgo, Portuguese Embassy
- 19) Philip French, The American Committees on Foreign Relations
- 20) Matt Gaisford, U.S. Department of Commerce
- 21) Ambassador Luis Gallegos Chiriboga, Ecuadorian Embassy
- 22) Sergio Gomez Maseri, newspaper *El Tiempo*
- 23) Stephen Johnson, Center for Strategic and International Studies
- 24) Pablo Menacho, Charge d'Affaires, Bolivian Embassy
- 25) Cory Mengual, George Washington University
- 26) Paul Moreno, Second Secretary, Ecuadorian Embassy
- 27) Joy Olson, WOLA
- 28) Jean-Louis Peta Ikambana, American Friends Service Committee
- 29) Celia Rangun
- 30) Ulrico A. Reale, Reale & Associates
- 31) Angelo Rivero Santos, Minister Counselor, Venezuelan Embassy
- 32) Marcela Sánchez-Bender, World Bank
- 33) Aaron Schumacher, Blue Star Strategies
- 34) John Walsh, WOLA
- 35) Coletta Youngers, International Drug Policy Consortium

*F. List of participants at the meeting with Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs José Antonio García Belaúnde*

- 1) José Antonio García Belaúnde, Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs
- 2) Néstor Popolizio, Peruvian Vice Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs
- 3) Claudio de la Puente, Director General of America, Peruvian Foreign Ministry
- 4) María Cecilia Rozas, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 5) Ricardo Vega Llona, Peruvian group coordinator
- 6) Jorge Ortiz, Peruvian group member
- 7) Rafael Roncagliolo, Head of the International IDEA Peru Office
- 8) Santiago Mariani, Report dissemination coordinator

*G. List of participants at the breakfast with the Andean Parliament members, Peru*

- 1) Alberto Adrianzén, Gana Perú
- 2) Hildebrando Tapia, Alianza por el Gran Cambio
- 3) Jorge Silva Dávila, Fuerza 2011
- 4) Javier Reátegui, Perú Posible
- 5) Ricardo Vega Llona, Peruvian group coordinator
- 6) Cecilia Blondet, Peruvian group member
- 7) Jorge Ortiz, Peruvian group member
- 8) Kristen Sample, Head of Andean Countries, International IDEA
- 9) Rafael Roncagliolo, Head of Peru Office, International IDEA
- 10) Santiago Mariani, Report dissemination coordinator

H. List of participants at the Forum “U.S.–Venezuelan Relations: Review and Prospects,” Venezuela

- 1) Alain Fort, First Counselor, French Embassy
- 2) Alberto Luis Arzola Márquez, B.A. in International Studies
- 3) Alexey Churikov, Chief Correspondent of the magazine *América Latina* at the Russian Academy of Sciences
- 4) Ana Huertas, First Secretary of Economy and Commerce, Delegation of the European Union in Venezuela
- 5) Aram Aharonian, freelance journalist
- 6) Carlos Fernández Gallardo
- 7) Carlos Subero, Bureau Chief, Caracas daily newspaper *La Calle* (Valencia)
- 8) Carmelo Alejandro Velásquez, post-graduate degree in Law and Political Science from the Universidad Central de Venezuela
- 9) Elianeth Hernández, journalist at Radio Nacional de Venezuela
- 10) Elides Rojas, Editor in Chief at *El Universal*
- 11) Elsy Barroeta, Information Chief at Globovisión
- 12) Ernesto Villegas, Director of newspaper Ciudad Caracas
- 13) Fermín Gutember, Confagan
- 14) Isabel Báez, Advisor at *Ultimas Noticias*
- 15) Javier Rodríguez, police officer
- 16) Jon Badiola
- 17) José Guerra, Economist
- 18) José Hurtado, Confagan
- 19) José Manuel Márquez Quesada, Public Accountant
- 20) José Ramón Martínez Gómez, sociology student at the Universidad Central de Venezuela
- 21) Juan Carlos Moncada Rosales, businessman
- 22) Juan Fuentes, Confagan
- 23) Juan Ponce, former advisor at *Ultimas Noticias*
- 24) Luis Alberto Hidalgo, International Affairs, Argentine Embassy
- 25) Manuel López, newspaper Correo del Orinoco
- 26) María Inés Delgado, Editorial Assistant at Panorama
- 27) Mauricio Tancredi, First Vice President of Consecomercio
- 28) Miguel Angel Trinidad, Representative for Venezuela at the OAS
- 29) Mikhail Fedoseev, Third Secretary at the Russian Embassy
- 30) Omaira Labrador, Editor in Chief at newspaper *La Nación* in San Cristobal
- 31) Oscar Rotundo, Deputy Advisor to Roy Daza, Representative in Venezuela’s National Assembly
- 32) Pedro Alvarez, Second Vice President of Consecomercio
- 33) Pedro Luis Segovia Sánchez, sports trainer
- 34) Pedro Suárez, lawyer
- 35) Ramón Sosa
- 36) Raquel Gamus Gallegos, Coordinator of the United States Studies Group at the Center for American Studies, Universidad Central de Venezuela
- 37) René Arreaza, lawyer
- 38) Vladimir Villegas, consultant at Unión Radio



## Annex IV

### A. List of people and institutions in Bolivia that received the Common Agenda Report:

- 1) Daniel Sánchez, President of the Confederation of Private Businesspeople in Bolivia (Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia)
- 2) Marcos Iberkleid, Manager of AMETEX (textile company)
- 3) George Satt, representative of private businessmen in La Paz
- 4) Luis Barberí, President of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce, Santa Cruz (CAINCO)
- 5) Julio Rodas, President of the Chamber of Eastern Agriculture (CAO)
- 6) Fernando Quiroga, political analyst from the city of Cochabamba
- 7) Raúl Peñaranda, Director of the newspaper *Página 7*
- 8) Gonzalo Mendieta, political and economic analyst and panelist on the political analysis program El Pentágono on the PAT network
- 9) Fernando Campero, Fundación Nuevo Norte
- 10) Juan Cristóbal Soruco, Director of the newspaper *Los Tiempos* in Cochabamba
- 11) Claudia Benavente, Director of newspaper *La Razón*
- 12) Roger Cortez, political analyst
- 13) Horst Grebe, Director of Instituto Prisma
- 14) Ronald Grebe, President of the National Association of Bolivian Journalists
- 15) Yerko Ilijic, political analyst and panelist on the political analysis program El Pentágono on the PAT network
- 16) Renán Estenssoro, Fundación para el Periodismo
- 17) Ramiro Ramírez, political analyst
- 18) Andrés Gómez, Radio Erbol, Association of Community Radios (Asociación de Radios Comunitarias)
- 19) Amalia Pando, Radio Erbol
- 20) Jimmy Iturri, News Director, Channel ATB
- 21) Gonzalo Lema, political analyst and writer
- 22) Elena Hargirakys, political analyst and former Forum member in Santa Cruz
- 23) Fernando Prado, analyst and former Forum member in Santa Cruz
- 24) Miguel Castro, political analyst, Tarija
- 25) Rodrigo Ayala, political analyst, Tarija
- 26) Waldo Albarracín, former Ombudsman
- 27) Gabriel Baracatt, Tarija
- 28) Carlos Hugo Molina, former prefect of Santa Cruz and political analyst
- 29) Gustavo Pedraza, national Senator
- 30) Guido Riveros, Director of the Fundación Boliviana para la Democracia Multipartidaria (FBDM)
- 31) Antonio Aramayo, Director of Fundación UNIR Bolivia
- 32) Gisela López, political analyst from Santa Cruz
- 33) Gustavo Guzmán, former Forum member
- 34) Carola Capra, weekly publication *Nueva Economía*
- 35) Fernanda Wanderley, economic analyst
- 36) Fernando Cajías, historian

- 37) José Antonio de Chazal, academic from Santa Cruz
- 38) Fernando Molina, political analyst and writer
- 39) María Teresa Zegada, analyst and columnist, Cochabamba
- 40) Félix Patzi, former Education Minister
- 41) Xavier Albo, writer
- 42) John Arandia, Director of Noticias Cadena A
- 43) Eduardo Pérez, Radio FIDES
- 44) José Antonio Quiroga, Prisma Institute, Director of Nueva Crónica y Buen Gobierno
- 45) Walter Limache Orellana, Director of Proyecto NINA
- 46) René Orellana, former Environment Minister
- 47) Jorge Carrasco, Director of *El Diario*
- 48) Raúl Novillo, President of the Association of Radio Broadcasters (Asociación de Radiodifusoras)
- 49) Juan Javier Zeballos, Director of the National Press Association (Asociación Nacional de la Prensa)
- 50) Pedro Glasinovic, President, of the La Paz Journalists Association (Asociación de Periodistas de La Paz)
- 51) Gustavo Aliaga, international relations expert
- 52) José Carlos Campero, political and economic analyst
- 53) Ivonne Farah, Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (UMSA)
- 54) Luis Tapia, UMSA
- 55) Gregorio Lanza, Political Observatory, UMSA
- 56) Esteban Ticona, Diplomatic Academy
- 57) Andrés Tórrrez, M.A. in Development, Universidad Católica Boliviana
- 58) Roger Tuero, Santa Cruz Political Observatory
- 59) Samuel Doria Medina, political party leader for Unidad Nacional
- 60) Juan del Granado political party leader for Movimiento Sin Miedo
- 61) Guido Vildoso, former President
- 62) Jaime Paz Zamora, former President
- 63) Jorge Tuto Quiroga, former President
- 64) Carlos Mesa, former President
- 65) Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé, former President
- 66) Gustavo Fernández, former Minister of Foreign Affairs
- 67) Armando Loayza, former Minister of Foreign Affairs
- 68) Gerbacio Condori, Union Confederation of Bolivian Rural Workers (Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia, CSUTCB)
- 69) Rafael Quispe, National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ)
- 70) Nilda Copa, Director of the “Bartolina Sisa” National Confederation of Rural Indigenous Women (Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas “Bartolina Sisa”)
- 71) Mónica Machicao, Reuters
- 72) Gabriela Orozco Asbora
- 73) Gloria Carrasco, CNN
- 74) Yoriko Yasukawa, UNDP
- 75) Armando Ortuño, UNDP
- 76) George Gray Molina, analyst and former worker at the UNDP
- 77) Antonio Aranibar Arce, UNDP

Embassies of: Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands, the United States, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Chile, Brazil and Argentina

- 78) Juan Carlos Alurralde, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
- 79) Carlos Romero, Autonomies Minister
- 80) Adolfo Mendoza, Senator for Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)
- 81) Germán Antelo, Senator for Convergencia Nacional (opposition party)

*B. List of people in the United States who received the Report*

- 1) Eric Cantor, Representative for Virginia
- 2) Nancy Pelosi, Representative for California, Kevin Brady, Representative for Texas
- 3) Jim Mc Dermott, Representative for Washington
- 4) Geoff Davis, Representative for Kentucky
- 5) Dave Reichert, Representative for Washington
- 6) Wally Herger, Representative for California
- 7) Devin Nunes, Representative for California
- 8) Vern Buchanan, Representative for Florida
- 9) Adrian Smithe, Representative for Nebraska
- 10) Aaron Schock Representative for Illinois
- 11) Lynn Jenkins, Representative for Kansas
- 12) Richard E. Neal, Representative for Massachussets
- 13) Lloyd Doggett, Representative for Texas
- 14) Joseph Crowley, Representative for New York
- 15) John B. Larson, Representative for Connecticut
- 16) Kay Granger, Representative for Texas
- 17) Nita Lowey, Representative for New York
- 18) Jesse Jackson, Representative for Illinois
- 19) Adam Schiff, Representative for California
- 20) Steve Rothman, Representative for New Jersey
- 21) Jerry Lewis, Representative for California
- 22) Frank Wolf, Representative for Virginia
- 23) Tom Cole, Representative for Oklahoma
- 24) Mario Diaz-Balart, Representative for Florida
- 25) Charles Dent, Representative for Florida
- 26) Steve Austria, Representative for Ohio
- 27) Ileana-Ros Lehtinen, Representative for Florida
- 28) Howard Berman, Representative for California
- 29) Connie Mack, Representative for Florida
- 30) Michael McCaul, Representative for Texas
- 31) Eliot Engel, Representative for New York
- 32) Jean Schmidt, Representative for Ohio
- 33) David Rivera, Representative for Florida
- 34) Christopher Smith, Representative for New Jersey
- 35) Eltron Gallegly, Representative for California
- 36) Albio Sires, Representative for New Jersey
- 37) Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, Representative for American Samoa
- 38) Donald Payne, Representative for New Jersey
- 39) Dana Rohrabacher, Representative for California

- 40) Harry Reid, Senator for Nevada
- 41) Mitch McConnell, Senator for Kentucky
- 42) Patrick Leahy, Senator for Vermont
- 43) Lindsey Graham, Senator for South Carolina
- 44) Daniel Inouye, Senator for Hawaii
- 45) Tom Harkin, Senator for Iowa
- 46) Barbara Mikulski, Senator for Maryland
- 47) Richard Durbin, Senator for Illinois
- 48) Mary Landrieu, Senator for Louisiana
- 49) Frank Lautenberg, Senator for New Jersey
- 50) Sherrod Brown, Senator for Ohio
- 51) Mark Kirk, Senator for Illinois
- 52) Roy Blunt, Senator for Missouri
- 53) Dan Coats, Senator for Indiana
- 54) Ron Johnson, Senator for Wisconsin
- 55) John Hoeven, Senator for North Dakota
- 56) Ron Wyden, Senator for Oregon
- 57) John Thune, Senator for North Dakota
- 58) John D. Rockefeller IV, Senator for West Virginia
- 59) Charles E. Schumer, Senator for New York
- 60) Debbie Stabenow, Senator for Michigan
- 61) Bill Nelson, Senator for Florida
- 62) Orrin G. Hatch, Senator for Utah
- 63) Chuck Grassley, Senator for Iowa
- 64) Mike Crapo, Senator for Idaho
- 65) Pat Roberts, Senator for Kansas
- 66) Dianne Feinstein, Senator for California
- 67) Eric Jacobstein, Majority Staff Director for the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control
- 68) Pablo Solón Romero, Bolivian Ambassador to the United Nations
- 69) Sherry Tross, Executive Secretary of the Summits of the Americas, OAS
- 70) José Miguel Insulza, Secretary General, OAS
- 71) Catalina Botero, Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression
- 72) Erika Dueñas Loayza, Business Chair, Bolivian Embassy
- 73) Nicolás Lloreda, Deputy Head of Mission, Colombian Embassy
- 74) Gabriel Silva Luján, Colombian Ambassador
- 75) Luis Valdivieso Montano, Peruvian Ambassador
- 76) Patrick M. Ward, Deputy Director of the Office to Reduce Drug Supply, National Office on Drug Control
- 77) Kristen Genovese, lawyer at the Center for International Environmental Law
- 78) Jim Kolbe, Senior Member of the German Marshall Fund of the United States
- 79) Rex Lee Jim, Vice President of the Navajo Nation
- 80) Fulton Armstrong, Member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

*C. List of people in Peru who received the Report*

- 1) Alan García, President of Peru
- 2) José Antonio García Belaúnde, Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs

- 3) Alberto Adrianzén, Andean Parliament, Gana Perú
- 4) Hildebrando Tapia, Andean Parliament, Alianza por el Gran Cambio
- 5) Jorge Silva Dávila, Andean Parliament, Fuerza 2011
- 6) Javier Reátegui, Andean Parliament, Perú Posible
- 7) Hilaria Suppa, Andean Parliament, Gana Perú
- 8) Rafael Rey, Andean Parliament, Fuerza 2011
- 9) Rómulo Pizarro, Executive President, DEVIDA (highest government body in the design of national drug policy)
- 10) Ricardo Soberón, Director of the Center for Research on Drugs and Human Rights (Centro de Investigación Drogas y Derechos Humanos)
- 11) Hugo Cabieses, economist and specialist in drugs issues at the Transnational Institute
- 12) Jaime Antezana, sociologist and analyst in drug trafficking issues
- 13) Jorge Morelli, journalist, congressional advisor for the political party Fuerza 2011
- 14) Adalid Contreras, provisional Secretary General, Andean Community of Nations

*D. List of people from Venezuela who received the Report*

- 1) Alain Fort, First Counsel, French Embassy
- 2) Alberto Luis Arzola Márquez, B.A. in International Studies
- 3) Alexey Churikov, Chief Correspondent of the magazine *América Latina* of the Russian Academy of Sciences
- 4) Ana Huertas, First Secretary of Economy and Commerce, Delegation of the European Union in Venezuela
- 5) Antonio Padrino
- 6) Carlos Fernández Gallardo
- 7) Carlos Subero, Bureau Chief, Caracas daily newspaper *La Calle* (Valencia)
- 8) Carmelo Alejandro Velásquez, post-graduate degree in Law and Political Science at the Universidad Central de Venezuela
- 9) Elianeth Hernández, journalist at Radio Nacional de Venezuela
- 10) Ely Barroeta, Information Chief at Globovisión
- 11) Fermín Gutember, Confaga
- 12) Isabel Báez, Advisor at *Ultimas Noticias*
- 13) Javier Rodríguez, police officer
- 14) Jon Badiola
- 15) José Guerra, economist
- 16) José Hurtado, Confagan
- 17) José Manuel Márquez Quesada, public accountant
- 18) José Ramón Martínez Gómez, sociology student at Universidad Central de Venezuela
- 19) Juan Carlos Moncada Rosales, businessman
- 20) Juan Fuentes, Confaga
- 21) Juan Ponce, former advisor at *Ultimas Noticias*
- 22) Luis Alberto Hidalgo, International Affairs, Argentine Embassy
- 23) Manuel López, Correo del Orinoco
- 24) Mauricio Tancredi, First Vice President of Consecomercio
- 25) Miguel Angel Trinidad, Representative for Venezuela at the OAS

- 26) Mikhail Fedoseev, Third Secretary at the Russian Embassy
- 27) Omar Lugo, Director of newspaper *El Mundo*
- 28) Oscar Rotundo, Deputy Advisor to Roy Daza, Representative in Venezuela's National Assembly
- 29) Pedro Alvarez, Second Vice President of Consecomercio
- 30) Pedro Luis Segovia Sánchez, sports trainer
- 31) Pedro Suárez, lawyer
- 32) Ramón Sosa
- 33) Raquel Gamus Gallegos, Coordinator of the United States Studies Group at the Center for American Studies, Universidad Central de Venezuela
- 34) René Arreaza, lawyer
- 35) Robert Narváez Medrano, Confagan
- 36) Roberts Cedeño, political science student
- 37) Silvia Alegrett, President of the National Council of Journalists
- 38) Teresa Holm, provisional Business Chair, Norwegian Embassy
- 39) Milos Alcalay, Former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
- 40) José Agustín Campos, President of Confagan
- 41) Miguel Angel Contreras, UCV researcher
- 42) Carlos Fernández, President of Consecomercio
- 43) Carlos Romero, Professor at UCV
- 44) Bernardo Alvarez, Ambassador to the United States
- 45) Robin Meyer, Political Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Venezuela
- 46) Luis Schilings, First Secretary, Dutch Embassy
- 47) Flavio Carucci, Representative of the Fundación Ebert in Venezuela
- 48) Alfredo Missair, Resident Representative UNDP
- 49) Ewald Scharfenberg, President, Instituto Prensa y Sociedad
- 50) Victor Hugo Febres, in charge of communications, ACNUR Venezuela



**Andean – United States Dialogue Forum  
A Report towards a Common Agenda:  
Media Coverage**

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2. Obama y los andinos
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# *El Tiempo*<sup>1</sup>

## **Diplomacia oficial e iniciativas ciudadanas**

SOCORRO RAMÍREZ

4 de marzo del 2011

Iniciativas que abren caminos y que no siempre logran el recibo oficial por sus opiniones críticas.

Hace un año parecía esotérica la idea de sentar a una misma mesa a personas influyentes de cada uno de los cinco países andinos y de Estados Unidos con el fin de analizar juntos las relaciones entre sus países. Las discrepancias mutuas estaban a la orden del día y entre algunos de ellos no existían siquiera relaciones diplomáticas.

Motivado por la labor del Grupo de Diálogo Colombia-Ecuador, que acompañó el Centro Carter, en el 2009 el ex presidente Jimmy Carter realizó una gira por varios países andinos para promover la sorprendente iniciativa. Y en febrero del 2010, en la sede del Centro, en Atlanta, el mismo ex presidente acogió como socio del proyecto a Idea Internacional, y saludó la participación de los treinta miembros andinos y los diez estadounidenses que habían aceptado el reto. La tarea no ha sido fácil, pero ha sido posible y ya ha producido buenos resultados.

El primer acercamiento estuvo marcado por mutuas desconfianzas y temores. Sin embargo, una franca conversación sobre la actual evolución interna de Estados Unidos, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Perú y Colombia generó un clima de apertura que dio paso a la decantación de temas de interés mutuo que podrían conducir a una agenda y una acción comunes. Para nutrir esa agenda, se entrevistó a una amplia gama de actores nacionales sobre lo que consideraban necesario explicar a los demás países, aquello en lo que no querían intervención externa y sobre aspectos que, a su juicio, debían contar con el respaldo internacional. Además, se aplicó una encuesta de percepciones mutuas.

En Lima, en mayo del 2010, tres grupos de trabajo iniciaron labores. Tras el debate sobre la actual política antidrogas y sus posibles alternativas, el grupo de drogas le ha formulado al gobierno colombiano audaces propuestas con miras a la cumbre de las Américas. Los comunicadores reunieron en Caracas y Bogotá a periodistas de medios nacionales y fronterizos de Colombia y Venezuela para revisar juntos cómo habían tratado los momentos más críticos de la relación en los últimos tres años y cómo pueden contribuir ahora a su reencuentro. El grupo de desarrollo estimula proyectos de integración fronteriza.

En la tercera reunión, que tuvo lugar en Washington a fines de septiembre, se llevó a cabo una estimulante interlocución con altos funcionarios del Gobierno y el Congreso, ONG relevantes y destacados personajes estadounidenses. La agenda acordada por el Foro estimuló el diálogo en torno a seis ejes: reconstruir la relación sobre una base no

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<sup>1</sup> Source: [http://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/columnistas/socorroramrez/diplomacia-oficial-e-iniciativas-ciudadanas\\_8963253-4](http://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/columnistas/socorroramrez/diplomacia-oficial-e-iniciativas-ciudadanas_8963253-4)



militarizada ni narcotizada, impulsar el desarrollo para superar la pobreza y desigualdad, estimular inversiones y comercio inclusivo, enfrentar el cambio climático, frenar el crimen transnacional, asumir la migración ligada al desarrollo y a los DD. HH. Venezolanos y colombianos, que aprovechan las reuniones para adelantar diálogos bilaterales, mostraron la necesidad de "destriangular" las relaciones con EE. UU. Y todos respaldaron un mensaje que Carter transmitió al Congreso sobre la urgencia de prorrogar el ATPDEA.

El Foro utiliza la estrategia conocida como Track 1.5, que actúa entre la diplomacia gubernamental y las iniciativas ciudadanas e involucra a personas influyentes en la opinión y con acceso a los gobiernos. Sus miembros se han reunido con ministros y vicepresidentes, y estudian la posibilidad de presentarles a algunos mandatarios distintas alternativas de acercamiento entre sus países. Estas iniciativas que construyen nexos y abren caminos no siempre logran buen recibo oficial por sus opiniones críticas. Pero los gobiernos sólo podrían ganar si examinan sus sugerencias y asumen las que consideren más beneficiosas.

## ***El Comercio***<sup>2</sup>

Manuel Chiriboga Vega

20 de marzo del 2011

### **Obama y los andinos**

El presidente Obama visita estos días tres países de la región: Brasil, Chile y El Salvador. El hacer esta gira, tardía debe decirse, reitera la voluntad de establecer nuevas relaciones con América Latina. Su viaje se produce en una coyuntura global crítica: la crisis nuclear japonesa a raíz del terremoto y tsunami y la decisión del Consejo de Seguridad de impedir vuelos militares libios que bombardean la insurgencia contra Gadafi.

La elección de países revela sentidos de política internacional, pero también las ausencias. Brasil es potencia regional y actor global, una potencia política y económica que reclama un puesto en el Consejo de Seguridad. Con la presidenta Rousseff, Obama buscará definir una alianza estratégica, del tipo logrado no hace mucho con la India: buscando coincidencias sobre aspectos globales, pero reconociendo diferencias importantes, como las relaciones con Irán, el tratamiento del acuerdo sobre uso de bases colombianas o del golpe en Honduras. Con Chile, la señal es otra, es el ejemplo que Estados Unidos postula para la región, por su modelo económico y social, cuanto como sistema político centrista, donde la transición desde la concertación a Piñera no marca ruptura significativa. Como me decía una colega, hoy, la izquierda allí reconoce la importancia del mercado y la derecha el papel del Estado; ambos defienden la estabilidad institucional. El Salvador, el pequeño pero potente país centroamericano, es también ejemplo de transición política, pero al revés, desde la derecha de Arena a la izquierda del FMLN, ambos contrincantes armados no hace mucho, pero capaces de diferir hoy en democracia. A ello se añade que la visita a El Salvador reitera el compromiso americano y espero la corresponsabilidad con los temas de seguridad y lucha contra las mafias mexicanas del narcotráfico.

No visitará la región andina, ni Colombia o Perú con quienes mantiene relaciones estrechas, ni Ecuador, con quien se ha construido una relación respetuosa, más allá de declaraciones altisonantes de algún funcionario locuaz. No llegará a países en que viven 127 millones de personas, con un PIB combinado de un billón de dólares e importaciones sobre 100 mil millones. Una región que por diversas vías de desarrollo ha crecido de manera sostenida, reducido de manera importante la pobreza y logrado mayor estabilidad de los gobiernos. Una zona que, sin embargo y a pesar de esfuerzos enormes que hacen los países, es gran productora de cultivos y procesamiento de drogas. Una región donde una visita hubiese ayudado a transformar la agenda de sus relaciones, alejándola de lo que fue aquella de los gobiernos republicanos anteriores a Obama: la seguridad y la lucha contra el narcotráfico.

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.eluniverso.com/Imprimir.htm> 3/21/2011

Como bien lo ha señalado el grupo de trabajo sobre relaciones entre los países andinos, promovida por el Centro Carter e IDEA, una nueva agenda de relaciones puede construirse sobre temas positivos y confluyentes: reducir la pobreza y mejorar la calidad y cobertura de las políticas sociales, unos acuerdos comerciales, que den mayor centralidad a los pequeños productores y a las Mypimes y mejoren las condiciones laborales, acuerdos relacionados con temas migratorios que afectan a miles de andinos en Estados Unidos, coincidencia operacional sobre temas ambientales: energías limpias o acciones dirigidas a frenar el cambio climático, promover un diálogo honesto sobre crimen organizado y narcodelincuencia, pero asegurando compromisos mutuos y corresponsabilidad entre países productores y el mayor mercado mundial de drogas.

En fin, una agenda nueva de relaciones que hubiese podido despegar aprovechando la visita. Quizás pronto haya visitas que podrían ser nuestras a Estados Unidos.

## ***Portafolio***<sup>3</sup>

### **'Acercamiento entre Colombia, Venezuela y Ecuador va por buen camino pero es frágil': Expertos**

11 de marzo de 2011

#### **Se requieren mecanismos que aseguren continuidad más allá de personalidades de sus mandatarios**

El panel de expertos reunidos en Washington a instancias del Centro Carter y del International IDEA, sirvió para lanzar oficialmente un nuevo reporte sobre las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y la Región Andina, **titulado, “Hacia una Agenda Común”**, el reporte es el resultado de un proceso de más de un año que buscó identificar diferencias y convergencias para tratar de reducir estereotipos, limitar tensiones y resolver temas comunes.

El panel estaba integrado por Jenniffer McCoy, del Centro Carter, Eric Farnsworth, del Consejo de las Américas, Hattie Babbitt, ex embajadora de E.U. ante la OEA, Adrian Bonilla, de Flasco (Ecuador), René Arreaza, ex funcionario del gobierno de Hugo Chávez y Ricardo Ávila, director de Portafolio.

Los expertos también estuvieron de acuerdo en que la llegada de Juan Manuel Santos a la presidencia de Colombia había facilitado el proceso de acercamiento y que, incluso, generó sorpresa por su disposición y pragmatismo para enfrentar la delicada relación bilateral con ambos países.

Sin embargo, de acuerdo con McCoy, era importante reconocer que los individuos “van y vienen” y de allí la necesidad de reforzar el proceso a través de mecanismos institucionales y la participación de la sociedad civil para asegurar la continuidad y limitar las tensiones cuando estas se vuelvan a presentar.

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<sup>3</sup> Source: <http://www.portafolio.co/economia/acercamiento-colombia-venezuela-y-ecuador-va-bien>

## *El Universal*<sup>4</sup>

### **ENTREVISTA: Socorro Ramírez, académica y miembro de la copiaf**

ROBERTO GIUSTI

30 de mayo de 2011

"Uribe pretende ponerle palos al giro diplomático de Santos"

"Santos comprendió necesidad de cambio en las relaciones bilaterales para evitar enfrentamiento que hubieran lamentado el resto de sus vidas" "Colombia se miraba a si misma y el lente para las relaciones internacionales era la problemática interna"

La mirada de Socorro Ramírez a la realidad colombo-venezolana no es solo la de una académica, una investigadora, una politóloga, una internacionalista o una colombiana, que también lo es desde todo esos ángulos. Obviamente hay una dosis de pasión, una postura política que en otros tiempos llamaban "progresista", sólo que asumiendo el término en su acepción original y una rica experiencia de lustros de inmersión en el tema desde la coordinación del Grupo Académico Colombia-Venezuela (UCV-Universidad Nacional), junto con su par venezolano José María Cadenas, además de su condición de miembro de la COPIAF Comisión Presidencial de Asuntos Fronterizos e Integración Colombo-Venezolana. Todo eso vale y mucho, pero sobre todo la de Socorro es una visión amplia, que pretende superar mitos, obviar lugares comunes y llega a reconocer el valor de una política constructiva que Álvaro Uribe califica de "meliflua y babosa".

**-Afirmas que Juan Manuel Santos ha dado un giro a la política exterior para abrirse al mundo antes que colocar a éste en la tesitura de ocuparse de los problemas internos colombianos. Eso suena bien, ¿pero es aplicable en el caso de Venezuela si consideramos que el proceso de integración, en la esfera de lo negativo, entre ambos, los obliga a soluciones conjuntas para resolver problemas como guerrilla, narcotráfico y paramilitares?**

-Cada vez veo nuevos indicadores sobre el propósito de Juan Manuel Santos de acercarse al mundo, y en particular a los vecinos, Latinoamérica y el Caribe, desde las oportunidades más que desde las diferencias. Me parece un giro necesario. Colombia se miraba a si misma haciendo abstracción de los cambios que ocurrían a su alrededor y en el mundo. El lente para sus relaciones internacionales era la problemática interna. En el gobierno anterior esa problemática se reducía a la guerrilla.

**-¿No resulta un tema vital el de la guerrilla?**

-Es más productivo para Colombia y Venezuela asumir la complicadísima problemática de seguridad que comparten, superando la estéril recriminación mutua de "por qué los dejó entrar" o "por qué los dejó salir". Es hora de aceptar que por décadas los dos países

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<sup>4</sup> Source: <http://www.eluniversal.com/2011/05/30/uribe-pretende-ponerle-palos-al-giro-diplomatico-de-santos.shtml>

han favorecido el desarrollo de una cruda realidad por ausencia o precaria presencia de los dos Estados en la mayor parte de la frontera común. Se construye una mejor aproximación a la maraña de problemas transfronterizos si se asume que las fronteras no son sólo contrabando, irregularidad, criminalidad. Ambos países ofrecen oportunidades ventajosas. Si se inscribe en ese marco la necesidad vital de una buena vecindad y de integración fronteriza, binacional, latinoamericana, caribeña, amazónica, los esfuerzos para revertir el desgobierno en las fronteras se vuelven imperativos.

**-En Venezuela causó extrañeza que el ministro de la Defensa de Álvaro Uribe, dentro de ese timonazo, una vez convertido en presidente, optara por el borrón y cuenta nueva, mientras las FARC siguen operando en nuestro territorio. ¿A qué atribuyes esa actitud?**

-Con su sentido pragmático de las realidades políticas, Santos entendió como, luego de tres años de tensión que casi lleva a los dos países a enfrentamientos que hubieran lamentado el resto de sus días, era necesario el giro e hizo de su posesión una oportunidad para que la necesidad de ambos gobiernos de rehacer sus relaciones mutuas se transformara en voluntad compartida de normalización. Y es que la situación de las fronteras no se resuelve solo con denuncias y señalamientos internacionales, menos aun cuando estos son parciales, como sucedió cuando Uribe denunció la presencia de las FARC y el ELN en territorio venezolano, pero no habló de los paramilitares. Más habrían alcanzado Uribe y Chávez en el campo de la seguridad si hubieran continuado la cooperación que mantuvieron entre el 2003 y 2007, cuando se plantearon las conexiones interoceánicas y la realización de obras de infraestructura indispensables para la frontera (acueductos, puentes, vías, gasoducto). Si se transformaran en socios estratégicos con proyectos como el poliducto, (salida venezolana al Pacífico por Colombia), habría mejores condiciones para resolver conjuntamente asuntos como el de la economía, la guerra y la droga.

**-Llamó la atención el silencio del gobierno colombiano sobre la reciente divulgación, por parte de un instituto británico, de los contenidos de las computadoras de Reyes, aun cuando Santos cuestiona la decisión de la Corte para invalidarlos como pruebas. ¿Hubo presión, desde Colombia, para resucitar el debate sobre el tema?**

-El Gobierno no guardó silencio. Dijo, para sus homólogos vecinos, que declaraba cerrado ese capítulo. Ahora, ante el sorpresivo fallo de la Corte sobre la invalidez jurídica de los documentos hallados en los computadores de Reyes, el presidente Santos defiende su validez probatoria. Pero más que afectar las relaciones con Ecuador o Venezuela, el fallo de la Corte pone en entredicho importantes procesos judiciales en Colombia, España, Canadá, EEUU y hasta en la Corte Penal Internacional (ésta solicitó oficialmente una copia) que tengan los documentos de las computadoras guerrilleras como prueba central. Pero claro que hay presión interna en Colombia para resucitar el tema y ponerle palos en la rueda al giro de Santo en su relación con Venezuela y Ecuador.

**-¿Proviene esas presiones del ex presidente Uribe?**

-Por su empeño en defender su gobierno ahora que surgen desde los estrados judiciales tantos cuestionamientos a su política de "todo vale" y por su obsesión con las FARC, el

ex presidente Uribe desconoce, una vez más, que el único problema de Colombia no es esa guerrilla. También se está oponiendo a la ley de reparación de las víctimas y de devolución de las tierras usurpadas, proceso esencial para consolidar el giro externo pero, sobre todo, para enfrentar uno de los problemas que más ha alimentado la confrontación.

**-Hablas de una diplomacia efectiva que concrete la cooperación.**

-No era necesario que Santos llamara a Chávez "mi nuevo mejor amigo". Lo que se requiere es despersonalizar e institucionalizar las relaciones. La diplomacia de Santos debe ser sobria y eficaz. Uribe y Chávez fueron intensos en el acercamiento (aún se recuerdan sus mutuos coqueteos electorales) e intensos en su distanciamiento. Las relaciones no estridentes ayudan a tramitar o al menos a administrar diferencias insolubles. Se trata de dos proyectos políticos, económicos y de inserción internacional muy distintos, pero no solo deben convivir sino que están obligados a aprovechar las oportunidades de la vecindad.

**-El canje de Becerra por Makled es un gesto mutuo de buena voluntad que le provocó a Chávez el repudio de sus partidarios más radicales. Tanto él como Santos están siendo bombardeados (metafóricamente) por sus propios aliados. Tanto sacrificio ¿no implica que se podría estar cocinando un acuerdo de paz con las FARC teniendo a Chávez, una vez más, como mediador?**

-No se si se cocina un nuevo proceso de paz. En Colombia hay un consenso muy grande en que no deben repetirse los errores del pasado e iniciar negociaciones o intentos de mediación utilizados luego por las FARC para ejercer protagonismo, impulsar su agenda y fortalecerse en la confrontación. Las guerrillas colombianas deberían aceptar el reiterado llamado del presidente Chávez y terminar una guerra que sólo sirve para destruir.

**-¿Te imaginas a las FARC reinsertadas como partido político tomando en cuenta las experiencias previas en la materia (Unión Patriótica, M 19, paramilitares) y las singularidades de una guerrilla acusada de narcotráfico y terrorismo?**

-Ojalá las FARC y ELN entiendan que no van para ningún lado con la lucha armada, que hoy la izquierda en América Latina logra mucho más desde las elecciones y el poder que desde las trincheras. Su impopularidad ha crecido tanto que entre más se demoren en negociar menos espacio político tendrán. Para crear las condiciones de un proceso de paz el Estado debe desmontar los factores que impedirían la consolidación de una verdadera decisión de las guerrillas de abandonar la lucha armada. Debe garantizarles, ante todo, la vida y sus legítimos derechos.

### **“Las relaciones entre los países andinos y los Estados Unidos.: conflicto o diálogo.”**

Camila Lanusse

22 de marzo de 2011

En los próximos días, el Presidente estadounidense, Barack Obama, visitará América Latina, los destinos son Brasil, Chile y El Salvador. Si bien en la Región Andina se encuentran dos de los países con los que Estados Unidos mantiene muy buenas relaciones, Colombia y Perú, el viaje no incluye la región.

Sin embargo, la visita vuelve relevante las relaciones entre los andinos y el país norteamericano. Como lo señala el Informe “Hacia una Agenda Común para los Países Andinos y los Estados Unidos”, producto de un proceso de diálogo entre personalidades de la sociedad civil de Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Estados Unidos, Perú y Venezuela, auspiciado por el Centro Carter e IDEA Internacional, las oportunidades, desafíos y amenazas para los intereses nacionales de estos cinco países y los Estados Unidos son comunes, requieren de acciones conjuntas y de comprensión mutua y ser abordados a través de una agenda común.

El desarrollo, la superación de la pobreza y la desigualdad son intereses compartidos. Hay un acuerdo firme acerca de la necesidad de promover una agenda social, más allá del enfoque tradicional del comercio e inversión de los Estados Unidos. Los andinos identifican la necesidad de *desmilitarizar* y *desnarcotizar* las relaciones como condición para la ayuda para el desarrollo. El cuidado del medio ambiente, los derechos humanos, la migración, el combate al crimen organizado también son temas de la agenda.

Existe ambivalencia frente al enfoque tradicional de la promoción de la democracia, que en ocasiones suele ser percibido como injerencia en los asuntos internos de los países y es sin duda un punto de división y un tema difícil de abordar sin generar disgustos entre los Estados. Una discusión amplia y profunda sobre el tema está pendiente, una alternativa es incluir en esta concepción la protección de los derechos sociales y económicos, además de los políticos y civiles.

Estos temas son abordados por cada país con visiones políticas distintas y/u ocupan un rango distinto en las prioridades de cada uno. Desde los Estados Unidos las prioridades de política exterior, seguridad y los problemas internos han limitado el camino hacia la construcción de una relación de socios con los andinos, como lo planteó el presidente Obama durante la Cumbre de las Américas en el 2009. En los países andinos las prioridades en los temas de las relaciones no siempre coinciden con las de los Estados Unidos.

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<sup>5</sup> Source: <http://www.quantum-informe.com>



## **Tensiones y problemáticas que cruzan las fronteras**

Las diferencias generan tensiones en las relaciones, que no se circunscriben únicamente al ámbito bilateral con los Estados Unidos, sino también a las relaciones entre vecinos al interior de la Región. En más de una ocasión la relación bilateral de los Estados Unidos con cada país, y especialmente con Colombia, ha sido el detonante de un desacuerdo o un conflicto entre vecinos. Conflictos que como resultado profundizan los problemas que deben afrontar los ciudadanos.

La presencia de actores ilegales armados, el crimen organizado son problemáticas que no respetan las fronteras. Las diferencias ideológicas vulneran las frágiles relaciones diplomáticas y terminan por afectar no solo el comercio y las oportunidades de integración, sino también la cotidianidad y el desarrollo de quienes habitan las zonas de frontera, donde bastas áreas de territorio carecen hoy día de una presencia efectiva del Estado y se prestan para las actividades ilícitas.

Así, las temáticas que debe enfrentar cada uno de los seis países afectan al conjunto. Por poner solo algunos ejemplos, la producción, el tráfico, el tránsito y también el consumo de drogas se han convertido en una amenaza global, transnacional que requiere de soluciones multilaterales. Una de las principales fuentes de tensión entre los andinos y los Estados Unidos ha sido la política estadounidense para la lucha antinarcóticos.

Los países andinos se sienten cada vez más afectados por las consecuencias que sobre sus instituciones han traído la falta de coordinación de la política antinarcóticos con los Estados Unidos y, por el incremento del crimen organizado que debilita la capacidad de respuesta del Estado ante sus ciudadanos. Los países andinos reclaman la necesidad de un enfoque multilateral que reconozca la heterogeneidad de la región y también un debate sobre el aparente agotamiento de la política de drogas vigente, basada en el militarismo y el prohibicionismo. Las fronteras han demostrado ser muy permeables al crimen organizado, los problemas de desarrollo de las zonas fronterizas requieren de estrategias binacionales que a su vez dependen de una cooperación más efectiva y alineada, en la medida de lo posible, a los intereses de los países beneficiarios.

## **Oportunidades para la acción conjunta**

En este mismo escenario, algunos de estos países andinos, cada uno a su manera, con aciertos y desaciertos, han buscado replantear su relación con los Estados Unidos como una relación de iguales, tanto a través de los foros multilaterales, como en su relación bilateral. Dos ejemplos son Ecuador y Colombia.

Bajo el actual gobierno, el Ecuador propuso a Estados Unidos un mecanismo de diálogo bilateral como una manera de posicionar sus intereses en la relación con uno de sus principales socios comerciales, la cual busca ir más allá de un intercambio comercial para incorporar también como prioridades la cooperación para el desarrollo y temas de carácter más político como la migración. Una tercera reunión bilateral está por darse en las próximas semanas, en un escenario donde el país ha dejado de gozar de las ventajas del ATPDEA cuya posible extensión podría ser de muy corto plazo ante el compromiso de representantes estadounidenses de presionar y acelerar la aprobación del TLC con Colombia. En los medios de comunicación se ha anunciado la posible participación de Arturo Valenzuela, Subsecretario de Asuntos Hemisféricos, en la misma. A su vez el

Ecuador estaría preparándose para jugar un rol estratégico que le permita sacar provecho de la misma, con un mayor enfoque en sus intereses, que le podría permitir moverse, en alguna medida, de las posiciones ideológicas a una relación más pragmática.

Colombia, percibida como el socio estratégico de los Estados Unidos en la región también ha buscado marcar su cancha y buscar una imagen independiente de su principal cooperante y socio comercial. Bajo el liderazgo del Presidente Juan Manuel Santos, el vecino del norte ha dado señas y concretado acciones en busca de una mejor relación con el resto de países de la región y América Latina, a la vez que le ha exigido a los Estados Unidos el cumplimiento de su compromiso en relación a la aprobación del TLC. La actual administración se encuentra trabajando en reparar sus lazos con Ecuador y Venezuela. A su vez el país mira con determinación al mercado asiático, bajo la premisa de diversificar sus socios estratégicos.

La necesidad de consulta, de prestar atención a las prioridades de cada país y a sus problemas internos es clave para alcanzar una agenda compartida que facilite el diálogo, limite el conflicto y tienda a una cooperación adecuada que permita potenciar las oportunidades de desarrollo y hacer frente de forma más efectiva a la amenazas.

## ***Página Siete***<sup>6</sup>

La Paz, Bolivia - 15/7/2011 9:38 AM

### **Peor es nada: Otra agenda es posible**

El cuestionamiento del Gobierno a la Convención de 1961 por el mantenimiento de la prohibición del acullicu de hoja de coca saca a relucir una faceta más de las desavenencias con Estados Unidos, cuyas autoridades son acusadas de obstaculizar la campaña de despenalización que emprendió Bolivia hace varios meses.

Es otra de las razones que impidieron la suscripción de un nuevo acuerdo bilateral y el pleno restablecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas. Tarea ardua, sin duda, llena de kutivueitas. Y como telón de fondo, obviamente, el tema de la lucha contra el narcotráfico que pone en evidencia otro choque de perspectivas respecto a las políticas públicas contra este delito.

En ese contexto es importante resaltar la publicación de un informe suscrito por varias personalidades que conforman la Comisión Global de Política de Drogas, entre ellas cinco ex mandatarios y un ex secretario general de la ONU, que concluye dictaminando el total fracaso de la lucha contra las drogas, una “guerra” propiciada por EEUU desde los años 80.

Las recomendaciones caen por su propio peso, es decir, se trata de la búsqueda de políticas para la regulación legal de las drogas, entre otras acciones. Así de complejo es el tema en sus aristas nacionales y globales, pero también en su dimensión regional, entre los países andinos y su relación con Estados Unidos. Más aún si los resultados electorales en Perú pueden fortalecer el “giro a la izquierda” que predomina en el continente y debilitar aún más la influencia norteamericana en la región, quizás por eso Obama recibió a Humala al margen de protocolos. Y por eso la incertidumbre acerca del derrotero del nuevo gobierno peruano.

No obstante, al margen de los avatares gubernamentales en uno y otro lado, es importante resaltar una iniciativa que, desde principios de 2010, impulsan el Centro Carter e IDEA Internacional para propiciar la elaboración de una agenda compartida entre Estados Unidos y los países de la región andina. Una iniciativa basada en las labores de un Foro de Diálogo Andino-Estadounidense conformado por académicos, periodistas, ex funcionarios gubernamentales, empresarios y políticos de los seis países, bajo la inspiración de Jimmy Carter, cuya lucidez y convicción democrática y, sobre todo, su sensibilidad hacia nuestra región no tienen parangón en las filas de la élite política estadounidense.

Este Foro elaboró un documento que sistematiza las opiniones de sus miembros y de varias personalidades del mundo social y político de los distintos países. Este documento empezó a ser socializado en el primer semestre de este año con el título

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<sup>6</sup> Source: <http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-07-15/Opinion/Destacados/18Opi00215-07-11-P720110714VIE.aspx>

“Hacia una agenda común para los países andinos y los Estados Unidos” y plantea la necesidad de “buscar nuevas formas de tener mejores relaciones' basadas en el respeto y en la inclusión de los intereses de ambas partes”. Y como punto de partida se formula la moción de “des-militarizar” y “des-narcotizar” la arena de relaciones internacionales.

En ese sentido, se privilegia una perspectiva de “agenda social” que comprende ampliar los temas de desarrollo sin circunscribirlos al comercio y la inversión, los cuales además deben contemplar la participación de los sectores sociales afectados y ajustarse a normas ambientales.

Precisamente, el tema medioambiental exige promover “energía limpia” y protección de bosques y glaciares en una mirada que privilegia la seguridad alimentaria. Otros temas cruciales, pero que son abordados con percepciones disímiles, tienen que ver con democracia y seguridad ciudadana.

Respecto a la democracia se sugiere despejar las dudas respecto a la “promoción” democrática que promueve Estados Unidos y que es percibida como “injerencia” en algunos países; por ende, se trata de proteger los derechos humanos en general, incluyendo los derechos sociales y económicos; y también se sugiere mayor protección a la labor periodística, así como analizar la concentración de propiedad mediática y sus efectos en el pluralismo. Las políticas de seguridad ciudadana, por su parte, no deben limitarse a los aspectos convencionales ligados al comercio ilegal de drogas sino a las diversas facetas del crimen organizado transnacional. Estos tópicos, y la manera de abordarlos, muestran que “otra agenda es posible” y, en ese afán, los esfuerzos desplegados por el Foro de Diálogo Andino-Estadounidense constituyen una iniciativa interesante que, como varias iniciativas de sociedad civil, está a la espera de las reacciones gubernamentales y busca eco en la opinión pública.

*Fernando Mayorga es sociólogo.*

# *La Republica*<sup>7</sup>

## **La otra agenda de un diálogo**

26/07/2011

Cuando George W. Bush asumía la presidencia su prédica hacia los “buenos amigos al sur de la frontera” auguraba, a comienzos del siglo, una era de relaciones fructíferas entre EEUU y A. Latina. El ataque terrorista del 11-S cambiaría drásticamente las prioridades de la política exterior norteamericana y su forma de relacionarse con el mundo. El unilateralismo del gobierno de Bush impuesto bajo endebles justificaciones y sustentado en el uso del poder militar para afrontar la “guerra contra el terrorismo” dañaría profundamente las relaciones y la posibilidad de construir consensos con los “buenos amigos” de la región.

La llegada a la Casa Blanca del primer afroamericano, Barak Obama, portaba el simbolismo e idealismo necesario para generar la esperanza de una nueva etapa. En este contexto auspicioso el expresidente Jimmy Carter realiza en 2009 una gira a los países andinos para recoger opiniones sobre el estado de las relaciones, los desafíos existentes y las posibles formas de abordarlos en conjunto. Luego de las consultas propone auspiciar desde el Centro Carter, convocando también para esta empresa a IDEA Internacional, un proceso de diálogo entre académicos, miembros de la sociedad civil, exfuncionarios de gobiernos, periodistas y empresarios de Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, EEUU, Perú y Venezuela. El Foro de Diálogo, consolidado como un espacio ciudadano a partir de visitas bilaterales que buscaron fomentar un mayor conocimiento de las distintas realidades y tres encuentros generales de todos sus miembros, logró plasmar el Informe: “Hacia una Agenda Común entre los Países Andinos y los EEUU”.

El informe, que representa un significativo aporte al debate de las relaciones andino-estadounidenses, logra sistematizar, a través de una consulta a líderes y a la opinión pública de los seis países, las áreas donde existe un terreno común para la cooperación y aquellas donde prevalece la ambivalencia y la divergencia. En cuanto a los consensos, destaca la necesidad de discutir nuevos enfoques para políticas migratorias, el impulso de una agenda social para lograr mayores niveles de inclusión e igualdad y la adopción de normativas que protejan el ambiente. Como divergencia señala la promoción de la democracia desde los EEUU y su percepción como una forma de ingerencia mientras que entre las divergencias aparece el tema del narcotráfico frente al agotamiento de las políticas existentes para combatirlo.

La construcción de este instrumento colectivo, que representa otra agenda posible en las relaciones entre los andinos y estadounidenses, deja planteada a los gobiernos los caminos alternativos para el abordaje de los desafíos y las problemáticas que afectan a estos países. La consideración de esta iniciativa y sus propuestas será en beneficio de los gobiernos y de los ciudadanos que representan.

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<sup>7</sup> Source: <http://www.larepublica.pe/print/370663>

### **“Andinos-EEUU: ¿Es posible una Agenda Común?”**

José Luis Exeni

27 de junio de 2011

Deliberaciones. Si los estados, los gobiernos, no logran dialogar, ¿por qué no habrán de hacerlo las sociedades? O mejor: si los líderes políticos, con arreglo a intereses y valores, no consiguen ponerse de acuerdo y construir una agenda común, ¿qué nos impide, como ciudadanas y ciudadanos, también con arreglo a valores e intereses, discutir-proponer cimientos, sendas, enfoques, prioridades?

Con esa convicción, desde enero de 2010 se está impulsando una importante iniciativa, asaz meritoria, de diálogo andino-estadounidense con el propósito declarado, nada desdeñable, de explorar y en su caso alentar nuevas formas de relación entre Estados Unidos y los cinco países andinos. Tender puentes, desde el espacio público, sin ingenuidad, en lugar de dinamitarlos.

¿Cómo avanzar en esta búsqueda compartida? Creo que lo fundamental radica en la premisa: a contra corriente de la tradición de intervencionismo y de “relaciones” asimétricas (imposiciones, más bien), ahora el desafío consiste en abonar un terreno común para la cooperación bajo el principio categórico del respeto. Y es que con intimaciones, lo sabemos, no hay comunicación posible.

Así pues, el Foro de Diálogo, que cuenta con el apoyo del Centro Carter y de IDEA Internacional, en poco tiempo y de manera informal, ha obtenido resultados destacables: formación de grupos de trabajo en cada país, sesiones de diálogo con participantes de los seis países, reuniones-visitas bilaterales de (re)conocimiento y, lo más relevante, la elaboración de una propuesta de agenda común.

Ahora bien, considerando los vínculos diferenciados que existen entre Estados Unidos y cada uno de los países andinos (relaciones entusiastas con unos, más bien tensas con otros), y habida cuenta de la persistencia de temas que enfrentan, estereotipos que separan, contraseñas que bloquean, ¿es realmente posible avanzar, como se propone el Foro, hacia una agenda común?

La iniciativa está planteada. Y de entrada resulta fundamental que, desde nuestra diversidad y sin renunciar a nuestros procesos de transformación-desarrollo,

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<sup>8</sup> Source: <http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-06-28/Opinion/Destacados/18Opi00128-06-11-P720110628MAR.aspx>

acreditemos seriamente la necesidad/posibilidad, por una parte, de relaciones entre iguales (sin condicionamientos) y, por otra, de vínculos de cooperación “desmilitarizados” y “desnarcotizados” (sin “certificaciones”). No es poca cosa. El solo planteamiento ahuyenta estigmas.

Más todavía. Considerando, por supuesto, el interés nacional en cada caso (y también el posicionamiento subregional andino, desde el Sur), la agenda común del Foro de Diálogo hace un significativo aporte al identificar, en las percepciones de líderes y de ciudadanos, temas en los que existen acuerdos firmes y aquellos otros en los que prevalece la ambivalencia y la divergencia.

Hay consenso, por ejemplo, en la necesidad de impulsar, más allá del solo comercio e inversión, políticas para promover la igualdad y luchar contra la pobreza. Aquí habitan, como ejes, el intercambio justo y la inclusión. Ello incluye, desde luego, políticas migratorias de nuevo tipo. También existe acuerdo general respecto a la promoción de energía limpia y la protección del medio ambiente.

¿Y las ambivalencias y divergencias? La agenda de seguridad ciudadana es una de ellas. Aquí los formuladores de políticas habrán de requerir otros enfoques. Y también es de alta sensibilidad –diría que hasta de franco rechazo– la agenda estadounidense de “promoción” de la democracia. ¿Cuál democracia? ¿Qué derechos humanos? ¿Quién promueve-exporta qué? ¿Con qué parámetros?

Andinos-Estados Unidos. Otra forma de relación es ineludible. Una nueva agenda común es necesaria. Y útil. Bajo esta cobertura, por ejemplo, podrían darse los pasos que faltan, ora prácticos, ora simbólicos, para que Bolivia y Estados Unidos, sin más demora –libres de Goldbergs y de altisonancias–, suscriban un acuerdo marco y restablezcan relaciones diplomáticas “de tú a tú”.

*José Luis Exeni es comunicador social.*



## **Andean – United States Dialogue Forum**

### **First Meeting between Venezuela-Colombia Media Professionals Caracas, November 23, 2010**

The relationship between Colombia and Venezuela has been described as a delicate balance. The fragile stability in diplomatic relations between the two countries has led to a call for dialogue to promote mutual understanding and thereby avoid relapse into another political Venezuelan-Colombian crisis. The dynamism that plays into their bilateral relations, compounded by the way the media reports on such interactions, have hindered improvement and stability between the two nations. At the same time, in Venezuela, the media have become increasingly more polarized according to their political affiliations.

With the recent resumption of Colombian-Venezuelan diplomatic relations on August 10, 2010, the need has become evident to create a deepened understanding between the two countries. Similarly, the media has been identified as an important tool for the strengthening and transformation of diplomatic relations due to its ability to inform and the role it plays in both societies.

With the goal of supporting the first steps each government has taken, The Carter Center invited a group of journalists and academics from Colombia and Venezuela to discuss the role of media with respect to diplomatic relations. The meeting was set up to facilitate the exchange of information, perspectives, and experiences between the Colombian and Venezuelan participants.

Organized by the Program to Strengthen Journalism in Venezuela and under the media working group under the Andean-U.S. Dialogue Forum, the first of two planned dialogue meetings between high-level media representatives from Colombia and Venezuela took place in Caracas on November 23, 2010. Editors and directors representing both pro-government and pro-opposition media in Venezuela, and professionals representing a wide range of political affiliations from Colombia participated in the dialogue. The meeting aimed at analyzing and discussing both the bilateral relationship and the media coverage of the main bilateral issues in both countries.

The program was divided into two parts: the first part was aimed at analyzing the bilateral relation between both countries, while the second part was aimed at analyzing the journalistic coverage of that relationship. The morning session was moderated by renowned Venezuelan journalist (and former ambassador to Brazil and Mexico),



Vladimir Villegas, and the afternoon session was moderated by noted Colombian journalist and ethics expert, Javier Darío Restrepo.

*The morning session.* Former Venezuelan Ambassador to Colombia (2005-2006), Pavel Rondon, gave an opening key note presentation on the characteristics of the Venezuelan-Colombian relationship over the last ten years. Two discussants, Ana Maria Sanjuan from Venezuela, and Socorro Ramírez, from Colombia, analyzed and commented the presentation.

During the ensuing discussion session, the participants pointed to some of the vulnerabilities in the recently restored diplomatic relations. Among other things, it was pointed out that without establishing institutional mechanisms that could outlast personal dynamics, the new “honeymoon” between the Colombian and Venezuelan presidents could break down again at any moment. They also noted that the strong economic interdependence reining in political conflict in the past no longer provided the same constraint. With the freeze in trade in 2008, Colombian producers have successfully diversified and no longer depend on exports to Venezuela. Venezuela is no longer its second trade partner after the U.S. Similarly, Venezuela has diversified its source of imports.

The participants also analyzed how the security relationship (guerrillas and drugs crossing the border), the strong presence of migrants on both sides of the border, and the intertwined border economies demand cooperation. The resolution of the U.S. military base cooperation agreement with Colombia and President Santos’ opening to South America to reduce its extreme dependence on the United States both bode well for the Venezuelan relationship as it helps to de-triangulate the U.S.-Colombia-Venezuela nexus.

*The afternoon session.* The afternoon session was devoted to the media coverage of the Colombia-Venezuela bilateral issues. The media representatives carried out an important self-criticism, noting the politicization of their coverage of the bilateral relationship, the Colombian media’s tendency to adopt ex-president Uribe’s criticisms of Venezuela without questioning, and the Venezuelan media’s tendency to adopt either Chávez’ version (government media) or Uribe’s position (opposition media) without question. They also identified their own tendency to report on presidential declarations and threats without contextualizing or interpreting them, and their failure to report on larger issues about the other country to help their readers understand better each country, beyond the personalities of the presidents.

*Accomplishments.* Among other achievements, one main accomplishment is that the meeting successfully involved high-profile Venezuelan director and editors from both the public and private sectors. Due to the acute polarization in Venezuela, organizing meetings where both sectors participate is practically impossible. The political and ideological differences between the two sides are seen as irreconcilable because there is no conceivable common ground on which to discuss conflicting perspectives. Professionals who identify with the “Bolivarian” process simply do not meet with professionals who question or oppose this process and vice versa. In the past three years, the only exceptions to this rule were the spaces provided by the Carter Center through its project on Strengthening Professional Journalism in Venezuela. The first meeting between Colombian and Venezuelan journalists allowed for the interchange of

views and opinions and debate over specific topics, which should be considered an added benefit of considerable importance.

*Next meeting.* The next dialogue meeting is planned for early February in Bogotá. The project aims to conduct a content analysis of media headlines to provide inputs to the analysis of that meeting. A third meeting is planned in a city in an area near the border (like Cucuta), to debate issues pertaining to the everyday coverage of border issues, like drug-trafficking.



## **Andean – United States Dialogue Forum**

### **First Meeting of Venezuela-Colombia Media Professionals: Media Coverage**

**Globovisión<sup>9</sup>**

#### **Periodistas latinoamericanos denuncian persecución contra medios de comunicación**

23/11/2010

Como parte del Programa para el Fortalecimiento del periodismo en Venezuela auspiciado por el Centro Carter, directores, editores y académicos de los medios de Colombia y Venezuela debatieron el tema de la labor periodística y cómo influye este en las relaciones bilaterales.

En el encuentro estuvo Javier Darío Restrepo, maestro de la Fundación Nuevo Periodismo Iberoamericano; Francisco Miranda, editor de Política de El Tiempo de Bogotá; Eleazar Díaz Rangel, editor de Últimas Noticias y Vladimir Villegas, locutor de Unión Radio.

Los ponentes colombianos lamentaron que se persiga y se intente cerrar medios de expresión. Dicen que en Latinoamérica se repite esta situación: en Colombia y México por la acción de grupos terroristas, guerrilleros y narcotraficantes y en Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia y Venezuela por la persecución de los gobiernos.

Díaz Rangel, por su parte, sin entrar en detalles y dar ejemplos específicos, aseguró que los medios han asumido un rol político.

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<sup>9</sup> Source: <http://www.globovision.com/news.php?nid=170099>

# Cuidad de Caracas<sup>10</sup>

## Sucedió en Catia

24 noviembre 2010 @ 8:36 pm In Venezuela,Voces CCS

### ERNESTO VILLEGAS POLJAK

#### LETRA TERCA

José Luis iba en moto por la calle principal de Los Flores de Catia. Acabábamos de convenir, por teléfono, en reunirnos en el centro. Hacia allá iba cuando, de pronto, oyó disparos. Siete en total. Dos alcanzaron su cuerpo, derribándolo al piso. Uno en la espalda, cerca de la columna vertebral, y otro en el brazo derecho. Detrás de él venían, a toda velocidad, otros dos motorizados que por poco le pasan por encima cuando ya estaba en el pavimento. Segundos después llegan al sitio, por la misma vía, tres motos blancas oficiales con dos uniformados de la GNB cada una. Seis hombres que al parecer iban en persecución de aquellos sujetos.

“No soy un malandro, yo trabajo en la Alcaldía”, les dice José Luis, previendo cualquier confusión.

Se sintió hombre muerto cuando uno de los guardias sacó una pistola del interior de una de sus botas mientras otro decía: “Le dimos al que no era... ¡mátalo!”.

La macabra escena la relata el propio José Luis Cacique, supervisor de distribución de Ciudad CCS y estudiante de la Unefa, desde su lecho de herido. Le creo. ¿Qué necesidad tiene de inventar algo semejante?

#### Uso responsable de la fuerza

El nuevo modelo policial que pretende implantar la Revolución Bolivariana supone un uso restringido, excepcional y responsable de las armas de fuego por parte de los funcionarios de todos los cuerpos de seguridad del Estado. No sólo los de la Policía Nacional Bolivariana.

Digámoslo así: que un malandro dispare a diestra y siniestra, o huya a toda velocidad del lugar donde cometió un delito, no autoriza a la autoridad para imitar esa conducta, como en una película de vaqueros.

No por azar las víctimas de “enfrentamientos” y situaciones de “fuego cruzado” suelen ser ciudadanos comunes, que nada tienen que ver con ilícitos. De situaciones así un robo deriva fácil e innecesariamente en un delito peor: homicidio. Ningún bien material está por encima de la vida. Protegerla es deber prioritario de los cuerpos de seguridad, por encima de cualquier otro. El derecho a la propiedad, por ejemplo, no puede privar sobre el derecho a la vida.

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<sup>10</sup> Source: <http://www.ciudadccs.info/?p=123076&print=1>

Si, en todo caso, un funcionario de seguridad hiere por error a una persona inocente —o a un presunto delincuente— su deber es prestarle auxilio. Nuestra Constitución establece la inviolabilidad del derecho a la vida que, como está dicho, se ubica por encima de cualquier otro.

Un antiguo vicio entre policías corrompidos del mundo entero es la “siembra” de drogas o armas involucradas en delitos a inocentes que son apresados, heridos o muertos en disímiles situaciones.

Que un funcionario de seguridad tenga escondida en su indumentaria una pistola o un revólver distinto a su arma de reglamento, probablemente involucrada en crímenes anteriores, revela una aberrante predisposición a la comisión de un delito. Un error, como puede ser el uso desproporcionado o irresponsable del arma de reglamento, siempre será menos grave que simular un hecho punible.

### **Pueblo salvador**

Según relata José Luis, fue la comunidad la que le salvó la vida. “¡No lo maten!, ¡no lo maten!”, escuchó decir en coro. La gente de Los Flores de Catia lo subió a una camioneta pick up, donde lo trasladaron a un hospital.

Dentro de todo, salió barato. Tuvo suerte. Además del escudo popular, la bala que entró por su espalda sólo rompió una esquinita de la vértebra L4. Si lo impacta dos centímetros más hacia el centro hubiese quedado condenado a una silla de ruedas. Eso sí, el proyectil dañó colon e intestino. El primero fue extirpado y el segundo reconstruido por los médicos. La bala permanece en su cuerpo. La radiografía muestra un proyectil 9 mm, el calibre utilizado por los efectivos de la GNB en labores de seguridad urbana. En el brazo sólo quedó el rastro de la otra bala rasante.

El jefe del Comando Regional 5 de la GNB, general Antonio Benavides, reaccionó consternado al enterarse del caso y ordenó una investigación exhaustiva de los hechos para identificar, expulsar de la institución a los responsables y colocarlos a las órdenes de los tribunales.

Así exactamente debe suceder. Es lo justo, lo legal, lo ético y lo revolucionario. Sé que el general Benavides se ha ocupado personalmente de la averiguación interna del caso.

La familia y los compañeros de trabajo de José Luis esperamos, asimismo, que la Fiscalía conduzca con rapidez y rigor la investigación penal correspondiente.

Vaya hasta José Luis Cacique nuestra solidaridad y afecto, con la certeza de que pronto estará recuperado para continuar dando la batalla diaria por y con la verdad.

### **Colofón**

Una visión errada entre los revolucionarios, producto de los reflejos condicionados de la polarización política, tiende a promover la solidaridad automática con las actuaciones no sólo de los cuerpos policiales sino, en general, de la burocracia estatal, tanto la vieja como la surgida en esta década, incluso en aquellos casos de individualidades que con conductas desviadas le hacen daño a la ciudadanía, a la institución a la que pertenecen

y, en suma, a la Revolución. Si interpreto bien al sociólogo Reinaldo Iturriza, ideólogo de la “repolarización”, ésta significa exactamente lo contrario, es decir, enfrentar abiertamente y sin tabúes los vicios y desviaciones del viejo Estado en proceso de transformación. En el caso de los cuerpos de seguridad, valga un pronóstico: los mismos hombres que hoy se permiten desviaciones y atropellos serán quienes, ante un hipotético cambio político, arremeterán contra el pueblo con la misma furia con que lo hicieron en abril del 2002.

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### **El cerro se desliza**

No sólo el cambio climático, obra del modelo de “desarrollo” imperante, queda en evidencia con las persistentes lluvias de estos días. También la irresponsabilidad de los pirómanos que, meses atrás, provocaron incendios que acabaron con hectáreas de vegetación en el Waraira Repano. Sin una capa vegetal desarrollada, la tierra cede con facilidad ante el agua.

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### **COTUFAS**

#### **REUNIÓN DE PERIODISTAS DE COLOMBIA Y VENEZUELA**

Invitado por el Centro Carter, esta semana asistí a un encuentro entre periodistas de Colombia y Venezuela concebido para respaldar la reconstrucción de una relación mutuamente respetuosa y provechosa entre ambos países hermanos. Por la parte colombiana vinieron Javier Darío Restrepo, Socorro Ramírez, Ricardo Ávila, Carlos Cortés, Catalina Lobo-Guerrero, Sergio Ocampo, Francisco Miranda, Luz María Sierra y Miguel André Garrido. Por la venezolana Aram Aharonian, Silvia Alegrett, Vladimir Villegas, María Inés Delgado, Omar Lugo, Elsy Barroeta, Elides Rojas, Eleazar Díaz Rangel, Maryclein Stelling, Ana María San Juan y quien suscribe, además de Pável Rondón, ex embajador en Bogotá, quien presentó un balance sobre la relación bilateral. Si de algo sirvió la reunión fue para hacer visible el rol de los medios —habitualmente invisibilizado— en la construcción de una buena o mala relación entre naciones hermanas. También sirvió para constatar las insalvables diferencias políticas que existen entre los periodistas venezolanos ubicados en una u otra acera de la polarización, así como los matices perceptibles entre los colombianos asistentes en torno a figuras como Juan M. Santos, Álvaro Uribe y Hugo Chávez.

#### **CONNIE MACK CONTRA LOS ANTICHAVISTAS**

El legislador Connie Mack, uno de los anfitriones del reciente cónclave derechista latinoamericano en Washington, es el autor de una propuesta que persigue incluir a Venezuela en la lista de países patrocinadores del terrorismo que, de ser aplicada por el gobierno de Barack Obama, iría directamente contra aquellos venezolanos que suelen viajar a EEUU. Para nadie es un secreto que los viajeros frecuentes a EEUU son mayoritariamente antichavistas. Paradoja: Mack es la nueva “niña consentida” de los políticos y comunicadores del antichavismo criollo que, en caso de prosperar la propuesta de marras, se verían sometidos a “revisiones adicionales” a las de los

pasajeros comunes y corrientes cada vez que viajen a EEUU, sólo por el hecho de ser venezolanos. No lo digo yo: lo informó El Universal el 7 de enero pasado.

# El Universal<sup>11</sup>

## Evalúan impacto de personalización del nexo con Colombia

Periodistas no creen que dure mucha relación Santos-Chavez

REYES THEIS

Miércoles 24 de noviembre de 2010 12:00 AM

El periodista colombiano Javier Darío Restrepo, cree que en la relación entre Colombia y Venezuela hay un factor relativo a la personalidad de los mandatarios que impacta en los nexos binacionales.

"Desaparecida la personalidad de Álvaro Uribe (de la Presidencia de Colombia) está desaparecido gran parte del problema. Ahora, alterada por razones políticas la personalidad (en lo que respecta al nexo con Venezuela) del presidente Juan Manuel Santos, se alteró también por razones políticas la personalidad de Hugo Chávez", sostiene.

Según el periodista, esa realidad plantea la pregunta ¿Hasta qué punto la suerte de un pueblo tiene que estar ligada a las condiciones personales de quien lo gobierna? En ese sentido, considera que las buenas relaciones no durarán mucho y terminarán como las lunas de miel de las parejas modernas que son inestables en sus sentimientos.

Las reflexiones de Restrepo las comentó en Caracas, donde participó en el primer encuentro de periodistas de Colombia y Venezuela que organizó el Centro Carter.

Por su parte, Vladimir Villegas, resaltó que el intercambio de extradiciones de guerrilleros por el supuesto narcotraficante Walid Makled, es un hecho inédito en las historia reciente de las relaciones binacionales. "Cuánto tiempo durará, es algo que hay que preguntarse, no solo sobre la luna de miel de Santos - Chávez , sino en cuanto al marcaje de distancia política entre el Gobierno de Venezuela y la guerrilla", dijo.

La periodista colombiana Luz María Sierra, cree que la solidez del nexo dependerá del tema Farc y recordó que "Uribe rompió con Venezuela porque estaba convencido de que el presidente Chávez apoyaba a la guerrilla".

En su intervención, Elides Rojas, se refirió a cómo la polarización afecta la cobertura informativa de la relación colombo-venezolana y Eléazar Díaz Rangel, planteó el supuesto uso que hizo EEUU de Uribe, como mecanismo para amenazar a Venezuela.

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<sup>11</sup> Source: [http://www.eluniversal.com/2010/11/24/pol\\_art\\_evaluan-impacto-de-p\\_2116593.shtml](http://www.eluniversal.com/2010/11/24/pol_art_evaluan-impacto-de-p_2116593.shtml)





## **Andean – United States Dialogue Forum**

### **Second Meeting of Venezuela-Colombia Media Professionals Bogotá, 15 February 2011**

#### **Goals of the meeting**

The Carter Center, in collaboration with IDEA International, invited journalists and academics from Colombia and Venezuela with the aim to strengthen bilateral relationships and discuss a wide range of issues related to media coverage. The purpose of this activity was to increase mutual understanding among media professional and academics from the two countries.

The Second Meeting of Venezuelan and Colombian Media Professionals, held on February 15, 2011 in Bogotá, Colombia, was intended to promote understanding and collaboration among Colombian and Venezuelan media in an effort to improve bilateral relations.<sup>12</sup> Nine Venezuelan and ten Colombian media directors and editors from some of the most influential communications media in both countries attended. Additionally, Colombian and Venezuelan academics who are experts on the issues to be discussed were present. Representatives of the Foundation for Press Freedom (FLIP, acronym in Spanish) and Media for Peace (Colombia) were invited as observers.<sup>13</sup>

The meeting was organized around the main goal of deepening dialogue and understanding between the Colombian and Venezuelan media, thus strengthening bilateral relations not only on the political level, but also in the social sphere.

#### **Thematic coverage of the event**

Participants covered a wide variety of issues, such as the role of journalists, sources of information, changes in bilateral relations between the two countries, the situation in border areas and differing notions of reality on the ground.

#### **Changes in bilateral relations: a new turn**

There has been a shift in bilateral relations since the Santos' election in Colombia. Unfortunately, news coverage overlooks collaboration and integration in Latin America. The newspapers tend to focus on negative events and rarely mention any positive

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<sup>12</sup> Annex A contains an agenda for the Meeting, including a brief description of the activities scheduled.

<sup>13</sup> Annex B contains a list of participants at the event.

occurrences and progress made. It was also pointed out that in general terms there has been a change in perception of each other among Colombians and Venezuelans. At this point in time, a positive perception prevails of Colombians in Venezuela, while there is generally a negative perception of Venezuelans in Colombia.

In Venezuela the media is strongly polarized, which also influences relations between the two countries. While Álvaro Uribe was president of Colombia, Venezuelan media based their coverage on political convenience. The “opposition” newspapers, for example, afforded Uribe positive coverage whenever he took a position against President Chávez, and was therefore perceived as an ally; if Uribe took a more conciliatory stance, the opposite was true.

### **The role of journalism: from being a journalist to how a journalist should be**

The role that journalists play in the dynamics of Colombian-Venezuelan diplomatic relations through reporting is subject to debate. A content analysis of Venezuelan and Colombian media coverage demonstrates that the binational agenda promoted by the two presidents exerts a strong influence on news coverage in their respective countries. It is therefore necessary to advocate in favour of institutionalizing relations between the two countries.

There has been a crisis in the field of journalism that has inhibited its purpose as a medium. These limitations are common in today’s world and lead to reactive, rather than proactive, journalism. The media tends to get “stuck” on the event of the day or days when it is taking place, but rarely follows up on the aftermath of the story. In principle, a journalist should aim to inform the public, regardless of any other characteristics which may be ascribed to the profession. However, there is a conflict regarding the role of journalists: to inform the public objectively or to seek to influence the way people think. There exists no consensus regarding the exact duties of a journalist. Further, the improvement of the governmental institutionalization of the bilateral relations between Venezuela and Colombia would also avoid a scenario in which the media serves as a microphone for one side or the other. In addition, there is a discrepancy over the duty of journalists to keep citizens informed and the need to protect information considered to be of national interest.

### **Sources: investigate more and in greater depth**

The dialogue between the participants emphasized the importance of reputable sources in the production of high-quality journalism. To achieve this kind of reporting, there is a need to verify sources, conduct broad investigations, follow up on news events, and so on. However, some topics require a more sophisticated and nuanced treatment when reported because, on occasion, sources use information in a negative way and manipulate it to gain political advantage. During discussions held in the afternoon session, one participant described examples of how newspapers such as *El País* (Spain) and *The New York Times* (USA) have made critical mistakes under different circumstances. As an example, during the 2004 Madrid bombings, the former believed the official version regarding the purported culprits of the bomb attacks against trains in Madrid, while the latter repeated the Bush Administration’s claims that Iraq harboured weapons of mass destruction. A lack of knowledge and a scarcity of other sources to

reference contributed to this instance of biased reporting. It is clear that in these particular cases, the resulting journalistic work was not reliable.

As concerns Colombian-Venezuelan diplomatic relations, the same problem of bias crops up. The newspapers in both countries tend to sway the emotions of their readership, particularly on issues classified as “nationalistic”. Insufficient knowledge about each other and lack of understanding between the two countries, compounded by dynamics of nationalism, increase the probability that the media inflames tensions in moments of crisis. At the same time, obstacles in logistics due to lack of first-hand information (primary sources) and very few correspondents stationed in each country by newspapers from the other also hamper the ability to produce high-quality journalism.

### **The border area: a need for more even-handed coverage**

According to Cicerón Florez, deputy director of the newspaper *La Opinión* (Cucutá, Colombia) the media in both countries should expand their thematic coverage. The border zones depend upon stability in relations between Bogotá and Caracas, as these affect trade and transport in the area, and in general have a major impact on the region. Partisan attitudes in the media distort messages and don't allow for proper presentation of the news. In any case, the media should publish information in a more positive light, as this would have a favourable effect on the border area.

### **What constitutes “reality”?**

The meeting between Colombian and Venezuelan journalists provided an opening for a broad-based discussion on concepts such as “truth” and “objectivity vs. subjectivity” in the newsroom and the difficulties faced nowadays by the media in Venezuela and Colombia.

Among other things, participants noted that if the role of journalists is to inform citizens regarding the reality of what is happening, then it becomes important to define what constitutes “reality”. In the world of news, reality is a relative concept that depends upon the source influencing it. Again, in principle, newspapers should cover what is “real” in the news (what actually happened). However, ‘positive’ realities get less coverage in the communications media. For their part, ‘negative’ realities tend to get the widest coverage possible, especially regarding bilateral relations between Colombia and Venezuela. Personalizing the facts has created a situation in which “reality” has become a combination of what is dictated by the hubs of influence (in this case, Santos and Chávez) and what is approved by the majority. As long as these facts don't change or new variables come on the scene, it will be impossible to report a different “reality”. The best example of this is the U.S. military bases in Colombia. Newspapers on both sides provided the desired coverage, including a focus on the president of each country, but unfortunately neither got the “reality” right. As it happened, reality made its appearance later via the *wikileaks* cables.

### **Recommendations**

For the purpose of continuing the dialogue being promoted by the Carter Center, participants at the Second Meeting of Colombian and Venezuelan Media Professionals proposed the following recommendations or tasks to be undertaken:

- To hold additional events (a third meeting), using the same format, or a round table. The idea is to lend continuity to the steps taken thus far and the progress made, in order to continue with the exchange of ideas, perceptions, differences and in general to pose questions and to debate answers.
- To deepen and conclude the contents analysis study of the newspapers in order to obtain conclusive information on the coverage of bilateral relations between Colombia and Venezuela. Part of this work includes a content analysis of the coverage of certain events with a view toward comparing statistical data.
- To include a case study on the dynamics of the newsroom at both Colombian and Venezuelan newspapers when a significant event occurs. A content analysis of coverage would serve as a means of comparison.
- To include a contents analysis study of other types of media (television or radio).
- To continue the dialogue between journalists by using new technologies: the creation of virtual forums, groups of social networks such as Facebook, press meetings and blogs, all of which offer a space to exchange experiences, discuss issues, suggest pertinent readings, and so on, in an effort to enrich the dialogue between journalists and deepen mutual understanding.
- To create a media observatory in each country that allows for a full overview of the coverage regarding bilateral relations and the exchange of information. It must also facilitate an examination of the quality of the information and evaluate the journalistic work among professional colleagues on the issue of Colombian - Venezuelan relations.
- To debate the structure of the media and thus be able to struggle against any new barriers to the reproduction, coverage and difficulties faced by newspapers, particularly in Venezuela.
- Hold workshops for journalists in order to better understand the media, its role and journalistic ethics, in order to avoid partisan attitudes or polarization, as is the case in Venezuela today.
- To create a list of contacts among the media professionals present and distribute it among them as a means of continuing with dialogue and communication.
- To invite journalists to return to the original mission of their trade: provide reliable information, convert information into knowledge and shun partisan or political roles.

## ANNEX A – Agenda of the Second Meeting of Venezuela-Colombia Media Professionals

Agenda		
Morning Session	09:00	<b>Opening remarks</b> Jennifer McCoy Director, Program for the Americas, Carter Center
	9:10	<b>Summary of the First Meeting: Main agreements and conclusions</b> Héctor Vanolli General Coordinator, Program to Strengthen Journalism in Venezuela, Carter Center
	9:30	<b>Introduction of participants</b>
	9:40	<b>Keynote address: News coverage on relations between Colombia and Venezuela: change and persistence</b> Germán Rey Director, ATICO Center, Universidad Javeriana  <b>Commentators:</b> Maryclen Stelling General Coordinator, Global Media Observatory, Venezuela chapter  Omar Rincón Director, Center for the Study of Journalism, Universidad de los Andes, Colombia
	10:30	<b>Exchange and debate among participants</b>  <b>Moderator:</b> Omar Lugo Director, El Mundo, Venezuela
12:40		Lunch
Afternoon Session	14:00	<b>The role of the media in relations between Colombia and Venezuela: Successes, difficulties and challenges Challenges moving forward Recommendations for future coverage Remarks and conclusions</b>  <b>Exchange and debate among participants</b>  <b>Moderator:</b> Javier Darío Restrepo Expert on ethics in journalism, Ibero-American New Journalism Foundation (FNPI), Colombia
	17:30	Cocktail
Hotel los Héroes, calle 74 No 15-60, Barrio El Lago		

**ANNEX B – List of Participants**

<b>NAME</b>	<b>POST</b>	<b>MEDIUM</b>	<b>CITY</b>
Aram Aharonian	Columnist		Caracas
Silvia Alegrett	President	National Association of Journalists (CNP)	Caracas
Maria Inés Delgado	Deputy Director, Newsroom	Diario Panorama	Maracaibo
Eleazar Díaz Rangel	Director	Últimas Noticias	Caracas
Omar Lugo	Director	El Mundo Economía y Negocios	Caracas
Elsy Barroeta	Head of Newsroom	Globovisión	Caracas

Elides Rojas	Head of Newsroom	El Universal	Caracas
Vladimir Villegas	Journalist	Unión Radio	Caracas
Ana María San Juan	Academic		Caracas
Javier Darío Restrepo	Expert on ethics	FNPI	Bogotá
Ricardo Ávila	Director	Portafolio	Bogotá
Carlos Cortes	Editor	La Silla Vacía	Bogotá
Catalina Lobo-Guerrero	Columnist		Bogotá
Sergio Ocampo	Columnist		Bogotá
Francisco Miranda	Editor	El Tiempo	Bogotá
Luz María Sierra	Editor	Semana.com	Bogotá
Miguel André Garrido	Editor	ColPrensa	Bogotá
Socorro Ramírez	Academic		Santa Marta
Cicerón Florez	Deputy Director	La Opinión	Cúcuta
Carmen Rosa Pabón	Editor	La Voz del Cinaruco	Arauca
Rodrigo Pardo	Member, editorial board	Semana	Bogotá
Eduardo Maldonado	Director	El Espectador	Bogotá
Germán Rey	Director	ATICO Center, Univ. Javeriana	Bogotá
Omar Rincón	Director	CEPER U.L.A.	Bogotá
Maryclen Stelling	Academic	Media Observatory	Caracas
Jennifer McCoy	Director	Program for the Americas, Carter Center	Atlanta
Héctor Vanolli	Coordinator	Program to Strengthen Journalism	Caracas
Rocío Castañeda	Director	Media for Peace	Bogotá
Adriana Blanco	Director	FLIP	Bogotá
Claudia Mejía		FLIP	Bogotá



## **Andean – United States Dialogue Forum**

### **Second Meeting of Venezuela-Colombia Media Professionals: Media Coverage**

#### **El Universal<sup>14</sup>**

Miércoles 16 de febrero de 2011

By ELIDES ROJAS

#### **Polarización influye en relación entre Bogotá y Caracas**

Abogan por evitar reactividad en medios de Colombia y Venezuela

Bogotá.- Devolver el papel de los medios de comunicación a su esencia y evitar la reactividad a la hora de procesar las informaciones fueron parte de las conclusiones consensuadas entre periodistas de Colombia y Venezuela durante un encuentro realizado en Bogotá patrocinado por el Centro Carter.

Durante la reunión a la que asistieron representantes de los medios de ambas naciones se resaltó cómo los líderes de Colombia y Venezuela generan la información, para bien o para mal, en beneficio o perjuicio de los dos países.

Germán Rey, director del Centro Ático de la Universidad Javeriana de Bogotá, explicó los alcances de un trabajo de investigación realizado sobre las publicaciones de los medios más importantes de ambas naciones.

Afirmó Rey que la característica fundamental de ambos gobiernos es que han invertido mucho dinero en reforzar su presencia mediática. Tienen buenas redes de medios electrónicos y cubren extensas áreas de la región. "Es decir, son gobiernos que manejan muy bien sus medios, generando una caída en la calidad de lo que recibe el usuario. Estamos hablando de propaganda. Al final el afectado es el ciudadano".

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<sup>14</sup> Source: [http://www.eluniversal.com/2011/02/16/pol\\_art\\_polarizacion-influye\\_2192438.shtml](http://www.eluniversal.com/2011/02/16/pol_art_polarizacion-influye_2192438.shtml)



En otra intervención, María Luisa Chiappe, ex embajadora de Colombia en Venezuela, afirmó que lo político y la polarización son elementos que desvían el trabajo de los medios. "En Venezuela, por ejemplo, los medios oficialistas tratan a Colombia y sus autoridades como elementos aliados del imperio, EEUU y fuerzas enemigas de Chávez. Vemos programas en VTV como La Hojilla, Contragolpe o Dando y Dando que no se verían en otros países. Por otra parte, los medios independientes y contrarios a Chávez ven en Colombia y sus políticas un factor para atacar al gobierno chavista. Eso es tremendamente perjudicial. Es necesario pues, ampliar la agenda y tratar temas diferentes".

Para Rodrigo Pardo, ex canciller de Colombia, las relaciones colombo-venezolanas siempre han sido conflictivas, pero algunos intentan culpar a los medios cuando se trata de un asunto de político y diplomático.

Ana María Sanjuan, socióloga, puntualizó que hay un profundo cambio en las percepciones de cada país, con un visible cambio, justamente producto de los tratamientos de los medios. Según su visión antes "los colombianos eran los malos, de donde provenía la violencia y la inseguridad. Ahora es al revés. Los malos están en Venezuela y desde allí se originan los males".

# El Tiempo<sup>15</sup>

20 de Febrero del 2011

By María Isabel Rueda Especial para EL TIEMPO

## **¿Se está acabando en Venezuela la libertad de expresión?**

La presidenta del Colegio de Periodistas de Venezuela, Silvia Alegrette, dice que en su país se criminalizó la opinión y que ha habido presos por 'twittear'.

Vino a Colombia invitada por el Centro Carter para un encuentro de periodistas. ¿Cómo podemos los colombianos apoyar a nuestros colegas venezolanos?

Venezuela vive un momento muy crítico en lo que se refiere a la libertad de expresión: se ha criminalizado. Una serie de mecanismos legales que se han introducido permiten que opinar en un momento dado sea motivo para ir a la cárcel o cerrar un medio de comunicación.

¿Usted llegaría al extremo de decir que en Venezuela se acabó la libertad de expresión?

Cuando supuestamente hay libertad de expresión, pero una serie de mecanismos te van cercando, se hace difícil que esa libertad se dé a plenitud y ocasiona que el periodista se autocensure. Es que ha ocurrido que por una simple opinión de un invitado a un programa el medio ha sido multado y la persona que estaba exponiendo la idea ha ido a la cárcel. Es el caso del ex gobernador del Estado Zulia Osvaldo Álvarez Paz, que por una opinión que expresó quedó preso por tres meses.

Autocensura hay en casi todas partes. Se busca la manera de decir las cosas para no ofender a los poderosos. Eso también pasa por períodos hasta en Colombia. ¿Usted diría que la situación en Venezuela va más allá de la simple autocensura?

He contabilizado 133 agresiones a la libertad de expresión. Por decisión del Gobierno se han cerrado, además de Radio Caracas TV, 32 emisoras de radio y 2 televisoras regionales, de un total de 240 que dijeron que iban a cerrar. Sin embargo, ante la acción del Colegio Nacional de Periodistas (tenemos 26 seccionales en todo el país haciendo marchas y ruedas de prensa, tomando plazas, redactando comunicados y discutiendo en los pocos programas de opinión que quedan), hasta ahí parecen haber llegado los cierres de manera directa.

Ahora lo que se hace es que o no se les renueva la concesión o muchas radios cierran por no tener anunciantes. O terminan cambiando su política editorial. Pasan a ser más light,

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<sup>15</sup> Source: [http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW\\_NOTA\\_INTERIOR-8891640.html](http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-8891640.html)

por ejemplo. De tener programas de opinión pasan a diversión y música para evitarse problemas.

¿Hay medios realmente independientes en Venezuela, que no se han plegado al chavismo?

Digamos que quedan menos. Los medios del Estado han crecido. Marcelino Visbal, un excelente comunicador, dice que aproximadamente hay 700 medios del Estado en distintos niveles, tanto regional como nacional. No tienen el respaldo del público, digamos que no superan el 6 por ciento de la audiencia o de los lectores, y sin embargo el Estado invierte en ellos, publicita ahí, porque son oficialistas.

Y rodean al Gobierno para ayudarlo a sacar adelante políticas específicas...

Es una red. Pero además muchos medios han tenido, si no que plegarse, variar extremadamente la calidad informativa. Canales de TV que tenían 4 y 5 programas de opinión, hoy tienen sólo 2. Y noticieros que en vez de arrancar con una noticia política grande, abren la emisión con un accidente de tráfico. Ya no hay casi medios donde opinar.

A un diputado lo filmaron mientras miraba en su computador un programa de sexo. ¿Es cierto que a raíz de ese episodio resolvieron restringir el cubrimiento periodístico de las sesiones de la Asamblea venezolana?

Es cierto. En la casa donde se generan las leyes, que van a manejar a la sociedad venezolana y a ponerle orden, están restringiendo la información. Sólo se permite el registro del medio oficial que pertenece a la Asamblea Nacional, que es un medio oficialista. Las cámaras sólo enfocan a los miembros del Gobierno. Al periodista independiente lo humillan, pues no le permiten entrevistar a su fuente, el diputado, ni estar dentro del hemiciclo. ¿Dónde está el derecho del ciudadano a conocer más allá de la información institucional? No existe.

Una primera página muy impresionante, publicada en 'El Nacional', sobre los muertos de un fin de semana en una morgue de Caracas, produjo la decisión judicial de prohibir la divulgación de noticias que afecten la salud mental...

Con esa excusa hipócrita intentaron controlar la información. El título de la noticia era que había 15 millones de armas ilegales rodando por el país. Era una foto de una noche muy dolorosa. Me hizo reflexionar. Los venezolanos nos acostumbramos a recibir los lunes un parte de guerra a través de los medios. Esa era una información no oficial de qué tantos muertos hubo ese fin de semana, porque oficialmente no te la dan. Es tal la mortandad, que estamos en una guerra en Venezuela. El periodista que estaba parado esa noche en la puerta de la morgue tomó esa foto.

Pero el juez terminó reversando su decisión...

Alcanzamos a generar, con la movilización del Colegio de Periodistas, tal cantidad de opinión contra esa decisión, que el juez tuvo que reconocer que se había equivocado.

¿El presidente Chávez ya está controlando Internet?

En diciembre, y esa es una de las cosas que nos tienen más preocupados a los venezolanos y para lo cual pedimos solidaridad de los colegas colombianos, se aprobó una ley que es un exabrupto jurídico, que va contra la Constitución, como es la Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio y Televisión, la ley 'Resorte'.

¿Por qué la llaman así?

Por las siglas: Re-sor-te. Es una ley que criminaliza la información. Y la acaban de reformar a raíz de que la gente utiliza Internet para expresarse y protestar. A los dueños de esos mecanismos (Google, por ejemplo) los están obligando a imponer filtros para controlar la información.

¿Ha habido censuras por las cosas que se dicen en Twitter?

Pasó una vez: en Twitter unas personas hablaban de un banco, y el Estado decidió que sus comentarios creaban zozobra y las pusieron presas. A esa ley le acaban de agregar que si la noticia va contra las buenas costumbres, puedes ir preso. Eso es subjetivo.

¿Ya se ha aplicado?

Los periodistas nos cuidamos. Pero claro, ya hay procesos corriendo. Globovisión tiene innumerables denuncias, procesos judiciales o administrativos, porque si no te pueden acusar legalmente te meten una multa. Tú sabes: es el manejo antidemocrático de las herramientas que tiene un gobierno para poner orden en su Estado. El hecho de impedir que el ciudadano esté informado cercena la libertad de expresión, que es la esencia de la democracia.

Lo irónico es que Chávez maneja muy bien los medios y se recuesta en ellos para gobernar...

Así es. Lo grave es cuando el Presidente olvida que ese medio tiene que informar y no hacer propaganda. La política estatal es tratar de que todos los medios sean mecanismos de propaganda. El que no la haga es un medio graduado de enemigo y se le hostiga, se le imponen multas o se pone en peligro su concesión. Por ejemplo, a Radio Coro, con 75 años de existencia, no le quieren renovar su concesión porque no hace parte del coro del Gobierno. Se trata de mantener sobre la gente un miedo, una persecución muy sutil.

¿Pero usted puede expresarse libremente en Venezuela?

Yo no puedo decir que no pueda hablar en mi país. Yo hablo en mi país, hablo en los medios de comunicación. De lo que no estoy muy segura es de que cuando salga de ahí

no le van a poner una multa al medio. O de si a mí no me van a hacer algún tipo de seguimiento o de agresión.

¿Cómo podemos ayudar los periodistas colombianos a nuestros colegas venezolanos?

Con solidaridad. Por ejemplo, por el caso de la foto de El Nacional recibí llamadas angustiadas de periodistas, desde la Patagonia hasta España, EE. UU. y, desde luego, Colombia. Eso generó presión de la opinión pública y el juez tuvo que echarse para atrás. En la medida en que los periodistas venezolanos tengamos el respaldo de nuestros colegas podemos esperar que cuando mandemos un comunicado se reproduzca y se difunda.

¿Colombia ha sido solidaria con la prensa venezolana?

Tengo la satisfacción de haber podido exponer aquí la situación de la libertad de prensa en mi país. Y me han expresado mucha solidaridad. Más allá de eso, el pedido es que se mantengan alertas para cuando nos cambien las leyes, o nos pongan preso a un periodista o nos cierren un medio.

Aspiramos a que en estos países que tienen libertad de expresión, como ustedes, se genere, en el pleno sentido de la palabra, una protesta que presione al Estado, al Gobierno, a asumir una posición. Como pasó con la Ley Habilitante, sobre la que el propio secretario Insulza, de la OEA, tuvo que salir a decir que no era muy democrática. Somos periodistas, estamos defendiendo nuestro derecho de ser profesionales de la comunicación y a que no nos obliguen a ser propagandistas, que es lo que están buscando.

Además, los ciudadanos venezolanos tienen pleno derecho de estar informados libremente...

Así es. La Ley de Ejercicio del Periodista que nos rige dice en el artículo 5 que el Colegio Nacional de Periodistas es custodio de la libertad de expresión. Si no denuncio que en mi país se está violentando la libertad de expresión, a mí me pueden poner presa por incumplir mi obligación como presidenta del Colegio. Tengo que denunciar a todo lo ancho y largo del mundo que en Venezuela la libertad de expresión está en peligro.

# Reporte Confidencial<sup>16</sup>

21 de Febrero de 2011

By Eleazar Díaz Rangel

## **Pastel de Chucho**

### MEDIOS Y PRESIDENTES

En un reciente encuentro colombo-venezolano de periodistas, reunido en Bogotá, se examinaron varios asuntos de interés común, y sorprendió conocer el resultado de una investigación según la cual el espacio que los cuatro diarios venezolanos estudiados dedicaron al Presidente Juan Manuel Santos en seis meses, es la mitad del que dedicaban al presidente Álvaro Uribe en un período igual. ¿Cómo explicar ese cambio?

Para algunos de los periodistas venezolanos que asistimos fue sencillo. La política de Uribe contra el gobierno venezolano, y especialmente contra el presidente Chávez, era compartida por un alto porcentaje de los medios venezolanos, y el cambio operado con el acceso al poder de Santos, desde la reunión de julio en Santa Marta, que permitieron mejorar sensiblemente las relaciones entre ambos países, carece del apoyo de la mayoría de esos medios y en consecuencia, sólo le dedicaron la mitad del espacio para las informaciones y opiniones coincidentes con esa nueva política de Santos. “Mientras en Colombia había diarios críticos del uribismo, (aunque en radio y TV predominaba la tendencia favorable) allá teníamos prensa uribista”, dijo uno de los colegas venezolanos.

Otro hecho de significación, que igualmente revela la relación de los medios con la formación de la opinión pública en asuntos binacionales, es que el porcentaje de opiniones adversas a Chávez bajó en Colombia en esos seis meses, en contraste con los niveles que tuvo durante los gobiernos de Uribe.

El mismo estudio revela que los cuatro medios impresos venezolanos estudiados ofrecieron a la cuestión de las bases militares más del doble del espacio que le dedicó la prensa colombiana, y en general, esta relación se repite en otros asuntos, a los que en Venezuela se dio mayor cobertura, sin ofrecer las razones.

La investigación falla porque no ofrece explicaciones a esos resultados, ni se analizan las tendencias en cada caso. Por ejemplo, ante el tema de las bases militares, se pueden tener dos posiciones: crítico o de apoyo, y el estudio no se acerca a determinarlo. Ante esas críticas que formulamos, hubo el compromiso de profundizar esa investigación y despejar las interrogantes que subsisten.

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<sup>16</sup> Source: <http://www.reporteconfidencial.info/noticia/22284/pastel-de-chuchopor-eleazar-diaz-rangel/>

## MÁS Y MENOS AMISTOSOS

En un estudio del Centro Carter e IDEA sobre las relaciones de EUA y los países andinos, resulta que los países más amistosos con EUA, según la opinión de los estadounidenses, son Venezuela y Perú con 20% cada uno y Colombia, que debía tener un porcentaje muy alto, apenas llega a 14%. Y los menos amistosos son Venezuela con 35%, se comprende, y Colombia 27% (¿por qué será, si lo ayuda tanto?).

Las mismas preguntas hechas a sectores élite de venezolanos, tienen estos resultados: países más amistosos: Bolivia 50%, Ecuador 15% y Colombia 10%. Los menos amistosos son: EUA 60%, no se equivocaron; y Colombia 18%. En cuanto a Colombia, Venezuela es el menos amistoso: 85%, y Ecuador (que fue invadido) 5%, y los más amistosos son: EUA 80%, se entiende, y Perú 10%.

Naturalmente, la principal fuente de formación de esas opiniones son los medios.

## EL CONGRESO DE ANGOSTURA

Pareciera que la mayoría de los diputados de oposición no cayeron en la cuenta de que el Congreso de Angostura, cuya instalación el 15 de febrero de 1819 conmemoró la Asamblea Nacional, era un cuerpo con importante presencia de militares.

Bien marcado era el sello militar de ese Congreso, entre los 27 diputados estaban: Coronel Francisco Parejo, Coronel Eduardo Hurtado, por Barcelona; General en Jefe Santiago Mariño, General de Brigada Tomás Montilla, por Cumaná; General de División Rafael Urdaneta, Coronel Miguel Guerrero, General de Brigada Pedro León Torres, por Margarita.

Estos oficiales, apenas terminaron las sesiones del Congreso, partieron hacia sus puestos de comandos. Por ejemplo, Bolívar con su Estado Mayor fue a reunirse en el Ejército Occidental con Páez en Apure; Santiago Mariño a establecer su cuartel general en El Pao, y el general Urdaneta a tomar en Margarita el mando de las tropas inglesas hace poco llegadas.

La ausencia de los opositores el pasado 15 en Ciudad Bolívar pareciera confirmar lo que escribí aquí en Pastel de Chucho el lunes pasado.

## INJERENCIA DE EUA EN ESPAÑA

La mayoría de ustedes recordarán el intento de golpe de estado en España del 23 de febrero de 1981, del cual se cumplen el miércoles 30 años. Entonces, el Teniente Coronel Antonio Tejero asaltó el palacio del Congreso en plena sesión, en el tránsito del régimen franquista al democrático.

Desde entonces se han publicado varios libros, algunos producto del periodismo de investigación. El más reciente de ellos es “23-F, El Rey y su secreto”, del periodista Jesús

Palacios, quien sostiene la tesis de que “no fue un intento de golpe de involución, sino una operación especial de corrección del sistema, que fue ampliamente ‘consensuada’ con la nomenclatura de la clase política institucional. Y con el beneplácito exterior de la administración norteamericana y del Vaticano”. El Rey, según esa versión, por supuesto estaba de acuerdo con lo que se intentaba hacer.

En un párrafo, se lee:

“Días atrás, (el embajador de EUA) Todman había comunicado al Secretario de Estado, General Alexander Haig, y al Pentágono, la operación que se iba a llevar a cabo en España, recibiendo instrucciones de apoyarla y de mantenerse muy atento e informar al momento del desarrollo de los acontecimientos... Cuatro días antes del 23 de febrero, todo el personal de inteligencia, técnico y militar de las bases de utilización conjunta de Morón, Rota, Torrejón y Zaragoza, se pusieron en estado de alerta... Todman había pedido un avión espía Awacs, que el 23-F estuvo listo en una base de Lisboa controlando las comunicaciones militares y gubernamentales”.

Queda claro que la injerencia no es sólo en los países latinoamericanos.

NO PARECE que andan bien las cosas en el chavismo neoespartano. Lo deduce uno de las declaraciones de Enrique Fernández y un grupo de voceros de varios municipios del Frente Social del PSUV a este diario. Demandan renovación del buró regional, que sean las bases las que elijan. Llegan a denunciar la presencia de corruptos en niveles direccionales. No sé hasta dónde puede ser verdad, pero debía ser motivo de preocupación para el comando chavista... ARISTÓBULO Istúriz planteó ayer en Caracas que el partido tiene que dejar de ser una maquinaria electoral: “los militantes tienen que salir a la calle y vincularse con la gente y a sus problemas, debemos ser autocríticos”. Ésto lo vienen diciendo hace tiempo, y parece que no avanzan en las tareas organizativas e ideológicas... SEGÚN la encuesta de SOL DE MARGARITA, un 80% cree que Guaiquerías derrotará a Panteras en su encuentro de esta semana. Que así sea...

NO SÉ qué pensarán ustedes, pero la bancada opositora de la MUD no quedó nada bien en la última sesión de interpelaciones. Rafael Ramírez los vapuleó. ¿Cómo es posible que en esas materias no se preparen debidamente?... GRAN triunfo del tachirense Larry Sánchez en el primer maratón oficial en Venezuela. Representó a la Unefa, y superó al venezolano Pedro Mora, que punteó durante 38 km., y al mexicano Sergio Pedroza. Se supone que cerca de 3.000 llegaron a la meta. La CAF dio una buena muestra de la organización de tan complejo evento, que comenzó con una misión de la FIA para certificar la distancia exacta: 42.194 m...

NO SERA fácil para la oposición escoger a su abanderado para las presidenciales de 2012. Por lo pronto no se ponen de acuerdo con el método para esa selección... CIEN AÑOS largos tiene el bolero reinando en la música latinoamericana, nacido en Santiago de Cuba en 1885. Aquí, simultáneamente aparecen el número 07 de la enciclopedia “Boleros y la música del Caribe”, con “el caudal creativo de México”, del editor y



coleccionista Omar Uribe, y el libro No. 1 de la “Historia del Bolero”, de los pastoreños Santiago González y Reinaldo Vilorio, dedicado a “Cuba, no me vayas a engañar”...



## **Andean – United States Dialogue Forum**

### **Third Meeting between Venezuela-Colombia Media Professionals Cúcuta, Venezuela**

**May 11 and 12, 2011**

#### **Introducción**

El 11 y 12 de mayo de 2011, editores, directores y periodistas independientes de medios de comunicación colombianos y venezolanos se reunieron en la ciudad fronteriza de Cúcuta, Colombia, para analizar y discutir la realidad de la frontera entre ambos países y la cobertura mediática de dichos temas por parte de los medios de ambos países. El encuentro, denominado III Encuentro Binacional entre periodistas de Colombia y Venezuela, fue organizado el Programa de Fortalecimiento de Periodismo en Venezuela y la Mesa de Medios del Foro de Dialogo Andino Estadounidense.

Al igual que lo realizado en los encuentros anteriores, para esta reunión fueron también convocados académicos de ambos países especializados en estudios de frontera e integración colombo-venezolana, así como representantes de algunos de los principales medios de la región fronteriza, tales como la radio Fe y Alegría. Durante el encuentro se dieron a conocer los resultados ampliados del estudio y monitoreo de medios iniciado en el mes de noviembre de 2010 con la participación de la Universidad de Georgia, bajo la coordinación de la doctora Jennifer McCoy. Mediante este estudio se pretendió aportar datos concretos al debate en torno a la calidad de la cobertura de los temas de carácter binacional por parte de los medios colombianos y venezolanos.

Los participantes efectuaron, como parte de la agenda de actividades, una visita al barrio El Escobal, ubicado en la zona límite entre Cúcuta (Colombia) y San Antonio del Táchira (Venezuela), con el objeto de compartir con miembros de la comunidad local vivencias y pareceres sobre la realidad local.

#### **Resumen general**

El III Encuentro Binacional entre profesionales de los medios de comunicación de Colombia y Venezuela reunió a representantes de alto nivel de medios colombianos y venezolanos. La reunión se inició con una presentación de la doctora Jennifer McCoy sobre los resultados del análisis de la cobertura mediática de los temas binacionales entre Colombia y Venezuela durante 2007 al 2010 por parte de la prensa de ambos países. Seguidamente, Jesus (Txuo) Rodríguez, el Director de Radio Fe y Alegría en la región de El Nula,<sup>17</sup> expuso un panorama

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<sup>17</sup> Fuente: [http://www.entreculturas.org/noticias/conflicto\\_fronterizo\\_el\\_nula](http://www.entreculturas.org/noticias/conflicto_fronterizo_el_nula)

de las difíciles circunstancias que viven a diario los pobladores de la frontera colombo venezolana, incluidas las circunstancias sociales derivadas de del tráfico ilegal de combustible. El sacerdote exhortó a los periodistas presentes a considerar los problemas de la frontera colombo-venezolana desde una óptica integral, dejando de lado las consideraciones puramente de seguridad o de economía, a fin de ponerle “un rostro humano” a esa realidad.

Dicha presentación fue comentada Maria Eugenia Bello, Directora del Centro de Estudios de Integración y Frontera de la Universidad de Los Andes en Venezuela y por el Maestro Cicerón Flórez, sub director del diario La Opinión de Cúcuta. En palabras de una de las participantes colombianas, “El relato del padre Txuo nos metió de lleno en la discusión de lo que se vive en esta región“. Por su parte, la especialista colombiana Socorro Ramírez exhortó a los presentes a considerar la frontera como algo más que un simple “perímetro defensivo entre un país y otro”.

La segunda parte del encuentro sirvió de marco para la presentación magistral de la periodista colombiana Maria Teresa Ronderos, quien se refirió al rol de los medios en la cobertura mediática en la realidad fronteriza. La presentación de Ronderos sirvió para abrir el debate entre los participantes sobre la calidad del trabajo periodístico que se realiza de los temas de frontera, así como las consecuencias del mismo para la población de las zonas de frontera. La periodista invitó a los asistentes a “cubrir los procesos, no sólo los sucesos,” dando ejemplos de buenas coberturas aparecidas en el diario Panorama (Zulia) y La Opinión (Cúcuta), piezas en la que, de acuerdo a la disertante, se mostró un periodismo más investigativo, que desmenuza las historias, mostrando sus numerosos y a veces complicados matices. Finalmente, Maria Teresa Ronderos se refirió al reto que representa para los periodistas convertir una historia local en una historia universal.

Ese mismo día, los participantes se dirigieron hasta El Escobal Viejo, ubicado en la zona fronteriza con Venezuela. La visita sirvió como punto de encuentro entre periodistas, académicos y habitantes de El Escobal, quienes manifestaron a los periodistas las necesidades de mantener un vínculo más cercano con los medios nacionales.

El segundo día de reunión, los periodistas abrieron una sustanciosa sesión de discusión sobre los temas tratados, incluyendo en dicho intercambio sugerencias y posibles acciones para mejorar la calidad de la cobertura periodística de los temas de interés binacional entre Colombia y Venezuela.

Entre los principales logros de la actividad se pueden destacar los siguientes puntos:

- a) Presentación del análisis completo de monitoreo de medios sobre la cobertura informativa de temas bilaterales;
- b) Publicación de informaciones relativas a los temas de frontera (tales como el contrabando de gasolina en la frontera y la vinculación de los cuerpos de seguridad);
- c) Realización por parte de algunos de los periodistas asistentes de una serie de trabajos informativos sobre la realidad informativa (trabajos aparecidos en Semana y La Silla Vacía)

### **Resumen de las discusiones**

La discusión sobre la cobertura de los temas de frontera se dividió básicamente en cuatro partes:

1) ¿Cuál es el actual panorama en lo que hace a la cobertura de los temas de frontera? 2) ¿Qué es lo que hace falta en la cobertura de los temas de frontera? 3) ¿Por qué los periodistas, y los medios, no avanzan en lo que falta por hacer? y 4) ¿Qué pueden hacer los periodistas --y los medios-- frente a estas falencias?<sup>18</sup>

Con respecto a la primera pregunta, es decir, los rasgos que caracterizan actualmente la cobertura de los medios de frontera, en general se confirmó algunos de los principales hallazgos del estudio de la Universidad de Georgia presentado por McCoy.

Con respecto a la segunda pregunta, es decir qué hace falta en la cobertura, Maria Teresa Ronderos mencionó tres grandes “ausencias”:

a) Faltan –en primer lugar- historias con visión, con panorama general, dijo, historias que vayan más allá del simple reporte de los hechos cotidianos (“los medios de ambos lados registran abundantemente lo que pasa en la frontera, pero les falta detenerse de vez en cuando a “mirar todo el paisaje”, ya sea que se discutan temas de seguridad, economía, política, o medio ambiente. Los medios tienden por lo tanto a cubrir “momentos”, dejando de lado la noción de “procesos”. No cumplen, por consiguiente, con el deber ético de contar a su público qué tendencias, qué fuerzas, que ríos profundos, van trazando el rumbo de sus sociedades”).

b) Faltan –en segundo lugar- historias contadas “desde abajo”. Es decir, historias que tengan que ver con la gente común, historias que no se limiten a la “lloradera” por el ultimo desborde de un río, la angustia por la muerte de un ser querido a manos de la delincuencia o al regateo por la sobrevivencia cotidiana (falta contar, por ejemplo, la historia de la economía de la frontera con crónicas de las personas inmersas en esa economía; la historia de la vida en el borde entre dos países, con historias de las personas que viven con dos países como hogar, etc).

c) Y faltan –en tercer lugar- historias que desmenucen; que no “traguen entero”. Es decir, historias que vayan a los detalles, historias que, por ejemplo, analicen en detalle los temas de interés para los habitantes del lugar (como, por ejemplo, el sentido o utilidad del último despliegue de tropas en la frontera; o el costo de un puente sobre un río y el impacto económico o de seguridad de esa construcción; los intentos para revelar la corrupción de las fuerzas de seguridad fronterizas de ambos lados; el comportamiento del tráfico ilegal en la frontera, etc).

Con respecto a la tercera pregunta, es decir, ¿Por qué los periodistas, y los medios, no hacen lo que hace falta? Se señalaron dos puntos críticos:

En primer lugar, dijo Ronderos, los medios latinoamericanos, y los periodistas en general, tienen la tendencia a permanecer amarrados a las agendas oficiales. Como consecuencia de ello, los medios están por lo general “mirando siempre para arriba”, lo que es decir, están mayormente pendientes del movimiento del poder. Y en ese ejercicio se les olvida “mirar de frente” a la gente, a los ciudadanos, a eso que le pasa a la “gente como uno”. Y puso ejemplos del lugar (las peripecias de los llamados “pinpineros”, por ejemplo, no tienen nunca en los medios el peso de otras noticias, como –por ejemplo- las noticias sobre el último

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<sup>18</sup> Aquí se separa “los periodistas” de “los medios” en forma deliberada. De este ciclo de reuniones quedó claro que, para el tratamiento en profundidad de estos temas, es imprescindible separar estos dos términos, como dos ángulos o ámbitos –distintos- de un mismo problema.

hallazgo sobre el contenido del computador del líder guerrillero Raúl Reyes. Ni muchas otras historias similares, como las historias de los refugiados de lado y lado; la de los contrabandistas de Coltán, las del funcionamiento de la minería del carbón y del oro a cada lado de borde nacional).

Las declaraciones oficiales, señaló Ronderos, se volvieron el nodo central de la cobertura de los medios colombianos y venezolanos, o para decirlo con sus palabras, las declaraciones oficiales se volvieron “nuestro Muro de Berlín”, un muro que no nos deja “conocernos ni encontrarnos”. No importa la posición del medio –a favor o en contra del gobierno. Todos, sin excepción, construyen la noticia, a partir de las declaraciones oficiales, ya sea para afirmarlas o para confrontarlas.

Por todo ello, concluyó la conferencista, no hay que sorprenderse de que si los presidentes gritan, los medios grafiquen o repitan la dimensión de su alarido; como no hay que sorprenderse si, cuando a los cancilleres les llega el turno de susurrar, la agenda mediática se acomoda inmediatamente a un ritmo más silencioso, menos estruendoso. El enfriamiento del discurso de los medios parece por lo tanto siempre coincidir con el encuentro de salidas diplomáticas o la normalización de las relaciones. Y aquí quizás se tenga una primera aproximación a la respuesta a una de nuestras preguntas iniciales: ¿De qué forma –si alguna– el ritmo de las relaciones entre Colombia y Venezuela han influenciado la cobertura periodística de los temas de interés binacional?

Y con respecto a la última pregunta, es decir, lo que hay o habría que hacer, hubo al final de este tercer encuentro una gran cantidad de ideas, propuestas, sugerencias, propuestas y recomendaciones (ver documento anexo).

## ANNEXO I - LISTA OF PARTICIPANTES

	NOMBRE	CARGO	MEDIO
<b>PARTICIPANTES VENEZUELA</b>			
1.	Aram Aharonian	Columnista	Independiente
2.	Silvia Alegrett	Presidenta	Colegio Nacional de Periodistas (CNP)
3.	Maria Ines Delgado	Subdirectora de Redacción	Diario Panorama (Zulia)
4.	Elsy Barroeta	Jefa de Información	Globovisión
5.	Elides Rojas	Jefe de Redacción	El Universal
6.	Eleazar Díaz Rangel	Director	Ultimas Noticias
7.	<i>Maryclen Stelling</i>	<i>Académica</i>	<i>Observatorio de Medios</i>
8.	Omaira Labrador	Jefe de redaccion	La Nacion (San Cristobal)
9.	Carlos Subero	Jefe Corresponsalia	Diario La Calle (Valencia)
<b>PARTICIPANTES COLOMBIA</b>			
1.	Carlos Cortés	Editor	La Silla Vacía
2.	Francisco Miranda	Editor Internacional	El Tiempo
3.	Alfonso Ospina	Editor	ColPrensa
4.	Catalina Lobo-Guerrero	Columnista	Semana
5.	Cicerón Florez	Sub director	La Opinión (Cúcuta)
6.	Omar Rincón	Director	CEPER
7.	Ricardo Avila	Director	Portafolio
8.	<i>Socorro Ramirez</i>	<i>Académica</i>	
<b>PONENTES &amp; COMENTARISTAS</b>			
1.	Jennifer McCoy	Ponente (1)	Programa para las Américas, TCC
2.	Jesus (Txuo ) Rodríguez	Ponente (2)	Sacerdote Jesuita Parroquia El Nula
3.	María Teresa Ronderos	Ponente (3)	
4.	María Eugenia Bello	Comentarista (VEN)	Directora Centro de Estudios Fronterizos (CEFI) Universidad de Los Andes, Táchira
5.	Cicerón Florez	Comentarista (COL)	La Opinión
<b>OBSERVADORES</b>			
1.	Maritza Lucumi,	Observadora	NRC (Consejo Noruego para Refugiados) Cúcuta. Coordinadora Regional
2.	Ninoska Laya	Observadora	Oficial NRC Venezuela
3.	Merete Hansen	Observadora	IMS
<b>STAFF</b>			
1.	Héctor Vanolli	Coordinador	Programa Fortalecimiento Periodismo,
2.	Griselda Colina	Coordinadora Técnica	Programa Fort. Periodismo
3.	Karin Anderson	Oficial de Programa	Programa para las Américas Centro Carter
4.	Karlymg Rodriguez Medina	Consultora Local (Cúcuta)	

## **ANNEXO II - BIOS PARTICIPANTES**

### **VENEZUELA**

#### **Eleazar Díaz Rangel**

Fue presidente de la Asociación Venezolana de Periodistas, directivo del Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Prensa y presidente fundador de la Federación latinoamericana de Periodistas (FELAP). Fue además director del diario Punto y la revista Tribuna, además de Director de la Escuela de Comunicación Social de la Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV). Actualmente se desempeña como Director del diario Últimas Noticias, el diario de mayor tirada en Venezuela.

#### **Elides Rojas**

Es abogado y periodista. Entre 1979 y 1990, se desempeñó como Secretario de Redacción del diario El Nacional. Anteriormente, y por siete años, trabajó como Jefe de Redacción y Director de Redacción e Información del diario Economía Hoy. Desde 1996 se desempeña como Jefe de Redacción del diario El Universal. Por su labor en los últimos años ha recibido varios premios, tales como el Premio Nacional de Periodismo (Opinión), en 1999, el Premio Nacional de Periodismo Científico en 1985, el Premio a la Excelencia que otorga la Society Newspaper Design en 1991 y el Premio Internacional de la SIP, mención Opinión, en 2005.

#### **Aram Aharonian**

Trabajó como periodista tanto en su Uruguay natal como en Argentina, Colombia y Venezuela. Fue corresponsal de las agencias PL, IPS y editor de UPI, El Espectador (Bogotá), Proceso (México) y Brecha (Uruguay). En Venezuela se desempeñó, entre otros cargos, como Presidente de la Asociación de la Prensa Extranjera en Venezuela. Se lo conoce por el rol central que desempeñó en la creación de Telesur, medio del cual fue su primer Director General. Actualmente dicta cursos de posgrado en Comunicación en Argentina y Venezuela, edita los portales Question digital y Surysur y dirige el Observatorio Latinoamericano en Comunicación y Democracia de la Universidad Latinoamericana y del Caribe.

#### **Maryclen Stelling**

Es socióloga, especializada en el área de estudio de medios. Es docente en la Universidad Católica Andrés Bello y la Fundación Escuela de Gerencia Social. Actualmente se desempeña como Directora Ejecutiva del Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos Rómulo Gallegos (CELARG), así como Coordinadora General del capítulo venezolano del Observatorio Global de Medios. Conduce además un programa radial semanal, que emite Radio Nacional Venezuela.

#### **Silvia Allegrett**

Se desempeñó como Coordinadora General de la ONG Expresión Libre durante seis años (xxx-xxx). Actualmente dirige el periódico XXX y se desempeña como Presidenta del Colegio Nacional de Periodistas (CNP).

#### **Elsy Barroeta**

Es licenciada en Comunicación Social de la Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV), se desempeña desde hace 15 años como directora de información del canal de televisión Globovisión. (datos pendientes de completar)

#### **María Inés Delgado**

Se desempeña actualmente como Subdirectora de la edición impresa del Diario Panorama, del estado Zulia, el diario de mayor índice de lectoría y el segundo de mayor circulación en Venezuela. Lleva 17 años en el ejercicio del periodismo, 14 de ellos en el diario Panorama, donde comenzó en 1990 como pasante y donde se desempeñó sucesivamente como cronista y redactora de la sección Cultura y editora de la sección

Política y Economía. Licenciada en Comunicación Social en la Universidad del Zulia (LUZ), 1993, realizó una Maestría en Ciencias de la Comunicación, mención Socio-semiótica de la Comunicación en 1998.

### **Omaira Labrador**

Es Jefa de Redacción de Diario La Nación, de San Cristobal, reconocida comunicadora social venezolana, de amplia trayectoria en el Táchira. Labrador es comunicadora social egresada de la Universidad de Los Andes, Táchira, ha ejercido el periodismo en medios regionales, impresos, como el Diario La Nación de San Cristóbal, donde ha sido reportera, jefe de información y actualmente ocupa la jefatura de redacción. En paralelo Labrador ejerce la docencia universitaria en el Instituto Universitario de Tecnología agroindustrial Los Andes (IUT). Actualmente cursa el post grado de periodismo en medios digitales en la universidad de Los Andes Táchira.

### **Carlos Subero**

Trabaja en medios impresos desde hace 28 años. Se especializó en periodismo de precisión (*precision journalism*) en Carolina del Norte (Estados Unidos) junto al creador de esa disciplina, el profesor Philip Meyer. Utilizando este concepto (uso de base de datos y estadísticas y realización de censos) ha desarrollado numerosos trabajos periodísticos en diversos medios gráficos, incluidos los diarios Notitarde, El Diario de Caracas y El Universal, lo que le ha valido numerosos reconocimientos. Actualmente se desempeña como editor, a cargo de la cobertura de la fuente política en Caracas, del diario La Calle, de Valencia, Carabobo.

### **Jesus Rodriguez Villarroel**

Es coordinador ejecutivo de Paz en Fronteras, director de Radio Fe y Alegría 106.1FM, profesor de Etica Empresarial de la Universidad Católica del Táchira y Vicario de la Parroquia San Camilo de Lelis / El Nula. Ha realizado una maestría en Fronteras e Integración de la Universidad de los Andes / Núcleo Táchira (En Fase de tesis ), es Lic. En Teología, mención Cum Laude por la Universidad Católica "Andrés Bello", diplomado en Derecho Internacional Humanitario por el Instituto Henry Dunant de la Cruz Roja Venezolana. Realizó curso de Especialización en Derecho Internacional de los Refugiados por el Instituto de Derecho Internacional de San Remo – Italia y cuenta con una especialización en Derechos Humanos, por el Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, Costa Rica. Entre sus publicaciones se encuentran : Coordinador de la investigación " Cultura de Paz en el Alto Apure y Táchira, un reto de fronteras" publicado por la Universidad Católica del Táchira y la Parroquia San Camilo de Lelis y el artículo: " Lo que hay después del encuentro (De Santa Martha) publicado en la Revista SIC / Caracas

### **Maria Eugenia Bello**

Es docente investigadora titular, adscrita al CEFI, al área de investigación socio-histórica, cultural y educativa. Lic. en Educación, por la Universidad Central de Venezuela. Doctora en Pedagogía por la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona. Editora de la Revista Aldea Mundo, 2000-2005  
Directora del CEFI 2005-2009. Coordinadora de la Maestría en Fronteras e Integración, 2009 en adelante.

## **COLOMBIA**

### **Ricardo Avila**

Es un periodista especializado en actualidad política y economía. Estudió Economía en la Universidad Javeriana y tiene un Master en Economía de la Universidad de Pittsburgh. Actualmente se desempeña como Director del diario de economía y negocios Portafolio, así como sub director de El Tiempo en el área de opinión.



### **Carlos Cortés**

Es abogado y especialista en Periodismo, graduado en la Universidad de Los Andes de Colombia. Entre 2005 y 2009 dirigió la Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa (FLIP), de Colombia. Anteriormente, entre 2003 y 2005, trabajó en la Defensoría del Pueblo, desempeñándose simultáneamente como colaborador de Publicaciones Semana. Actualmente se desempeña como Editor de La Silla Vacía, un medio digital de notorio éxito en los últimos años en Colombia. En este medio se desempeña además como asesor en proyectos especiales y temas de cooperación internacional. Es también profesor de Política y Derecho de Medios del Programa de Periodismo y Opinión Pública de la Universidad del Rosario.

### **Francisco Miranda Hamburger**

Politólogo, especialista en economía Social y master en Administración Pública con concentración en Desarrollo Económico y Política Urbana de la Universidad de Columbia (Nueva York), se desempeña actualmente como editor de la sección Opinión del diario El Tiempo de Bogotá. Es además profesor de la Universidad del Rosario y de la Escuela de Negocios del Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración (CESA) de Bogotá. En 2005 fue becario de la Fundación Fulbright (2005).

### **Catalina Lobo-Guerrero**

Es antropóloga y periodista. Ha trabajado como reportera de los portales Semana.com (Bogotá) y Clarín.com (Buenos Aires), así como para el noticiero de televisión Noticias Uno. En los últimos años se desempeñó como stringer para medios internacionales y fue Editora del portal de cubrimiento electoral Votebien.com. Actualmente trabaja como periodista freelance y como investigadora para un documental de la serie

Women, War & Peace de PBS, la cadena de estaciones de la televisión pública de los estados Unidos.

### **Socorro Ramírez**

Entre otros títulos, tiene un post doctorado en el Institut des Hautes Etudes de L'Amérique Latine (HEAL) de la Universidad de La Sorbona, un Diplomado en Estudios Avanzados en Relaciones Internacionales (donde) y un Magister en Análisis de Problemas Político-Económicos e Internacionales en (xxx). Actualmente se desempeña como Coordinadora del Grupo sobre Integración regional y del Grupo América latina del Proyecto de Inserción de Colombia en el Sistema Internacional (xxx). Es además miembros del Foro de Diálogo Países Andinos-Estados Unidos, que auspician Idea Internacional y el Centro Carter.

### **Omar Rincón**

Profesor Asociado Universidad de Los Andes, se desempeña actualmente como director del Centro de Estudios de Periodismo (CEPE), de esa casa de estudios. Es además director del Centro de Competencia en Comunicación de la Fundación Friedrich Ebert. En el ámbito editorial es autor de varias publicaciones, tales como "Narrativas Mediáticas o cómo Cuenta la Sociedad del Entretenimiento" (Gedisa, Barcelona, 2006); "Televisión, Video y Subjetividad" ( Editorial Norma, Buenos Aires, 2002. Es además editor de publicaciones tales como "Televisión Pública: del Consumidor al Ciudadano (La crujía, Buenos Aires, 2005); "Los Tele-presidentes: cerca del pueblo, lejos de la democracia" (FES, Bogotá, 2008) y "Por Qué nos Odian Tanto? Estado y Medios de Comunicación en América Latina" (FES, Bogotá, 2010).

### **Alfonso Ospina**

Es Editor General de Colprensa - Bogotá

PROGRAMA TERCER ENCUENTRO BINACIONAL DE PERIODISTAS DE VENEZUELA Y COLOMBIA

<b>11 MAYO</b>	12:30 m	<b>Almuerzo - Palabras de apertura</b> Jennifer McCoy Directora, Programa para las Américas, Centro Carter
	1:30 pm	<b>Presentación de participantes</b>
	1:40 pm	<b>Resumen de los encuentros anteriores</b> Héctor Vanolli Coordinador, Programa para el Fortalecimiento del Periodismo, Centro Carter
	2:00 pm	<b>Presentación del análisis de contenido actualizado para el 3er Encuentro: Cobertura de los temas binacionales por los medios de Colombia y Venezuela</b> Jennifer McCoy Directora, Programa para las Américas, Centro Carter
	2:30 pm- 3:00 pm	<b>Introducción a la realidad de la frontera: Problemas, desafíos y propuestas en la frontera colombo-venezolana</b> Jesús "Txuo" Rodríguez Villarroel Coordinador Ejecutivo, Paz en Fronteras Director, Radio Fe y Alegría, El Nula, Venezuela
	3:00pm 3:30pm	<b>Presentación magistral: Cobertura mediática de las realidades de la frontera</b> María Teresa Ronderos, periodista, Revista Semana, Colombia
	3:30-3:45pm 3:45-4:00pm	<b>Comentaristas:</b> María Eugenia Bello, Centro de Estudios Fronterizos, ULA, Táchira, Venezuela Cicerón Flórez, Sub-Director, Diario La Opinión, Cúcuta, Colombia
	4:00 pm 5:00 pm	<b>Intercambio y debate entre participantes</b> <b>Moderación:</b> Aram Aharonian (Venezuela)
	5:00 -5:10pm 5:15- 6:45 pm 6:45-7:00 pm	<b>Traslado a El Escobal</b> <b>Conversatorio Comunidad de El Escobal</b> Conversatorio con miembros de organizaciones comunitarias, desplazados y refugiados Traslado al Hotel Bolívar
7:30 pm		<b>Cena en Hotel</b>
<b>12 MAYO</b>	7:00-8:00 am	<b>Desayuno y check out</b>
	8:30 -10:00am	<b>Intercambio y debate entre participantes</b> <b>Moderación:</b> Aram Aharonian (Venezuela)
	10:00-10:30	<b>Coffee break</b>
	10:30 am 1.30 pm	<b>Conclusiones y recomendaciones</b> <b>Moderación:</b> Catalina Lobo-Guerrero (Colombia)
1:30 – 2:50		<b>Almuerzo</b>
	3:00	<b>Salida Aeropuerto</b>

Hotel Bolívar, Av. Demetrio Mendoza, Vía San Luis, Junto al c.e. Bolívar, Cúcuta



## **Andean – United States Dialogue Forum Third Meeting between Venezuela-Colombia Media Professionals: Media Coverage**

### **Últimas Noticias<sup>19</sup>**

#### **Denuncian gran guiso de la FAN en la frontera**

*Consejos Comunales del municipio Páez, en el Alto Apure, denunciaron el fuerte contrabando en la frontera venezolana y las actuaciones irregulares de la Fuerza Armada Nacional y policías de la zona.*

A través de un comunicado que enviaron al Mayor General, Luis Motta Domínguez, Comandante General de la GNB, representantes de los consejos comunales "Pastor Villalonga", "Barrio Bolívar", "Polideportivo", "Bella Vista", "la T", "Barrio La Hormiga", "La Cañada", "11 de noviembre" y "Barrio Las Palmas" expresaron su preocupación ante las redes de presuntos contrabandistas que incluye a propietarios y trabajadores de varias de las estaciones de servicio ubicadas en El Nula (Apu) y en los municipios Fernández Feo, San Cristóbal y Libertador (Tách), así como a efectivos de los cuerpos de seguridad de ambos estados.

Explicaron que para llevar a cabo la irregularidad con estas actividades utilizan camiones "con 18 toneles de 220 litros cada uno, cargados de gasolina y diesel, llegando al descaro de instalar en estos vehículos enormes cisternas de hasta 12 mil litros de combustible" y así pasan por nueve puestos de control de la FAN.

Aseguran que el procedimiento es el pago de grandes cantidades de dinero a los funcionarios de turno en los puestos de control ubicados en: La Charca km 30; en el puente Sarare; el barrio Primero de Mayo, entre otros. Añaden que esta situación se vive igualmente con los productos de Mercal, los cuales se consiguen con gran facilidad en Colombia".

Lo mismo sucede con el gas doméstico y con productos de la cesta básica, "que aparte de la especulación, sufrimos la escasez por el contrabando hacia el vecino país.

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<sup>19</sup> Source: <http://www.ultimasnoticias.com.ve/Noticias/Actualidad/Denuncian-gran-guiso-de-la-FAN-en-la-frontera.aspx>

Soluciones. Entre las propuestas expuestas por los voceros comunales destaca la rotación, en un lapso no mayor de tres meses, de los funcionarios adscritos a los puestos de control en la zona fronteriza. Proponen activar la Milicia Bolivariana para que coordine junto con las comunidades acciones de vigilancia en los puntos de control, amparándose en el art.29 de la Ley Orgánica de los Consejos Comunales.

Piden supervisar las casas de la población de El Nula, pues existen depósitos ilegales de combustible y, además, promover la creación de organizaciones socio-productivas para generar fuentes de empleo.

# Opinión: Los Domingos De Díaz Rangel

## Radio en Vivo - YVKE Mundial :: Artículos<sup>20</sup>

### La computadora inhabilitada

Eleazar Díaz Rangel

22 de mayo de 2011

¿Dónde se habrá metido Álvaro Uribe después que la Corte Suprema de Justicia colombiana declaró que los contenidos de la computadora del jefe guerrillero Raúl Reyes en absoluto tienen valor como pruebas de nada?. Explicó que las Fuerzas Armadas suplantaron a la Policía Judicial en el registro de lugares y recolección de materiales, y porque se desconoce si lo que se llamó correos de Raúl Reyes en realidad no se sabe si lo son, porque se hallaron "en un formato Word, en archivos estáticos que no ligan un origen con un destino". Por supuesto, los razonamientos son más extensos, propios de un alto tribunal en materia tan peliaguda.

El caso es que junto a sus efectos jurídicos inmediatos, tiene otros de significativa importancia. En el orden político, se caen todas las acusaciones que hizo Uribe contra Venezuela y contra los presidentes Chávez y Correa, así como las denuncias que posteriormente Uribe llevó a la OEA, que provocaron la ruptura de relaciones y que aquí en Venezuela llevó a nuestra infame oposición a pedir que se investigaran tales acusaciones y denuncias. Otras quedaron hace poco devaluadas con las declaraciones del presidente Santos, según las cuales los campamentos de unos 1.500 guerrilleros que denunció Uribe como establecidos en territorio venezolano, no existen.

Pueden existir otros, pero esos, precisamente "esos", ya no están. De manera que políticamente es un nuevo revés para el uribismo, dentro y fuera de Colombia, como aquí en Venezuela, por ejemplo. Como lo destacó el canciller Nicolás Maduro en el foro de Sao Paulo, "esa fábula envenenada debe pasar al basurero del olvido como parte de todas esas campañas que han pretendido montar... para atacar a los gobiernos progresistas".

(Campaña que, entre paréntesis, no cesa. Hace nada, el diario alemán Die Welt denunció que en la península de Paraguaná las fuerzas armadas de Irán están montando bases con la cooperación de la Fuerza Armada venezolana. Algo parecido y ampliado publicó después El Nuevo Herald de Miami. ¿Esa "noticia" la sacarían de la misma fuente que le informó al Canciller británico hace un mes que Kadafi había huido a Venezuela?).

No terminarán ahí los efectos de la sentencia de la CSJ colombiana. Desacredita la versión de Interpol a los pocos días de rescatada la computadora, y el muy recientico

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<sup>20</sup> Source: <http://cantv.radiomundial.com.ve/yvke/noticia.php?t=491016&postorder=desc>

informe del International Institute for Strategic Studies recogido en un libro que pasó inadvertido en Bogotá, y que ni aquí pudieron levantar.

Se anuncia que Piedad Córdoba puede ser la primera gran beneficiada. Ella fue inhabilitada políticamente por 18 años por decisión del procurador Alejandro Ordóñez, tenido en Bogotá como brazo derecho de Uribe, por mantener relaciones con las Farc, acusación basada en textos de la computadora de Raúl Reyes, ésta sí, ahora bien inhabilitada, por la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Lo más probable es que su caso se revise y ella pueda volver al Senado. Habrá que seguir creyendo en ese viejo dicho de que la justicia tarda pero llega.

¿Este Dominique Strauss-Kahn, que tenía el Partido Socialista francés como su candidato presidencial, cuya carrera política parece perdida por estar acosando a camareras de un lujoso hotel, no es el mismo que en el Fondo Monetario Internacional se ocupaba de clasificar los países según su crecimiento económico? Alguna responsabilidad debió tener cuando el FMI declaró hace poquito que con un PIB de 1,6 en este año, Venezuela era el peor de los países más desarrollados de América Latina. Por supuesto, no habrá leído las informaciones según las cuales en el primer semestre de este año, el PIB de Venezuela tuvo un crecimiento de 4,5, que con el vendaval del gigantesco plan vivienda deberá mantenerse o subir; tampoco habrá tenido tiempo, en ese berenjenal en que se metió, para tratar de averiguar por qué se peló tanto y quién o quiénes pudieron hacerlo equivocar. Sospecho que todo quedará para sus Memorias.

Las nuevas máquinas de votación que anunció contratará el CNE hará de Venezuela el "único país del mundo con un sistema electoral totalmente automatizado", son palabras de Tibisay Lucena, y además, reforzará la transparencia del proceso y el secreto del voto, más de lo seguro que está ahora. El rector Vicente Díaz las objeta por su elevado costo, que podría invertirse en otras áreas. Partidos hay que cada vez que se incorpora nueva tecnología para blindar el acto de votación, no se les ocurre sino repetir que se está montando una trampa, que buscan que el Gobierno sepa cómo votan los ciudadanos. Lo que les falta es proponer que regresemos al sistema de conteo manual y al del acta mata voto.

La Guardia Nacional Bolivariana, ejerciendo funciones que le corresponden a Conatel, estuvo en la emisora Fe y Alegría, en El Nula, Apu, para una inspección que no le corresponde y que es difícil de desvincular con las denuncias que días antes hizo el director de esa radio, el padre Jesús Rodríguez, y que publiqué el pasado domingo sobre eventuales nexos de la GNB con el contrabando de gasolina. ¿Estarán informados sus superiores?.

Con escepticismo, reservas o rechazo han sido vistas por los partidos políticos españoles, las centrales sindicales y los medios, el movimiento por una democracia real que inesperadamente se ha venido mostrando en las principales ciudades. El "acampado en la Puerta del Sol", en Madrid, ha sido el más multitudinario y permanente. Nadie sabe cómo podrá influir en las elecciones municipales que se celebran hoy en ese país, y menos avizorarle el futuro.

El VI Congreso del Partido Comunista Cubano tuvo una característica que lo diferencia de casi todos los anteriores: la autocrítica. Veamos algunas: modelo económico excesivamente centralizado, perturba el desarrollo de la iniciativa en la sociedad; "promoción acelerada de cuadros inexpertos e inmaduros a golpe de simulación y oportunismo", la militancia en el PCC no debe ser condición vinculante para desempeñar funciones en el Gobierno o el Estado; contra la discriminación para asegurar la promoción a funciones importantes a mujeres, negros, mestizos y jóvenes; reconocen que no cuentan con una reserva de sustitutos debidamente preparados. Pero seguramente el cuestionamiento que más habrá impactado a los cubanos es la eliminación de la tarjeta de abastecimiento, que desde 1960 favorecía a todos y se convirtió en "una carga insoportable para la economía y un desestímulo al trabajo, además de generar ilegalidades diversas". Y lean esta frase de Raúl Castro: "Lo que aprobemos en este Congreso no puede sufrir la misma suerte que los acuerdos anteriores, casi todos olvidados sin haberse cumplido". Increíble.

# Ultimas Noticias - Question Digital<sup>21</sup>

## El contrabando mayor

Eleazar Diaz Rangel

En el aeropuerto de San Antonio del Táchira, mal mentado “Juan Vicente Gómez” (1), tuve el primer contacto con el contrabando de gasolina cuando una funcionaria me echó el primer cuento de la red de los 6 mil pimpineros, parte de una poderosa mafia; lo recaudado parece ir a diversas jerarquías del funcionariado. Después, en las dos cortas carreteras que nos llevan a Cúcuta, se observan hileras y montones de pimpinas de todo tamaño para la venta pública de gasolina. “A un tanque de 60 litros, que cuesta unos 6 bolívares, le sacan tres pimpinas de 20 que las venden hasta por 80 cada una. Imagínense lo que ganan, eso se lo reparten y todavía sobra”.

Comenzando la tarde, instalado en Cúcuta el Encuentro de periodistas colombo-venezolanos, hubo abundante información sobre el voluminoso y productivo contrabando de gasolina que tantas ganancias produce, que ha desplazado al narcotráfico. La primera fuente fue el padre jesuita Jesús Rodríguez, a quien todos llaman “Txúo”, director de la radio Fe y Alegría en El Nula, periodistas de la región fronteriza, y la académica Socorro Ramírez.

Veamos un resumen de lo que dijeron:

Hasta hace poco, la zona fronteriza Táchira-Norte de Santander se caracterizaba por enfrentamientos armados entre los diversos grupos que operan en la región: Farc, FBL, AUC y el ELN, el más débil de todos, pero recientemente habrían acordado formas de convivir, de penetrar la sociedad, permear las instituciones, y gradualmente han controlado el contrabando, comenzando por el de gasolina, que les da un gran poder económico, e influyen en toda la vida, hasta en los divorcios y separaciones de parejas, y por supuesto, secuestros, sicariatos, reclutamiento de niños y adolescentes, para incorporarlos a los grupos armados y que las madres ni se atreven a denunciar por temor a represalias.

Entre El Nula y San Cristóbal hay 10 alcabalas controladas por estos grupos, nadie puede pasarlas sin pagar, se han en empresas gananciosas. Hasta en Puerto Contreras (Col) se encuentran con facilidad productos de Mercal que escasean en las poblaciones tachirenses. (“Mire, en Ecuador también llegan las cargas de Mercal, pero aquí uno tiene que hacer cola”, me contó en San Antonio un empleado que me reconoció).

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<sup>21</sup> Source: <http://questiondigital.com/?p=13673&print=1>



-La Misión Identidad favoreció a los irregulares colombianos que [buy flagyl](#) tenían capacidad para obtener cédulas venezolanas, que las permiten recorrer la zona sin dificultad, en cambio tenemos compatriotas apátridas, sin documentos. (“Túo” dixit)

El gran negocio es el contrabando de gasolina. Pdvsa surte a esa zona con 19 millones de litros al mes; estiman que a El Nula (20.000 hab) llega hasta un millón de litros, que van casi todos a vehículos colombianos, que compran el litro hasta 20 veces más caro, precio que crece en la medida en que se alejan de Venezuela. Los pimpineros apenas son una muestra; contaron cómo los llamados tractomulas (gandolas con tanques gigantes y hasta con depósitos especiales) pasan todos los puestos de la GN y alcabalas, pagando vacuna, por supuesto. “Por ahí se van miles de litros cada vez, y su precio permite que se los repartan hasta los de arriba”.

-¿Dónde los llenan?

-Pues imagínese usted.

Conocida esa realidad, hice una pregunta que quedó sin respuesta: ¿Por qué coinciden los gobiernos de Venezuela y Colombia en la pasividad y falta de decisión para enfrentar la presencia de esos grupos y erradicar el contrabando?

El pasado 2 de noviembre los presidentes Chávez y Santos firmaron aquí en Caracas un convenio sobre suministro de combustible a los departamentos colombianos fronterizos con Zulia, Táchira, Apure y Amazonas, hasta por 37 millones 156 mil 800 litros mensuales, equivalentes a 7.741 MMD. En ese convenio se lee:

“Decidimos fortalecer los esquemas de control en ambos lados de la frontera para erradicar el contrabando de combustible y desarrollar programas de reversión social y laboral”

La pregunta es aún más pertinente: ¿por qué en los seis meses transcurridos desde entonces no ha cambiado nada?

Quizá la respuesta está en algo que dijo el Padre Txúo:

-Antes, enviar a un oficial a esta zona era tenido como un castigo, ahora se lo sortean. Conozco el caso de un oficial de la Guardia Nacional que en una sola noche obtuvo 18 mil bolívares fuertes con paso de gasolina; al que se puede añadir el cobro por paso armas, paso de drogas, hoy muy secundario, hasta de alimentos de Mercal. Hace poco se volcó un camión y enviamos a dos reporteros, allí encontraron a militares y contrabandistas viendo cómo salvaban la carga. A nuestros periodistas los amenazaron”.

(1) Bautizado por un Concejo Municipal por un paisano de Gómez, nacido en La Mulera, y de nada han valido las propuestas para cambiarle el nombre. Increíble ese homenaje.

## **El Universal**<sup>22</sup>

### **Periodistas analizan hoy temas comunes entre Caracas y Bogotá**

11 de mayo de 2011

Hasta mañana en Cúcuta estarán debatiendo sobre cobertura bilateral.

Por tercera vez el Centro Carter, a través del programa para el Fortalecimiento del Periodismo en el país, organiza el encuentro de periodistas de Venezuela y Colombia. A partir de hoy y hasta mañana, en la ciudad colombiana de Cúcuta, se congregarán editores y periodistas de medios de ambas naciones para analizar la cobertura informativa de las relaciones bilaterales.

Al mediodía de hoy, Jennifer McCoy, directora del programa para las Américas del Centro Carter, presentará el análisis de contenido actualizado para el encuentro: "Cobertura de los temas binacionales por los medios de Colombia y Venezuela".

Posteriormente, según el programa, Jesús Rodríguez Villarroel, director de radio Fe y alegría (El Nula, Venezuela) ofrecerá una "Introducción a la realidad de la frontera: Problemas, desafíos y propuestas en las fronteras colombo-venezolana".

Luego, la periodista de la revista colombiana *Semana*, María Teresa Ronderos, se referirá a la cobertura mediática de las realidades de la frontera. Mañana continuará el debate y serán presentadas las conclusiones y recomendaciones.

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<sup>22</sup> Source: <http://www.eluniversal.com/2011/05/11/periodistas-analizan-hoy-temas-comunes-entre-caracas-y-bogota.shtml>

## **La Opinión**<sup>23</sup>

11 de mayo de 2011

### **Encuentro de periodistas**

La Fundación Carter ha propiciado, con respaldo efectivo, los encuentros de periodistas de Colombia y Venezuela. El primero fue en Caracas, el segundo en Bogotá y hoy es el tercero en Cúcuta. Todos con una participación muy representativa de los diferentes medios de información de los dos países.

Esos encuentros han de servir no solamente para intercambiar experiencias sobre las condiciones en que se ejerce el periodismo en una y otra nación sino también para asumir propuestas comunes orientadas a la cooperación en el campo de la información, a la búsqueda de proyectos integracionistas y la defensa de los derechos que deben garantizarse a quienes tienen la responsabilidad del manejo de los medios.

El encuentro de hoy en Cúcuta se produce en momentos en que hay mucho por debatir por el periodismo y construir acciones que unan y fortalezcan su ejercicio en Colombia y Venezuela.

## **La Opinión**<sup>24</sup>

10 de mayo de 2011

### **Tercer Encuentro Binacional de Periodistas de Colombia y Venezuela**

Cúcuta será epicentro hoy y mañana de uno de los encuentros binacionales más importantes de periodistas de Colombia y Venezuela.

La cumbre de profesionales de la comunicación organizada por el Centro Carter, por iniciativa del Foro Andino Estadounidense, es la tercera que se lleva a cabo entre los dos países y la primera que tendrá lugar en una ciudad de frontera.

El primer encuentro binacional de periodistas tuvo lugar en noviembre del año pasado en Caracas (Venezuela) con la participación de 20 comunicadores. El segundo se desarrolló en Bogotá, en febrero.

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<sup>23</sup> [http://www.laopinion.com.co/noticias/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=372822&Itemid=38](http://www.laopinion.com.co/noticias/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=372822&Itemid=38)

<sup>24</sup>

[http://www.laopinion.com.co/noticias/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=372784&Itemid=31](http://www.laopinion.com.co/noticias/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=372784&Itemid=31)

En esta oportunidad el objetivo es profundizar en los debates y las discusiones que se han dado en los dos primeros encuentros y analizar la forma en que se aborda el tema fronterizo en un corredor limítrofe como este.

Dentro del programa está contemplado un espacio para discutir acerca de la realidad de la frontera colombo-venezolana y sus principales problemas, desafíos y propuestas.

De la misma forma, se abordará el cubrimiento mediático que se hace a la situación de la frontera tanto en Colombia como en Venezuela.

Los periodistas invitados participarán además en un conversatorio en el sector de El Escobal, donde compartirán con miembros de organizaciones comunitarias, desplazados y refugiados.

El encuentro está previsto la 1:30 de la tarde en el Hotel Bolívar y continuará mañana a partir de las 8:30.

Los invitados al Tercer Encuentro Binacional de Periodistas son directores y editores de los principales medios de comunicación de Colombia y Venezuela.

Personajes que han estado vinculados a las discusiones anteriores y que ya vienen manejando un discurso y un debate sobre el tema de la frontera.

Griselda Colina, Coordinadora Técnica del Programa para el Fortalecimiento del periodismo en Venezuela, e integrante del comité organizador del evento confirmó la asistencia de:

Por Colombia: Carlos Cortés, Editor de La Silla Vacía; Francisco Miranda, Editor Internacional de El Tiempo; Alfonso Ospina, Editor Colprensa; Catalina Lobo-Guerrero, Columnista de Semana; Cicerón Flórez Moya, Subdirector de La Opinión; Omar Rincón, Director Ceper; Ricardo Ávila, Director de Portafolio, y Socorro Ramírez, académica.

Por Venezuela: Aram Aharonian, columnista independiente; Silvia Alegrett, Presidenta del Colegio Nacional de Periodistas (CNP); María Inés Delgado, Subdirectora de Redacción, Diario Panorama (Zulia); Elsy Barroeta, Jefa de Información de Globovisión; Elides Rojas, Jefe de Redacción, El Universal; Eleazar Díaz Rangel, Director, Últimas Noticias; Maryclen Stelling, Directora Ejecutiva Observatorio Global de Medios; Omaira Labrador, Jefe de Redacción de La Nación (San Cristóbal); Carlos Subero, Jefe de Corresponsalía, Diario La Calle (Valencia).

Como ponentes y comentaristas estarán:

-Jesús Rodríguez, Director de Radio Fe y Alegría, parroquia El Nula (Venezuela).

-Jenifer MacCoy, Directora del Programa para las Américas del Centro Carter, Atlanta.

-María Teresa Ronderos, Revista Semana.

-María Eugenia Bello, Directora del Centro de Estudios Fronterizos, CEFI, ULA,  
(Táchira-Venezuela).



## Content Analysis of Colombian – Venezuelan written news media

This content analysis of Colombian and Venezuelan media was undertaken for the purpose of analyzing the content of media coverage between the two countries. The methodology consisted of gathering articles on 15 previously selected landmark events which occurred in Colombia and Venezuela between the years 2009 and 2010.

### Chronology of landmark events in bilateral relations between Colombia and Venezuela during 2009 and 2010

#### 21 July 2009

Chávez indicates that he intends to review relations with Colombia due to the latter's negotiations with the United States about the establishment of US military bases on Colombian territory.

**(Key word: *military bases*)**

#### 28 July 2009

The Swedish government confirms that several rocket-launchers captured from the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) were sold by Sweden to Venezuela in the late eighties.

**(Key word: *rocket-launchers*)**

#### 28 August 2009

Meeting in Bariloche, Argentina, the leaders of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) seek ways to reduce the polarization caused by the military agreement reached between Colombia and the United States.

**(Key word: *UNASUR*)**

#### 13 November 2009

The Colombian ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), Luis Alfonso Hoyos, protests bellicose "threats" from Venezuela.

**(Key word: *OAS*)**

#### 21 June 2010

Juan Manuel Santos is elected President of Colombia. The Venezuelan government, through its Ministry of Foreign Relations, issues an official statement congratulating the Colombian president-elect.

**(Key word: *Santos*)**

#### 25 June 2010

The former Colombian ambassador to Venezuela and representative to the United Nations (UN), María Angela Holguín is appointed Minister of Foreign Relations to Juan Manuel Santos' new cabinet, presumably because her diplomatic experience may be helpful in trying to thaw out relations between the two countries.

**(Key word: *Holguín*)**

#### 15 July 2010

Colombia affirmed it has evidence that several guerrilla leaders of the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) are in Venezuela, a situation which might further deteriorate relations with its neighbor.

(Key word: guerrilla leaders)

10 August 2010

Presidents Hugo Chávez and Juan Manuel Santos “relaunch” diplomatic relations between Caracas and Bogotá.

(Key word: *relaunch*)

For the purpose of preparing a detailed analysis of the written media coverage and the agenda of the newspapers, events reported on were examined not only on the key date(s) on which the event took place, but for a period of fifteen days, in order to examine the before, the during and the after for each of these. Key words were systematized in every case in order to seek and select news stories. Once chosen, the stories or articles were formatted and introduced to a software program called QDAminer. The program thereupon counted the frequency with which certain words appear. This determined which issues receive the most coverage. Final results were compared among the newspaper previously selected.

In Colombia *El Tiempo*, *El Espectador* and *La Opinión* (newspapers) and *Revista Semana* (weekly news magazine) were chosen. *La Opinión* is published in the city of Cucutá, on the border with Venezuela; the other three publications are from the capital city of Bogotá. Due to the polarized situation in Venezuelan media, newspapers from both sides of the political spectrum were selected, as follows: *El Nacional*, *Últimas Noticias*, *Tal Qual* and *Panorama*; the latter is a newspaper published in Maracaibo, state of Zulia, which borders on Colombia, while the other three papers are from the capital city of Caracas. Data collection was systematized and computerized, and the data gathered was thereupon delivered to Dr. Germán Rey, an academic.

Dr. Germán Rey is the director of the Centro ATICO at Javeriana University. He presented the results of the data analysis at the Second Binational Meeting of Colombian and Venezuelan Journalists, which took place in Bogotá (February 2011). The study was titled “Media Coverage of Colombian-Venezuelan Relations: Change and Persistence”,<sup>25</sup> and reveals a variety of dynamics occurring in the media. It is divided into four parts: (1) references to media behavior; (2) thematic agenda; (3) issues or attitudes persisting over time; and (4) changes observed in newspaper coverage of events.

1) References to media behavior.<sup>26</sup>

Due to the shift in diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela, a change in how the crisis between the two countries is being approached in the media was detected. The difference between coverage in the years 2009 and 2010 is noteworthy.

- As concerns media coverage, the Colombian newspaper *El Tiempo* takes a prudent position in its news coverage. It makes mention of diplomatic relations

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<sup>25</sup> It is worth mentioning that the analysis presented by Dr. Germán Rey covers only events which took place during the years 2009 and 2010.

<sup>26</sup> These references refer to a study carried out previously by Dr. Germán Rey and Dr. Salazar in 1998.

- between Colombia and Venezuela as a “freezing of relations”, or “a tense setting”. With the improvement in relations, it began using expressions such as “opening the door”, “frank dialogue” and “turning the page”.
- The Venezuelan newspaper *El Nacional*, for its part, has a thematic approach based on the notion of “political governance as disaster”.<sup>27</sup> Its main thrust is aimed at the guerrilla and the conflict in Colombia, in addition to the commercial debt, weapons, drugs and terrorism.
  - The weekly newsmagazine *Revista Semana* (Colombia) offers ample coverage of the relationship between the new Colombian president, Juan Manuel Santos, and the president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez Frías.
  - The newspaper *Tal Cual* (Venezuela) mainly focuses on political coverage, but is beginning to adopt a more diversified agenda and now includes other matters of interest.
  - The Venezuelan newspaper *Panorama* is published in Zulia, a state bordering with Colombia. It therefore includes ample coverage of Colombian affairs.

## 2. Thematic agenda:

The study demonstrated that the media in both Colombia and Venezuela focus mainly on two issues: the presidents and the FARC. After these, the most frequently mentioned are the foreign ministers of both countries, diplomacy, the economy and, lastly, personal security (delinquency).

The data also confirmed the personalization of diplomatic relations based on the relationship between the presidents as individuals rather than their governmental institutions. This is quite clear from the record of articles gathered for this study. Therefore, the challenge of institutionalizing relations between the two countries, thus strengthening the institutions involved, continues to be a priority.

Presidential coverage is characterized mainly by the creation of magnetic poles that limit information to the personalities of Álvaro Uribe and Hugo Chávez. However, Uribe gets more coverage than Chávez, as proven by the statistical data gathered on the contents of the material examined. At the same time, there is a transformation underway as focus on the presidency has diminished with the change of president in Colombia.

- The former president of Colombia, Álvaro Uribe, is mentioned three times as often in Venezuelan newspapers than Chávez is in Colombian newspapers.
- In Colombia, *Revista Semana* lays greater stress on the figure of the president than does *El Tiempo*.
- In Venezuela, the newspaper *Tal Cual* focuses more on presidents than *El Nacional*.
- In border states, *La Opinión* (Cúcuta, Colombia) and *Panorama* (Zulia, Venezuela) are the papers that emphasize the respective presidents least. The

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<sup>27</sup> “Political governance as disaster” is a term used by Dr. Germán Rey in an academic paper published in 2000. It describes the saturation of information by journalists intended to convey a disastrous context.



magnetic focus on presidents is a phenomenon of the capital cities in both nations. It is not nearly as pronounced in the border states.

Journalistic coverage also emphasizes the FARC. As concerns the armed conflict:

- The weekly magazine *Revista Semana* and the newspaper *Tal Cual* provide ample coverage of the armed conflict in Colombia.
- The weekly magazine *Revista Semana* and the newspaper *Tal Cual* provide twice as much coverage of the armed conflict than *El Tiempo* and *El Nacional*.

The other four frequently raised subjects are the ministers of foreign relations of both countries, diplomacy, the economy and crime (in the order in which they are presented here, after presidents and the FARC). The data examined indicate the following:

- In the Colombian newspapers these four issues are covered more frequently than in their Venezuelan counterparts.
- Among the two newspapers published in border states, *Panorama* gives less importance than *La Opinión* to matters concerning the economy and personal security.

Finally, issues such as the paramilitary, hostages and kidnapped persons receive remarkably scarce coverage in the publications selected for this study.

### 3. - Issues or attitudes persisting over time

There are certain issues, based on the analysis of statistical data, which remains constant over time. These have been termed “persistent”, both in the aforementioned study carried out by Dr. Germán Rey and Dr. Salazar in 1998 and in this content analysis study presented at the Second Meeting of Colombian and Venezuelan Journalists. Taking both studies into account, the following is the case:

- There is a greater flow of information about Colombia in Venezuela than about Venezuela in Colombia.
- The journalistic agenda has focused on the internal conflict in Colombia. However, lately there has been an increase in attention to diplomacy.
- The overall approach to information is based on the tension and conflict in the area. This was more evident during the Uribe-Chávez period.
- Coverage is based mainly on metropolitan relations between Bogotá and Caracas, and tends to overlook the vibrant economic, social and cultural aspects of bilateral relations.
- The notion of a “hot border” or conflict zone is an *idée fixe*. Relations at the border are considered synonymous with diplomatic relations between the capital cities of Bogotá and Caracas by the media.
- Along the border area, media coverage is based more on the economy or issues concerning personal security. It focuses less on the presidents and on the events surrounding them.
- Coverage continues to be framed within the idea of *governance as disaster* due to the fact that any minor criminal event is automatically connected to the president.

- Newspapers provide extensive coverage of events at their peaks, but subsequently often fail to follow up on the news item.

#### 4. - Changes observed in media coverage


Although in both studies there are tendencies which stay the same over time, certain changes in news coverage can be noted between the first study, carried out in 1998, and the second (2009-2010). Some of these are as follows:

- Starting eight to ten years ago, most media tends to focus mainly on presidential activities.
- Coverage of events in Venezuela has increased in the Colombian media, although it focuses almost entirely on the disputes between the two countries.
- Although the issues as such are persistent, the content has changed. For instance, the coverage of diplomacy has changed to focus on border issues, which in turn has changed to emphasize the ruptures and recommencements in bilateral relations between Colombia and Venezuela.
- The figure of the president as such (presidency) has diminished, and the focus is more on the influence the personal characteristics of each president may exercise on the others' behavior, and relations between the two.
- The notion that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is the personality with most appearances in written communications media should be revised. This content analysis demonstrates that in reality Colombian President Álvaro Uribe is (was) the political figure with stronger media coverage.
- The content analysis shows there has been a slight shift from the context of difficulties and disputes to the realignment and normalization of diplomatic relations. The media are now following the changes in bilateral relations and emphasize how fragile these still are.
- Themes in the news have diversified mildly, although they are still very basic. At the same time, the recent militarization of relations demonstrates the weight that subjects such as the FARC and (military) security has in the coverage provided by the Colombian and Venezuelan media. This situation is now receiving more coverage than presidential issues, the economy, personal security, and diplomatic relations.


It is worth mentioning that this content analysis is purely quantitative. It does not analyze the actual content of each article. In the events studied, the statistical numbers reflected do not indicate the position taken on the issue at hand. For example, the data on publications regarding US military bases do not reflect if the articles tended to support or oppose the bases. However, a content analysis study should also take into account the opinion or tendency expressed in the articles (their qualitative aspect); doing so would enable greater precision regarding the meaning or significance of the quantitative side. Another recommendation is to compare this content analysis exercise with the study titled "The Border in the Venezuelan Newspapers *El Nacional* and *La Nación*", carried out by the *Universidad de los Andes*, Venezuela, in order to compare and contrast the conclusions reached in each.

Given that the content analysis study is, as mentioned, quantitative in nature, there is no interpretation of the content of the publications counted. However, the study confirms the idea that Colombian-Venezuelan relations are vulnerable and that the media have not followed up sufficiently on news items. In addition, when covering events, the agenda is not broad enough. As mentioned, for the events studied, the statistical numbers reflected do not indicate the position taken on a particular issue.


**Thematic News Coverage of Selected Events from 2009-2010 of Venezuelan and Colombian Newspapers**  
**AVERAGE NUMBER OF ARTICLES PER COUNTRY**



The thematic News Coverage of Selected Events from 2009-2010 of Venezuelan and Colombian Newspapers  
**NUMBER OF ARTICLES PER NEWSPAPER**



**Thematic News Coverage of Selected Events from 2009-2010 of Venezuelan and Colombian Newspapers**  
**NUMBER OF WORDS PER NEWSPAPER**




## Palabras Clave

- **Presidentes:** Chávez, Santos, Uribe
- **Canciller:** Holguín, Maduro, Bermúdez
- **Economía:** Comercio, Deuda, Devaluación, Inflación, Inversión
- **Seguridad Personal:** Crimen, Droga, Homicidios, Seguridad
- **Migración:** Migración, Refugiados
- **Diplomacia:** OEA, Restablecimiento, Normalización
- **UNASUR:** UNASUR
- **Política:** Elecciones, Reforma Constitucional, Corte Constitucional, Tribunal Supremo
- **FARC/Secuestrados:** Armamentos, Beligerante, Córdoba, Ejército, Guerrilleros, Insurgentes, Lanzacohetes, FARC, Liberación, Mediación, Militares, Negociaciones, Paramilitares, Rehenes, Terroristas, Secuestrados
- **Seguridad Nacional:** Amenaza, Bélica, Invasión, Incursión

# Thematic News Coverage of Colombian Newspapers Based on Keywords for Selected Events in 2009-


2010

## FREQUENCY OF ARTICLES






**Thematic News Coverage of Venezuelan Newspapers Based on Keywords for Selected Events in 2009-2010**  
**FREQUENCY OF ARTICLES**




# Thematic News Coverage of Colombian Newspapers Based on Keywords for Selected Events in 2009-2010



# Thematic News Coverage of Venezuelan Newspapers Based on Keywords for Selected Events in 2009-2010

## FREQUENCY OF WORDS



THE  
CARTER CENTER



**Trilateral Media Dialogue:  
Colombia – United States – Venezuela**

## **1. Introduction**

The trilateral media dialogue between journalists, editors and newspaper directors from Colombia, the United States (U.S.) and Venezuela took place June 13-14, 2011 in Atlanta, Georgia. This encounter was the fourth in a series of meetings between Colombian and Venezuelan media professionals to promote a deeper understanding of the role of the media in inter-country relations and to promote more balanced reporting on issues that cause tensions between the countries. The journalists have held rich discussions that have focused on the political constraints and the strengths and deficits in the content of the reporting. This effort has accompanied the improvement in bilateral relations and seeks to support that improvement, which is viewed as still fragile and dependent on the personalities of the two leaders. Given the triangulation that has often affected the U.S.-Venezuela-Colombia relationship (e.g. the 2009 U.S. military base cooperation agreement) and the related media coverage, the group proposed to hold its fourth session with U.S. editors and journalists. The meeting series is a part of the Media Working Group, part of The Carter Center and International IDEA's U.S.-Andean Forum, a group of citizens from Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, United States and Peru that work to improve relations between the six countries.

The meeting was designed to provide a space for prominent journalists, editors and directors to share information on the characteristics of the trilateral media coverage. In so doing, the organizers hoped to promote mutual understanding among the participating journalists and media professionals while contributing to the forging and deepening of personal relations and networks. The Carter Center and IDEA also hoped that the exchanges would contribute to an improved quality of information available to the participating journalists on issues that cause tensions between countries.

Overall, the participants valued being part of the meeting. In the evaluations, they commented on the importance of mutual understanding for high-quality reporting and found the discussion that took place during the meeting to be useful and informative. Many participants noted that the discussions between media professionals from different countries exposed them to different perspectives and gave them new views on the relations between Colombia, Venezuela, and the United States. Resulting from these sessions, many participants intended to be more conscious of bias and work to produce deeper news reports. They also found it incredibly beneficial to make new contacts with journalists from other countries. Many of the evaluations highlighted the need for continued dialogues to produce real changes in the media coverage in each country.

## **2. Topics analyzed**

The meeting was opened by a presentation by three experts on foreign policy from Venezuela, Colombia and the U.S. The presentations focused on the "triangulation" of the relations between the three countries; how it was generated, how it is being changed and what risks exist that it could happen again. As part of this panel, one journalist from each country commented on the presentation, based on their own experience and

expertise. Then the conversation was opened up for wide comments, discussion and analysis by all participants through a moderated conversation over dinner.

The second day focused on analyzing the characteristics of the trilateral media coverage and the factors, dilemmas and constraints that are affecting the media coverage. The findings from a content analysis of the press coverage of main issues on the bi-national agenda between Colombia and Venezuela, carried out by the Carter Center, were shared. The second day was also dedicated to jointly examining approaches to ensure that the trilateral media coverage contributed to an informed citizenry rather than detract with politicized reporting.

### **2.1. 'Triangulization' and de-triangulization' of Colombia – United States – Venezuela relations**

The panelists who spoke on the relationship between Colombia, Venezuela, and the United States characterized it as a triangular relationship; the actions taken by one country or between two countries has an effect on policies and relationships held by the third. As the three panelists outlined in their presentations on the subject, this triangular relationship started to appear in 1999, when U.S. policies such as Plan Colombia and the election of President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela dramatically changed international relations between the three countries. The polemic differences between the Venezuelan and the U.S. government strained bilateral relations, while U.S. anti-narcotic, and later anti-terrorist, policies strengthened ties between Colombia and the U.S.

The tensions between Venezuela and the United States result directly from their views on democracy and global power. Ever since the end of World War II, the United States has sought to accumulate and exert its power in the global realm. Chávez challenges this unipolarity, actively seeking alliances to create a multi-polar global power structure. As the panelists pointed out in their presentations, Colombia faces the dilemma of either aligning itself with U.S. interests, or with the interests of other South American countries, such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador. As a result, their foreign policy decisions have contrary effects on their bilateral relations with the United States and Venezuela, respectively. An alignment with U.S. interests inevitably negatively affects the country's relationship with Venezuela while strengthening the one it has with the United States, and vice versa.

Colombian presidents Pastrana (1998-2002) and Uribe (2002-2010) aligned themselves strongly with the United States. The internal problems that Colombia faces with the illegal drug trade and guerrilla violence aligned symmetrically with American anti-narcotic and anti-terrorism priorities and international policies. Upon president Chávez'

declaration of neutrality on the issue of violence caused by the FARC, and in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September 11, 2001, president Uribe capitalized on the U.S.'s anti-terrorism policies, outlining its problems with the FARC and drug production within anti-terrorist and anti-narcotic frames. In conjunction with Plan Colombia, started in 1999 as an attempt to decrease illegal drug production in Colombia (the principal producer of narcotics), Colombia became a recipient of significant U.S. funds. In 2004, Colombia was the primary recipient of anti-terrorist operatives and the third largest recipient of military aid from the U.S in the world. This alliance can be seen further in Colombia's support of the invasion of Iraq and President George W. Bush's other foreign policies.

According to one of the panelists, this kind of relationship between the countries began when U.S. involvement in the area started to be seen as a national threat by Venezuela. Each initiative that tied Colombia closer to the U.S. increased tensions between Venezuela and both countries. Chávez views Plan Colombia and anti-terrorist aid as an excuse for military build-up for a future invasion of Venezuela. From the United States' perspective, Venezuela's alliances with Iran, Cuba, and other countries judged 'unfriendly' to the U.S. are perceived to represent a threat to U.S. national security and Venezuela's oppositional stance on U.S. interventionism severs the possibilities of military and political coordination between the two powers on global issues such as the drug trade.

While both panelists and commentators agreed on the bilateral frictions that exist between Colombia and Venezuela, the perceived origin of tensions differed between participants. While the three panelists noted the political polarization between Venezuela and the U.S. as the main source of tensions between Colombia and Venezuela, one commentator argued that the original schism between these two Latin American countries was to be found in Uribe's new, aggressive approach to combating the FARC and Chávez simultaneous neutrality in the matter. While this difference clearly facilitated the U.S.-Colombia alliance, it also created a link between Chávez and the FARC, which reflected poorly upon the Venezuelan president in the eyes of Colombians, contributing further to the tensions between the two countries.

Additionally, the panelists acknowledged that this triangular relationship could potentially lead to a diplomatic renaissance between the United States and Venezuela. Multiple participants imagined instances where the relationship each of these countries has with Colombia could indirectly improve relations between the U.S. and Venezuela. Additionally, a couple participants pointed out the complexities of the triangulation between the three countries by highlighting that a multitude of internal and external factors affect the trilateral relationship. These complexities make it hard to predict how the relationship will develop or how to ameliorate its frictions. One participant noted that the election of Santos in Colombia has initiated a new phase to this relationship since he

has actively tried to mend Colombia's relationship with Venezuela and in turn distance itself slightly from the U.S. international agenda.

Ultimately, the commentators questioned the journalist's role in creating, maintaining, or weakening this triangulation. While one noted that a lack of serious investigation and contextualization in the media has led to a general polarization in its reports on international events, another participant developed this idea further, questioning the journalist's responsibility in reporting on international affairs. While maintaining that it was not the press' responsibility to actively mediate international affairs, he elucidated the difficulties associated with providing objective coverage. Due to economic demands, it is tempting to report 'the sensational' and the negative simply because it attracts more interest than positive stories. He stressed the need to contextualize these sensational stories in order to provide reader access to both sides of the issue.

## **2.2. Characteristics of the trilateral media coverage**

In this section of the meeting, the participants analyzed how the U.S. press portrays Colombia and Venezuela in the news and how the U.S. is discussed in Colombian and Venezuelan newspapers. All participants recognized serious shortcomings in the way that each national media outlets cover international affairs between these countries. For Colombia, Venezuela and the United States, the participants discussed ways in which the stance taken by the national government on issues tends to have a great effect on the way the media in the country reports on current events.

The journalists from the three countries are all facing a declining public interest when it comes to international news. In Colombia, there is very little news on the United States, Venezuela, or any other country for that matter. This same draining of interest, along with harder financial times for newspapers, has led to the revoking of on-site correspondents in Colombia and Venezuela for U.S. media. Reports that fill the pages of newspapers come from larger news agencies, such as Associated Press and Reuters, and lack the sophisticated knowledge of the areas on which they are commenting to write unbiased stories – there is a fundamental lack of decent contextualization in each of the three countries' media. These large news corporations also they represent a monopoly of the information on international events that audiences read. Society's access to varied and detailed reporting on international news events is curtailed by this monopoly on information. Furthermore, U.S. international interests are preoccupied with Middle East and North Africa, areas of conflict and upheaval, and as a result, Latin America gets less and less coverage in the U.S.



Many Venezuelan participants identified that their country's media as polemic. For example, media outlets aligned with or against the government will cover events related to the U.S. differently. As a result, the same story is told from opposed, yet often equally biased, positions. This divide in media reflects the ideological divide among Venezuelan citizens, and the participants pointed to its unfortunate side effects as it prevents the dissemination of more neutral and unbiased information.

Similarly, many participants noted that the U.S. media often reported on issues that bolster the U.S.' position in their international relationships with each country. Colombia receives less and less coverage in daily U.S. newspapers. Venezuela, on the other hand, appears frequently in the American media, but the topics covered range from reports on negative events in their country to criticisms of political reforms that Chávez has enacted. As one participant noted astutely, the opinion of the national government of each country is an inevitable and powerful input into the work that journalists produce. Additionally, two other participants noted the necessity to cater to the audience that actually buys the paper. These audiences select for a range of articles that interest them – and this is where much of the bias originates. In order to maximize profits, newspapers have to cater the information they include within their pages to what their consumers would like to read about. Due to the poor economic situation and the rising access to information through technology, print newspapers are even more constrained by their audiences' interests.

Another main factor in each country's representation in international media was the role that its leader played in characterizing the entire nation. Uribe, Bush, Chávez, Santos, and Obama are all charismatic leaders whose actions and opinions become synonymous with the nation they represent in the other country's media. This perception is misleading. One participant articulated this, adding that it limits the ability of a story to be informative. It ignores large sections of the population, and the diversity and richness of the countries.

Overall, the bias we see in the media of each country is the result of multiple factors: the external forces of the economy, shifting public interests, insufficient contextualization of the issues in the media, and inadequate investigation. While some of these forces are unavoidable, there are also clear factors that journalists can actively counteract.

### **2.3. The role of the journalist**

The participants analyzed the role of the journalist. They agreed that the journalists have the responsibility to inform the population. As such, journalists and the media contribute to the shaping of perceptions of the reality of the other country through their reporting. Therefore, a Colombian participant believes that a journalist should write reports with the consciousness of how their words affect the audience that reads them. When referring to

the trilateral relations of Venezuela and Colombia, the participant believes that journalists should take into consideration how the information can affect the trilateral relations and the population overall before writing a news article. In contrast, other participants strongly support the idea that a journalist should always inform, regardless of the impact that the information has. One journalist supports the argument that the mission of a journalist is not to reduce “messiness” of the information but to simply inform.

According to the participants, the role of the journalist has to be balanced between the informative roles innate to the profession and with the microphone diplomacy that such information bears. A Venezuelan participant claims that the Venezuelan media had the role to fill the vacuum left by the lack of an organized opposition. For another participant, it is impossible for journalists not to have an effect, negative or positive, with the news coverage, since there are always ethical consequences.

Each of the participants saw their role in different lights. Some focused on the need to sell papers, satisfy their editors or owners, or otherwise conform to the multiple forces that affect what gets printed in their magazine or newspaper. Others clearly agreed with Stelling in the fundamental duty journalists have to have the prescience to know the impact their reports will have on their audience and consciously tailor their work to producing the optimum result. It is clear that the discussion encapsulated the struggle that a journalist has between the ideal – to inform in an objective manner – and the practical – the exogenous factors that control the demand for certain stories and the competition that elicits exaggeration and bias. While everyone agreed that media has a clear impact on relations, disagreements abounded as to what role journalists played and should play in remedying or contribute positively these international ties.

#### **2.4.Factors, constraints and dilemmas affecting the trilateral media coverage**

The participants concluded that there are two types of constraints that limit and affect journalists and the media when covering the other countries: structural and non-structural. The structural impediments refer to those that the journalist have no control over while the non-structural refer to those factors that journalists do have an impact on.

For structural impediments, the participants identified some factors such as economical, the limitation on the number of pages that a newspaper has, etc. The economical and financial situation that newspapers are facing today limits the coverage of events in other countries since there is no money to have correspondents abroad. Due to the limited resources that the media has, the number of correspondents has decreased proportionally. According to one participant, that has greatly limited the ability to cover events abroad. Another participant explained that editors are sometimes constrained between choosing to send someone abroad to cover an event or the possibility to allocate that resource for the

coverage of 10-15 events that had occurred within the country. Thus, the scope of national media outlets on international affairs tends to be limited.

This is also connected to the fact that the news is ultimately a business, as one participant highlighted during the meeting, and is concerned about selling newspapers and their ratings. In the U.S. case, since the attention from Latin America has shifted – has fallen off the headlines of newspapers – to other regions of the world, it becomes difficult to assign resources to cover Latin America. Besides the lack of interests in Latin America news coverage, one participant emphasized that the media has become a source of power which is driven by specific interests that are used to set the agenda of the newspapers and how the media reports certain news, which becomes a structural constrain for a journalist.

Also, there is the physical limitation of the number of pages that a newspaper has, as a participant highlighted. In the case of Colombia, decisions such as covering the internal Colombian conflict and the daily news leave the international section to be sacrificed for the sake of actual printing space. It presents a dilemma of what news is covered and printed, bending to fit the interests of their readers. This limits the amount of coverage that other countries get. The participants agreed that the news of the country and the interests of the readers will take precedent over any news coverage from abroad.

In addition, during the meeting discussion turned on what determines the informative agenda. There were two trends that indicated that the agenda could be set by the ‘bottom up,’ meaning what the readers want, or the ‘top down,’ referring what the editors and owners of media outlets want. According to a Colombian journalist, if it is set by local interest, it undermines the coverage of the bi-national relations between Colombia and Venezuela. Another participant emphasized the parochial nature in the news coverage base on the agenda set by the readers. If it is based upon the ‘top down’ structure, the question was raised: do media organizations as economic enterprises have an impact on the news coverage? The discussion revolved around the issue that certain enterprises will cover or not certain news according to the political or economical interest that they have. For example, privately own newspaper will give more importance to certain news that they have a direct relation rather than equality covering all pieces of news. Another example given was related to the Peruvian newspaper El Comercio and its coverage to the newly elected President Ollanta Humala. The newspaper gave a negative coverage after the candidate declared that he wanted to create competition to the airline LAN. The owners of the Peruvian newspaper have economic ties with LAN airlines and thus its coverage reflected that conundrum. Also, one participant illustrated self-censorship as an example of the pressure from the ‘top-down.’ Journalists use self-censorship as a tool when searching for news since journalists will not do research or try to pitch an idea when they are aware that such idea is going to be shot down by the editor. A journalist will not force too often an editor into the uncomfortable position of saying ‘no.’

Lastly regarding the non-structural impediments, the participants had a short discussion on the topic. The participants agreed upon the need to create articles with high standards. Since the relations between the countries are personalized by the specific individuals in power and not the institution itself, the coverage will be influenced by it.

## **2.5. The impact of the digital media**

The participants analyzed the impact that the internet and social networks have on the media. They agreed that the internet has played a role in the media since news outlets only have editorial control over the information that they manage while there is information that has not passed through any type of verification or quality control. With the rise of the internet and other social networks, the news coverage has been affected by different factors. The increase of bloggers that write about the news can be a danger since they are not well trained and also can exacerbate bi-national relations. However, according to a participant, the internet can actually help inform what is happening in certain parts of the world where there is a lack of access such as Cuba.

Additionally, the internet, and other modes of news transmission, has greatly reduced the demand for newspapers and magazines. This is an important side-effect of the rise of internet because it places print media in dire economic conditions, making it harder not to amplify stories and cater to popular interest in order to sell papers and remain afloat. This side effect becomes an obstacle for journalists.

There was not a consensus between the participants with regards to the type of effect that the internet has in the news coverage. For one participant, the internet does not have an impact on newspapers since it does not affect the widening the scope of interest of its readers regarding other countries. It is just creates an access to information at the hands of the citizens. In contrast, another participant believes that the internet is a dangerous since it creates low-standard information as well as limiting journalists to be more concern about audiences rather than informing news.

## **3. Reports on internal politics of each country**

The meeting opened Tuesday with three presentations on the internal politics of Colombia, the United States, and Venezuela. These summaries were then followed by a discussion between all the participants, where they could respond to the information presented as well as introduce new information into the conversation.

## **Colombia:**

The Colombian participant's presentation emphasized a growing sense of pessimism in Colombia. A powerpoint he referenced showed poles that demonstrated that people see that the country is in trouble: they view the economy as worsening, rising tides of corruption, and a heightening sense of insecurity – both due to urban crime and guerrilla violence. While Santos has succeeded in passing much of the progressive reforms outlined during his campaign - most notably The Victim's Law which gives land back to victims removed violently from their homes and recognizes victims of the armed internal conflict since 1985 - his approval rating is in decline. As president, he not only faces this rising tide of pessimism, but also criticisms by former president Uribe.

During the discussion that followed the presentations, the Colombian participants expounded upon the schism between Uribe and Santos, stating that the friction arises because, despite Santos' work with the FARC and in diplomatic international relations to construct peace, Uribe doesn't view Santos as protecting his interests. Additionally, a participant noted that Santos cares less about public opinion than Uribe, and so the way he manages the government is decidedly different than the government under Uribe.

## **United States:**

Like the Colombian presenter, the American participant who presented on the U.S. highlighted an increasing feeling of popular discontent in American politics. He characterized the current trend in policy as a deregulation of economics, political alignment with big business, and tax-cutting which has resulted in a society that is highly inequitable. Most of the country's wealth accrues to the top 0.1% of the population, while tax cuts on the wealthy and increasing costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have indebted the U.S. over \$3 trillion. While Obama's election was a moment of hope for Americans, his initiatives, such as the stimulus bill and the healthcare bill, have failed to engender optimism and have been less progressive than hoped. The political system is crippled by a voter population that is largely de-politicized and apathetic, political trends that are decidedly anti-intellectual, and a polarized party system. The U.S. now faces 9.1% unemployment, huge debt, and an apolitical public. These challenges to American politics are reflected in a general sense of dissatisfaction and cynicism for the political system in the U.S.

## **Venezuela:**

The Venezuela presentation explained that the government is currently preparing for the coming elections in 2012, despite the fact that these elections are still unscheduled. With no leader for the opposition, it seems that Chávez will secure re-election in 2012, but the presenter pointed out that the president's approval rating has dropped from 70% in the

last elections to 49% currently. But the country faces serious problems: an energy crisis, homelessness, high inflation rates, a large public debt, and increasing violence and security problems throughout the country. The police system is deteriorating; large percentages of kidnappings and robberies are executed by police functionaries and ex-functionaries, police officials extort and accept bribes, and are unresponsive to human rights violations, such as the current violence against trade unionists. Additionally, increasing violence by paramilitary groups and the FARC contributes to a heightened sense of insecurity along the country's border with Colombia. The presenter also cited an unofficial censorship over the media in Venezuela. There is a fear that results in private media companies self-censoring oppositional articles, as well as government officials seizing journalist recordings if they ask controversial questions in press conferences.

During the discussion, one participant asked whether Chavez was likely to give up power even if he lost the upcoming elections, and if he gave up power, whether it would be a viable for the opposition president to govern, since all of the political institutions would be controlled by chavistas. To this, the Venezuelan participants agreed that Chavez' past actions have never implied that he would overrule the result of the elections, citing notably his acquiescence when he lost the vote on the referendum for constitutional reform. Additionally, one participant pointed out that Chavez entered his presidency while political institutions were controlled by the opposition. The participants had confidence that an opposition leader would be able to govern if he or she were elected in the 2012 presidential elections.

The Venezuelan participants disagreed much more strongly on the issues raised by the presentations. They debated the recent attacks on trade unionists, foreign policy, and social programs. The division and arguments between Venezuelan participants reflected the political polarization between *los chavistas* and the opposition, and shed light not only on the issues debated, but also on the problem of this political schism that divides the country in half.

#### **4. Conclusions and proposals**

In the last session, the participants discussed possible future actions that can be taken to improve the quality of news coverage and to deepen mutual knowledge and understanding of each others' countries. They concluded that the lack of knowledge that exists between the participants about each other's countries contributes to poor reporting and complicates the contextualization of stories in the media. One participant proposed the creation of a mechanism to promote bilateral and trilateral dialogues, much like the Media Dialogue meetings, to continue improving mutual understanding. Another participant also supported this idea, agreeing that journalists from different countries

should work together and publish news stories in their respective countries' media outlets that aim to foster mutual understanding.

The participants also proposed diminishing and/or contextualizing microphone diplomacy in the news. One participant introduced this proposal, suggesting that the media should actively try to diffuse political situations by reducing headlines and by contextualizing scandals and statements that are inflammatory. While several participants agreed, many of the participants debated the duty that the media has and the role it plays in international relations. Those that disagreed with the proposal believed that the journalist's role was to cover all stories, regardless of the impact that this information can have in the international realm.

The debate related back to the discussion the participants had throughout the Atlanta meeting about the role of the journalist and the responsibilities they had to mediate international politics. Those that felt that journalists had an obligation to mediate diplomacy tended to agree, while those who felt journalists had a larger responsibility to providing the public with all the information often disagreed. One participant mentioned that to take such an active role in controlling how information is displayed in the newspaper (whether the title is big or small, whether it appears on the front page, whether or not to publish a story, etc) is also subject to bias. When making these kind of decisions, editors and journalists have to anticipate the possible consequences of an article, and impose their own judgments upon what materials their audience sees as important.

Some participants argued that this kind of active mediation was unrealistic. Due to the demands and constraints that journalists and news companies face, newspapers have to allot limited space to the stories that will draw more attention and earn the company higher profits. In the face of this obstacle, many agreed that contextualizing these potentially inflammatory news stories is the only concrete way that journalists can have an effect on inter-country diplomacy.

## Annex 1 – List of participants

### Trilateral Media Dialogue: Colombia- United States- Venezuela

#### List of Participants

Ricardo Ávila	Director, <i>Portafolio</i> magazine (Colombia)
Elsy Barroeta	News Editor, <i>Globovisión</i> (Venezuela)
Alejandro Botía	Editor in Chief, <i>TalCual</i> (Venezuela)
Antonio Maria Delgado	Columnist for the newspaper <i>El Nuevo Herald</i> (United States)
Phil Gunson	Freelance Journalist for <i>The Economist</i> and <i>The Miami Herald</i> (United States)
Francisco Miranda	Opinion editor of <i>El Tiempo</i> (Colombia)
Martin Pacheco	Union Radio (Venezuela)
Nelson Fredy Padilla	Sunday Editor of <i>El Espectador</i> (Colombia)
Christian Parenti	Contributing Editor of <i>The Nation</i> (United States)
Socorro Ramírez	Retired Professor, National University of Colombia (Colombia)
Eleazar Diaz Rangel	Director of <i>Ultimas Noticias</i> (Venezuela)
Javier Darío Restrepo	Professor at la Fundación Nuevo Periodismo Iberoamericano (Colombia)
Todd Robberson	Columnist for <i>The Dallas Morning News</i> (United States)
Carlos Romero	Professor of Political Science, Universidad Central de Venezuela (Venezuela)
Rafael Romo	Senior Latin American Affairs Editor, CNN Worldwide (United States)
Luz María Sierra	Editor of <i>La Semana</i> (Colombia)
Maryclen Stelling	Coordinator of the Venezuelan Chapter of Global Media Watch (Venezuela)
Vladimir Villegas	Columnist for <i>El Nacional</i> ; Host of political programs for the radio channel, Circuito Union Radio (Venezuela)



Carter Center and IDEA International

Karin Andersson	Program Associate, Americas Program, The Carter Center
Jennifer McCoy	Director, Americas Program, The Carter Center; Professor in Political Science of Georgia State University
Rafael Roncagliolo	Senior Political Advisor, Andean Region Program; Head of Mission, Peru, International IDEA
Hector Vanolli	Representative in Venezuela, The Carter Center

## Annex 2– Group Photo



All of the forum members together on the last day of the fourth dialogue session in Atlanta, Georgia

## **Annex 3 – Agenda**

### **Trilateral Media Dialogue: Colombia – United States - Venezuela**

June 13-14, 2011

#### **Monday, June 13, 2011**

- |               |   |                        |
|---------------|---|------------------------|
| 4:00 – 4:30pm | <b>Transportation to the Carter Center from<br/>Hotel Indigo</b>                                    | Hotel Indigo           |
| 4:30 - 5:00pm | <b>Registration and welcome</b>   | Ivan Allen lobby       |
| 5:00-5:15 pm  | <b>Opening, meeting ground rules.<br/>Presentation of participants.</b>                             | Cecil B. Day<br>Chapel |
|               | <i>Jennifer McCoy</i>   |                        |
| 5:15 – 5:30pm | <b>Presentation of agenda. Background of<br/>Forum and Common Agenda</b>                            |                        |
|               | <i>Jennifer McCoy</i>   |                        |
| 5:30 – 5:45pm | <b>Presentation of previous Colombia -<br/>Venezuela Media Dialogues</b>                            |                        |
|               | <i>Hector Vanolli</i>   |                        |
| 5:45 – 7:00pm | <b>Triangulation and de-triangulation of<br/>Colombia – Venezuela – United States<br/>relations</b> |                        |
|               | <i>Hector Vanolli (moderator)</i>   |                        |

#### ***Panelists:***

*Carlos Romero (Venezuela)*

*Socorro Ramirez (Colombia)*

*Jennifer McCoy (United States)*

***Commentators:***

*Luz María Sierra (Colombia)*

*Eleazar Diaz Rangel (Venezuela)*

*Tod Robberson (United States)*

7:00 – 7:30pm	<b>Wine and appetizers</b>	Ivan Allen lobby
7:30 – 8:30pm	<b>Moderated discussion over dinner</b> <i>Rafael Roncagliolo (moderator)</i>	Cecil B. Day Chapel
8:30 - 9:00pm	<b>Transportation to Hotel Indigo</b>	

**Tuesday, June 14, 2011**

7:45 – 8:15 am	<b>Transportation Hotel Indigo – The Carter Center</b>	
8:15 – 9:00 am	<b>Breakfast</b>	Ivan Allen lobby
9:00 – 9:15 am	<b>Welcome and review of agenda for the day</b> <i>Jennifer McCoy</i>	Cecil B. Day Chapel
9:15-10:15 am	<b>Reports on internal politics of each country. Discussion</b> <i>Hector Vanolli (moderator)</i>	

***Presenters:***

*Ricardo Avila (Colombia)*

*Christian Parenti (United States)*

*Vladimir Villegas (Venezuela)*

10:15-11:00 am	<b>Characteristics of the bi-national Colombia – Venezuela press coverage. Discussion</b> <i>Jennifer McCoy</i>	
11:00 – 11:15 am	<b>Coffee break</b>	Ivan Allen lobby

11:15 – 12:30 pm	<p><b>Characteristics of trilateral media coverage</b>  <i>Analysis of U.S. media coverage of Colombia and Venezuela</i>  <i>Analysis of Colombian and Venezuelan media coverage of the U.S.</i>  <i>Carlos Romero (moderator)</i></p>	
12:30 – 2:00 pm	<b>Lunch</b>	Ivan Allen lobby
2:00 – 3:30 pm	<p><b>Factors, constraints and dilemmas affecting the trilateral media coverage</b>   <i>Review of economic and political constraints: similarities and differences among countries and media outlets?</i>  <i>Socorro Ramirez (moderator)</i></p>	Cecil B. Day Chapel
3:30 – 4:00pm	<b>Coffee break</b>	Ivan Allen lobby
4:00 – 5:30 pm	<p><b>Recommendations to promote media coverage that contributes to an informed citizenry</b>  <i>Javier Darío Restrepo (moderator)</i></p>	
5:30 – 6:00 pm	<p><b>Conclusions and closing remarks</b>  <i>Jennifer McCoy</i></p>	
6:00 – 6:30 pm	<b>Transportation to Hotel</b>	
6:30 – 7:30 pm	<b>Rest at Hotel</b>	Hotel Indigo
7:30 – 9:00pm	<b>Dinner</b>	Restaurante Baraonda

## Annex 4 –Media Coverage

### Primer Momento<sup>28</sup>

#### Relaciones trilaterales

19/06/2011

En el encuentro de Atlanta, fue motivo de comentarios la denuncia sobre el contrabando de gasolina que formulé en esta misma página, así como el documento de los consejos comunales (CC) de El Nula dirigido al comandante de la GNB, general Motta Domínguez, y que parece no ha llegado a su destinatario. Es de lamentar que la esperada visita del general a los consejos no se haya producido.

Pero se observan desplazamientos en los comandos, de manera que las jurisdicciones de los puentes Sarare y La Chacra han cambiado de mandos, y parece que debilitarán el control del contrabando y la eventual acción contra los GN que pudiesen estar involucrados. “¿Qué nos quieren decir con esos cambios?”, me escriben desde un CC de El Nula que ha propuesto la permanente renovación de esos puestos militares.

Arturo Valenzuela, el subsecretario para las relaciones con América Latina, declaró en Bogotá que el presidente Chávez ha cambiado mucho frente a Colombia, que su discurso es muy distinto, y elogió tales cambios. ¿Por qué será que ese señor ve las cosas de un solo lado? ¿Es que no se da cuenta de los cambios en el presidente Santos? ¿O es que haber desechado el plan de instalar bases militares de EEUU en su país es poca cosa? ¿No ve que tales cambios en Bogotá han provocado los que él ve en Caracas?

Me sorprendió leer a mi regreso una declaración del Psuv criticando la posición asumida por la oposición en la oportunidad de la repentina intervención quirúrgica al presidente Chávez, pues pensé que en la MUD reaccionarían humanamente, y como cristianos que son en su mayoría.

Con el propósito de examinar el papel de los medios en las relaciones trilaterales de Venezuela, Colombia y Estados Unidos, nos reunimos periodistas y académicos de los tres países en las instalaciones del Centro Carter, en Atlanta, invitados por el Centro e Idea, de Estocolmo. Correspondió a los profesores universitarios Socorro Ramírez y Carlos Romero las exposiciones de apertura. En mi turno traté de complementar esas ponencias con políticas y acciones del orden militar desde Estados Unidos, que han tenido claras incidencias en las relaciones bilaterales. No se puede ver esa triangulación sin valorar el hecho militar.

Como escribió el ex embajador en Bogotá Pável Rondón, “el vértice Colombia-EEUU tenía un acercamiento político-militar-económico, mientras entre EEUU y Venezuela encontramos

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<sup>28</sup> Source: <http://primermomento.com/?p=90319>

distanciamiento por el rechazo y la agresión política de la administración norteamericana a la República Bolivariana de Venezuela”.

Veamos esos hechos de la política militar de Washington de indiscutible influencia en el deterioro de las relaciones colombo-venezolanas, característica de esa triangulación: 1) Plan Colombia, que convirtió a ese país en el tercero del mundo (después de Israel y Egipto) en recibir asistencia militar de EEUU, estimados en unos 4.000 millones de dólares; 2) presencia de tropas de EEUU en varios lugares de Colombia, casi todos fronterizos; 3) reactivación de la IV Flota en el Caribe, después de unos 50 años inoperativa; 4) frecuentes declaraciones del jefe del Comando Sur de las FA de EEUU contra Venezuela y su gobierno; 5) embargo de armamentos a Venezuela, que no puede ni adquirir repuestos a su sistema aéreo F-16, ni comprar en terceros países si tales equipos tienen tecnología estadounidense, pese a los contratos existentes; 6) concesión para uso de unidades estadounidenses de siete bases militares, entre las cuales Palanquero tenía capacidad de dominio hasta el extremo sur del continente, según informe de la Air Force al Senado de EEUU (a las que se añaden tres bases en Panamá y una en Curazao).

Como pueden ver, desde ese tercer ángulo ha existido una política, con muy concretas expresiones militares, dirigidas a fortalecer las relaciones con Colombia, deteriorar las de Venezuela, convertir al vecino en una amenaza real, y en escenarios diplomáticos los mostraba en la región como “polos políticos contrastantes”. En ese campo también Venezuela desarrolló políticas que incomodaban a Washington, como fue el enfrentamiento al Alca, las iniciativas para crear Unasur y -más recientemente- la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y del Caribe (Celac), que no casualmente se instala en algunas semanas aquí en Caracas con delegaciones de 23 países.

Frente a ese panorama, ¿cuál ha sido la posición de los medios de comunicación? Sin ninguna duda, los de EEUU han sido de identificación y apoyo a esas políticas; basta ver los editoriales de los más importantes, como The New York Times y The Washington Post, así como la selección diaria de noticias que sobre Venezuela publican, o las que difunde CNN. La Embajada de Venezuela tiene un estudio demostrativo de esa parcialización.

En cuanto a Colombia, aunque muchos medios conservaron su capacidad crítica frente al gobierno de Álvaro Uribe, estuvieron a su lado en los altos y bajos de las relaciones con Venezuela. ¿Y qué decirles de los medios venezolanos?

La mayoría estuvo coincidiendo con las políticas y declaraciones de Uribe y los suyos, de cuantas acusaciones hacían contra Venezuela, pero de pronto cambiaron cuando Juan Manuel Santos llega a la Presidencia. Una investigación colombiana reveló cómo los medios venezolanos, en períodos comparables, destacaron mucho más al presidente Uribe que a Santos, y las informaciones procedentes de EEUU contra Chávez son destacadas aquí de tal manera que se convierten en un factor en esa triangulación.

No creo que el debate influyera en algo en la visión de los periodistas estadounidenses sobre las relaciones colombo-venezolanas y la influencia ejercida por Washington.

**Eleazar Díaz Rangel**

# El Sol de Margarita<sup>29</sup>

## Pastel de Chucho

*Eleazar Díaz Rangel*

### LOS PRESOS ARMADOS

Necesariamente, la pregunta que se hace la ciudadanía es: ¿cómo entraron tantas armas a la prisión de El Rodeo, en Miranda? Porque no se trata de alguna pistolita. Lo que nos mostraron fueron ametralladoras, fusiles, escopetas, pistolas, revólveres, granadas de mano y miles de proyectiles. Porque ingresar ese armamento, solo en la Torre 1, parece imposible sin complicidad interna, que tendrán que ser averiguada apenas el gobierno termine de controlar esa situación.

Porque hasta ayer, al menos cuando escribo, la operación para rescatar El Rodeo 2 no había concluido y, por supuesto, no existe un balance, pero se sabe que la magnitud del armamento en manos de los presos les ha permitido resistir en la torre 2, donde permanecían el domingo 1.400, a pesar de todas las exhortaciones y llamamientos de las autoridades para que se entreguen y proceder a la requisa. Se supone que en esa torre, el arsenal debe ser mayor que lo encontrado hasta ahora.

Por lo pronto, debemos reconocer que las acciones de la Guardia Nacional Bolivariana no se parece en absoluto a las de décadas atrás; en una situación como ésta, habrían penetrados esas instalaciones con un elevado saldo de víctimas, como sucedió en La Planta y en el Retén de Catia. Esta vez, la GNB ha perdido a dos de sus hombres, un teniente y un sargento mayor, y tiene más de 20 heridos. Nunca se había visto una situación como ésta. Y sin embargo, la ONG “Una ventana a la libertad” la define como “una represión excesiva militar”, siguiendo la línea de algunos opositores.

Es de suponer que estamos próximos a cerrar ese capítulo de la historia penitenciaria, y que ya estudiarán operativos para el desarme en otras cárceles. Por eso, es válido eso de que cuando veas las barbas de tu vecino ardiendo, pon las tuyas en remojo.

### VENEZUELA-COLOMBIA Y EUA

Con el propósito de examinar el papel de los medios en las relaciones trilaterales de Venezuela, Colombia y Estados Unidos, nos reunimos periodistas y académicos de los tres países en las instalaciones del Centro Carter en Atlanta, invitados por el Centro e IDEA, de Estocolmo. Correspondió a los profesores universitarios Socorro Ramírez y Carlos Romero, las exposiciones de apertura. En mi turno traté de complementar esas ponencias con políticas y acciones del orden militar desde Estados Unidos, que han tenido claras incidencias en las relaciones bilaterales. No se puede ver esa triangulación sin valorar el hecho militar.

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<sup>29</sup> Source: <http://www.elsoldemargarita.com.ve/Noticias.aspx?NoticiaId=81739&Seccion=5>



Como escribió el exembajador en Bogotá, Pável Rondón, “El vértice Colombia-EUA tenía un acercamiento político-militar-económico, mientras entre EUA y Venezuela encontramos distanciamiento por el rechazo y la agresión política de la administración norteamericana a la República Bolivariana de Venezuela”.

Veamos estos hechos de la política militar de Washington de indiscutible influencia en el deterioro de las relaciones colombo-venezolanas, característica de esa triangulación: 1) Plan Colombia, que convirtió a ese país en el tercero del mundo (después de Israel y Egipto) en recibir asistencia militar de EUA, estimados en unos 4.000 millones de dólares; 2) presencia de tropas de EUA en varios lugares de Colombia, casi todos fronterizos; 3) reactivación de la IV flota en el Caribe, después de unos 50 años inoperativa; 4) frecuentes declaraciones del jefe del Comando Sur de las FA de EUA contra Venezuela y su gobierno; 5) embargo de armamentos a Venezuela, que no puede ni adquirir repuestos a su sistema aéreo F16, ni comprar en terceros países si tales equipos tienen tecnología estadounidense, pese a los contratos existentes; 6) concesión para uso de unidades estadounidenses de siete bases militares, entre las cuales Palanquero tenía capacidad de dominio hasta el extremo Sur del continente, según informe de la Air Force al Senado de EUA (A las que se añaden tres bases en Panamá y una en Curazao).

Como pueden ver, desde ese tercer ángulo ha existido una política, con muy concretas expresiones militares, dirigidas a fortalecer las relaciones con Colombia, deteriorar las de Venezuela, convertir al vecino en una amenaza real, y en escenarios diplomáticos los mostraba en la región como “polos políticos contrastantes”. En ese campo también Venezuela desarrolló políticas que incomodaban a Washington, como fue el enfrentamiento al Alca, las iniciativas para crear Unasur y, más recientemente, la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y del Caribe (Celac), que no casualmente se instala en algunas semanas aquí en Caracas con delegaciones de 23 países.

Frente a ese panorama, ¿cuál ha sido la posición de los medios de comunicación? Sin ninguna duda, los de EUA han sido de identificación y apoyo a esas políticas; basta ver los editoriales de los más importantes, como The New York Times y The Washington Post, así como la selección diaria de noticias que sobre Venezuela publican, o las que difunde CNN. La Embajada de Venezuela tiene un estudio demostrativo de esa parcialización.

En cuanto a Colombia, aunque muchos medios conservaron su capacidad crítica frente al gobierno de Álvaro Uribe, estuvieron a su lado en los altos y bajos de las relaciones con Venezuela.

¿Y qué decirles de los medios venezolanos? La mayoría estuvo coincidiendo con las políticas y declaraciones de Uribe y los suyos, de cuantas acusaciones hacían contra Venezuela, pero de pronto cambiaron cuando Juan Manuel Santos llega a la Presidencia. Una investigación colombiana reveló cómo los medios venezolanos, en periodos comparables, destacaron mucho más al presidente Uribe que a Santos, y las informaciones procedentes de EUA contra Chávez, aquí son destacadas de tal manera que se convierten en un factor en esa triangulación.

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**EN EL ENCUENTRO** de Atlanta fue motivo de comentarios la denuncia sobre el contrabando de gasolina que formulé oportunamente, así como el documento de los consejos comunales (CC) de El Nula, dirigido al Comandante de la GNB, general Motta Domínguez, y que parece no ha llegado a su destinatario. Es de lamentar que la esperada visita del General a los consejos no se haya producido. Pero se observan desplazamientos en los comandos, de manera que las jurisdicciones de los puentes Sarare y La Chacra han cambiado de mandos, y parece que debilitarán el control del contrabando y la eventual acción contra los GNB que pudiesen estar involucrados. “¿Qué nos quieren decir con esos cambios?”, me escriben desde un CC de El Nula que ha propuesto la permanente renovación de esos puestos militares...

**ARTURO** Valenzuela, subsecretario para las relaciones con América Latina, declaró en Bogotá que el presidente Chávez ha cambiado mucho frente a Colombia, que su discurso es muy distinto, y elogió tales cambios. ¿Por qué será que este señor ve las cosas de un solo lado? ¿Es que no se da cuenta de los cambios en el presidente Santos? ¿O es que haber desechado el plan de instalar bases militares de EUA en su país es poca cosa? ¿No ve que tales cambios en Bogotá han provocado los que él ve en Caracas?... **ME SORPRENDIÓ** leer a mi regreso una declaración del PSUV criticando la posición asumida por la oposición en la oportunidad de la repentina intervención quirúrgica al presidente Chávez, pues pensé que en la MUD reaccionarían humanamente, y como cristianos que son su mayoría...

**DOS FIGURAS** del beisbol perdimos esta semana. Primero, en Maracaibo, Carrao Bracho, el pitcher de más récords en el beisbol profesional venezolano: más temporadas: 23, y fue a cinco series finales, con 391 juegos. Y días después murió Héctor Benítez Redondo, centerfield, uno de los héroes del equipo campeón mundial de 1941, jugó 12 temporadas (1946-1957), creo que fue el único criollo con tres jonrones en un partido, jugando con Gavilanes, en Maracaibo. Nuestra sentida palabra a su deudos.

## Ultimas Noticias<sup>30</sup>

LOS DOMINGOS DE DIAZ RANGEL

### Relaciones trilaterales

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<sup>30</sup> Source: <http://www.ultimasnoticias.com.ve/Opinion/Firmas/Los-Domingos-de-Diaz-Rangel/Relaciones-trilaterales.aspx>

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## Op-Ed Article by Jimmy Carter

### The New York Times

June 16, 2011

# Call Off the Global Drug War<sup>31</sup>

Atlanta

IN an extraordinary new [initiative](#) announced earlier this month, the Global Commission on Drug Policy has made some courageous and profoundly important recommendations in a report on how to bring more effective control over the illicit drug trade. The commission includes the former presidents or prime ministers of five countries, a former secretary general of the United Nations, human rights leaders, and business and government leaders, including Richard Branson, George P. Shultz and Paul A. Volcker.

The report describes the total failure of the present global antidrug effort, and in particular America's "war on drugs," which was declared 40 years ago today. It notes that the global consumption of opiates has increased 34.5 percent, cocaine 27 percent and cannabis 8.5 percent from 1998 to 2008. Its primary recommendations are to substitute treatment for imprisonment for people who use drugs but do no harm to others, and to concentrate more coordinated international effort on combating violent criminal organizations rather than nonviolent, low-level offenders.

These recommendations are compatible with United States drug policy from three decades ago. In a [message to Congress](#) in 1977, I said the country should decriminalize the possession of less than an ounce of [marijuana](#), with a full program of treatment for addicts. I also cautioned against filling our prisons with young people who were no threat to society, and summarized by saying: "Penalties against possession of a drug should not be more damaging to an individual than the use of the drug itself."

These ideas were widely accepted at the time. But in the 1980s President Ronald Reagan and Congress began to shift from balanced drug policies, including the treatment and rehabilitation of addicts, toward futile efforts to control drug imports from foreign countries.

This approach entailed an enormous expenditure of resources and the dependence on police and military forces to reduce the foreign cultivation of marijuana, coca and opium poppy and the production of cocaine and heroin. One result has been a terrible escalation in drug-related violence, corruption and gross violations of human rights in a growing number of Latin American countries.

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<sup>31</sup> Source: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/17/opinion/17carter.html>

The commission's facts and arguments are persuasive. It recommends that governments be encouraged to experiment "with models of legal regulation of drugs ... that are designed to undermine the power of organized crime and safeguard the health and security of their citizens." For effective examples, they can look to policies that have shown promising results in Europe, Australia and other places.

But they probably won't turn to the United States for advice. Drug policies here are more punitive and counterproductive than in other democracies, and have brought about an [explosion in prison populations](#). At the end of 1980, just before I left office, 500,000 people were incarcerated in America; at the end of 2009 the number was nearly 2.3 million. There are 743 people in prison for every 100,000 Americans, a higher portion than in any other country and seven times as great as in Europe. Some 7.2 million people are either in prison or on probation or parole — more than 3 percent of all American adults!

Some of this increase has been caused by mandatory minimum sentencing and "three strikes you're out" laws. But about three-quarters of new admissions to state prisons are for nonviolent crimes. And the single greatest cause of prison population growth has been the war on drugs, with the number of people incarcerated for nonviolent drug offenses increasing more than twelvefold since 1980.

Not only has this excessive punishment destroyed the lives of millions of young people and their families (disproportionately minorities), but it is wreaking havoc on state and local budgets. Former California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger pointed out that, in 1980, 10 percent of his state's budget went to higher education and 3 percent to prisons; in 2010, almost 11 percent went to prisons and only 7.5 percent to higher education.

Maybe the increased tax burden on wealthy citizens necessary to pay for the war on drugs will help to bring about a reform of America's drug policies. At least the recommendations of the Global Commission will give some cover to political leaders who wish to do what is right.

A few years ago I worked side by side for four months with a group of prison inmates, who were learning the building trade, to renovate some public buildings in my hometown of Plains, Ga. They were intelligent and dedicated young men, each preparing for a productive life after the completion of his sentence. More than half of them were in prison for drug-related crimes, and would have been better off in college or trade school.

To help such men remain valuable members of society, and to make drug policies more humane and more effective, the American government should support and enact the reforms laid out by the Global Commission on Drug Policy.

*Jimmy Carter, the 39th president, is the founder of the Carter Center and the winner of the 2002 Nobel Peace Prize.*



# ON DRUGS

REPORT OF THE  
GLOBAL COMMISSION  
ON DRUG POLICY

JUNE 2011

# REPORT OF THE GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY

To learn more about the Commission, visit:  
[www.globalcommissionondrugs.org](http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org)

Or email: [declaration@globalcommissionondrugs.org](mailto:declaration@globalcommissionondrugs.org)

## COMMISSIONERS

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**Carlos Fuentes**, writer and public intellectual, Mexico

**César Gaviria**, former President of Colombia

**Ernesto Zedillo**, former President of Mexico

**Fernando Henrique Cardoso**, former President of Brazil (chair)

**George Papandreou**, Prime Minister of Greece

**George P. Shultz**, former Secretary of State, United States (honorary chair)

**Javier Solana**, former European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Spain

**John Whitehead**, banker and civil servant, chair of the World Trade Center Memorial Foundation, United States

**Kofi Annan**, former Secretary General of the United Nations, Ghana

**Louise Arbour**, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, President of the International Crisis Group, Canada

**Maria Cattauri**, Petroplus Holdings Board member, former Secretary-General of the International Chamber of Commerce, Switzerland

**Mario Vargas Llosa**, writer and public intellectual, Peru

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**Michel Kazatchkine**, executive director of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, France

**Paul Volcker**, former Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve and of the Economic Recovery Board

**Richard Branson**, entrepreneur, advocate for social causes, founder of the Virgin Group, co-founder of The Elders, United Kingdom

**Ruth Dreifuss**, former President of Switzerland and Minister of Home Affairs

**Thorvald Stoltenberg**, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Norway



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The global war on drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the world. Fifty years after the initiation of the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and 40 years after President Nixon launched the US government's war on drugs, fundamental reforms in national and global drug control policies are urgently needed.

Vast expenditures on criminalization and repressive measures directed at producers, traffickers and consumers of illegal drugs have clearly failed to effectively curtail supply or consumption. Apparent victories in eliminating one source or trafficking organization are negated almost instantly by the emergence of other sources and traffickers. Repressive efforts directed at consumers impede public health measures to reduce HIV/AIDS, overdose fatalities and other harmful consequences of drug use. Government expenditures on futile supply reduction strategies and incarceration displace more cost-effective and evidence-based investments in demand and harm reduction.

### **Our principles and recommendations can be summarized as follows:**

End the criminalization, marginalization and stigmatization of people who use drugs but who do no harm to others. Challenge rather than reinforce common misconceptions about drug markets, drug use and drug dependence.

Encourage experimentation by governments with models of legal regulation of drugs to undermine the power of organized crime and safeguard the health and security of their citizens. This recommendation applies especially to cannabis, but we also encourage other experiments in decriminalization and legal regulation that can accomplish these objectives and provide models for others.

Offer health and treatment services to those in need. Ensure that a variety of treatment modalities are available, including not just methadone and buprenorphine treatment but also the heroin-assisted treatment programs that have proven successful in many European countries and Canada. Implement syringe access and other harm reduction measures that have proven effective in reducing transmission of HIV and other blood-borne infections as well as fatal overdoses. Respect the human rights of people who use drugs. Abolish abusive practices carried out in the name of treatment – such as forced detention,

forced labor, and physical or psychological abuse – that contravene human rights standards and norms or that remove the right to self-determination.

Apply much the same principles and policies stated above to people involved in the lower ends of illegal drug markets, such as farmers, couriers and petty sellers. Many are themselves victims of violence and intimidation or are drug dependent. Arresting and incarcerating tens of millions of these people in recent decades has filled prisons and destroyed lives and families without reducing the availability of illicit drugs or the power of criminal organizations. There appears to be almost no limit to the number of people willing to engage in such activities to better their lives, provide for their families, or otherwise escape poverty. Drug control resources are better directed elsewhere.

Invest in activities that can both prevent young people from taking drugs in the first place and also prevent those who do use drugs from developing more serious problems. Eschew simplistic ‘just say no’ messages and ‘zero tolerance’ policies in favor of educational efforts grounded in credible information and prevention programs that focus on social skills and peer influences. The most successful prevention efforts may be those targeted at specific at-risk groups.

Focus repressive actions on violent criminal organizations, but do so in ways that undermine their power and reach while prioritizing the reduction of violence and intimidation. Law enforcement efforts should focus not on reducing drug markets *per se* but rather on reducing their harms to individuals, communities and national security.

Begin the transformation of the global drug prohibition regime. Replace drug policies and strategies driven by ideology and political convenience with fiscally responsible policies and strategies grounded in science, health, security and human rights – and adopt appropriate criteria for their evaluation. Review the scheduling of drugs that has resulted in obvious anomalies like the flawed categorization of cannabis, coca leaf and MDMA. Ensure that the international conventions are interpreted and/or revised to accommodate robust experimentation with harm reduction, decriminalization and legal regulatory policies.

Break the taboo on debate and reform. The time for action is now.

# INTRODUCTION

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## UNITED NATIONS ESTIMATES OF ANNUAL DRUG CONSUMPTION, 1998 TO 2008

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	Opiates	Cocaine	Cannabis
<b>1998</b>	12.9 million	13.4 million	147.4 million
<b>2008</b>	17.35 million	17 million	160 million
<b>% Increase</b>	34.5%	27%	8.5%

The global war on drugs has failed. When the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs came into being 50 years ago, and when President Nixon launched the US government's war on drugs 40 years ago, policymakers believed that harsh law enforcement action against those involved in drug production, distribution and use would lead to an ever-diminishing market in controlled drugs such as heroin, cocaine and cannabis, and the eventual achievement of a 'drug free world'. In practice, the global scale of illegal drug markets – largely controlled by organized crime – has grown dramatically over this period. While accurate estimates of global consumption across the entire 50-year period are not available, an analysis of the last 10 years alone<sup>22,4</sup> shows a large and growing market. (See chart above.)

In spite of the increasing evidence that current policies are not achieving their objectives, most policymaking bodies at the national and international level have tended to avoid open scrutiny or debate on alternatives.

This lack of leadership on drug policy has prompted the establishment of our Commission, and leads us to our view that the time is now right for a serious, comprehensive and wide-ranging review of strategies to respond to the drug phenomenon. The starting point for this review is the recognition of the global drug problem as a set of interlinked health and social challenges to be managed, rather than a war to be won.

Commission members have agreed on four core principles that should guide national and international drug policies and strategies, and have made eleven recommendations for action.

## PRINCIPLES

1. Drug policies must be based on solid empirical and scientific evidence. The primary measure of success should be the reduction of harm to the health, security and welfare of individuals and society.

In the 50 years since the United Nations initiated a truly global drug prohibition system, we have learned much about the nature and patterns of drug production, distribution, use and dependence, and the effectiveness of our attempts to reduce these problems. It might have been understandable that the architects of the system would place faith in the concept of eradicating drug production and use (in the light of the limited evidence available at the time). There is no excuse, however, for ignoring the evidence and experience accumulated since then. Drug policies and strategies at all levels too often continue to be driven by ideological perspectives, or political convenience, and pay too little attention to the complexities of the drug market, drug use and drug addiction.

Effective policymaking requires a clear articulation of the policy's objectives. The 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs made it clear that the ultimate objective of the system was the improvement of the 'health and welfare of mankind'.

This reminds us that drug policies were initially developed and implemented in the hope of achieving **outcomes** in terms of a reduction in harms to individuals and society – less crime, better health, and more economic and social development. However, we have primarily been measuring our success in the war on drugs by entirely different measures – those that report on **processes**, such as the number of arrests, the amounts seized, or the harshness of punishments. These indicators may tell us how tough we are being, but they do not tell us how successful we are in improving the 'health and welfare of mankind'.

2. Drug policies must be based on human rights and public health principles. We should end the stigmatization and marginalization of people who use certain drugs and those involved in the lower levels of cultivation, production and distribution, and treat people dependent on drugs as patients, not criminals.

Certain fundamental principles underpin all aspects of national and international policy. These are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and many international treaties that have followed. Of particular relevance to drug policy are the rights to life, to health, to due process and a fair trial, to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, from slavery, and from discrimination. These rights are inalienable, and commitment to them takes precedence over other international agreements, including the drug control conventions. As the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay, has stated, "Individuals who use drugs do not forfeit their human rights. Too often, drug users suffer discrimination, are forced to accept treatment, marginalized and often harmed by approaches which over-emphasize criminalization and punishment while under-emphasizing harm reduction and respect for human rights."<sup>1</sup>

A number of well-established and proven public health measures<sup>2,3</sup> (generally referred to as **harm reduction**, an approach that includes syringe access and treatment using the proven medications methadone or buprenorphine) can minimize the risk of drug overdose deaths and the transmission of HIV and other blood-borne infections.<sup>4</sup> However, governments often do not fully implement these interventions, concerned that by improving the health of people who use drugs, they are undermining a 'tough on drugs' message. This is illogical – sacrificing the health and welfare of one group of citizens when effective health protection measures are available is unacceptable, and increases the risks faced by the wider community.

# PRINCIPLES


(Continued)

## IMPACT OF DRUG POLICIES ON RECENT HIV PREVALENCE AMONG PEOPLE WHO INJECT DRUGS<sup>9</sup>


Sample of countries that have consistently implemented comprehensive harm reduction strategies:



Sample of countries that have introduced harm reduction strategies partially, or late in the progress of the epidemic:



Sample of countries that have consistently resisted large scale implementation of harm reduction strategies, despite the presence of drug injecting and sharing:



Countries that implemented harm reduction and public health strategies early have experienced consistently low rates of HIV transmission among people who inject drugs. Similarly, countries that responded to increasing HIV prevalence among drug users by introducing harm reduction programs have been successful in containing and reversing the further spread of HIV. On the other hand, many countries that have relied on repression and deterrence as a response to increasing rates of drug-related HIV transmission are experiencing the highest rates of HIV among drug using populations.<sup>10,11,12</sup>

An indiscriminate approach to 'drug trafficking' is similarly problematic. Many people taking part in the drug market are themselves the victims of violence and intimidation, or are dependent on drugs. An example of this phenomenon are the drug 'mules' who take the most visible and risky roles in the supply and delivery chain. Unlike those in charge of drug trafficking organizations, these individuals do not usually have an extensive and violent criminal history, and some engage in the drug trade primarily to get money for their own drug dependence. We should not treat all those arrested for trafficking as equally culpable – many are coerced into their actions, or are driven to desperate measures through their own addiction or economic situation. It is not appropriate to punish such individuals in the same way as the members of violent organized crime groups who control the market.

Finally, many countries still react to people dependent on drugs with punishment and stigmatization. In reality, drug dependence is a complex health condition that has a mixture of causes – social, psychological and physical (including, for example, harsh living conditions, or a history of personal trauma or emotional problems). Trying to manage this complex condition through punishment is ineffective – much greater success can be achieved by providing a range of evidence-based drug treatment services. Countries that have treated citizens dependent on drugs as patients in need of treatment, instead of criminals deserving of punishment, have demonstrated extremely positive results in crime reduction, health improvement, and overcoming dependence.

## PATIENTS NOT CRIMINALS: A MORE HUMANE AND EFFECTIVE APPROACH

### Case Study One: Switzerland<sup>13</sup>

In response to severe and highly visible drug problems that developed across the country in the 1980s, Switzerland implemented a new set of policies and programs (including heroin substitution programs) based on public health instead of criminalization. The consistent implementation of this policy has led to an overall reduction in the number of people addicted to heroin as well as a range of other benefits. A key study<sup>14</sup> concluded that:

"Heroin substitution targeted hard-core problematic users (heavy consumers) – assuming that 3,000 addicts represent 10 percent to 15 percent of Switzerland's heroin users that may account for 30 percent to 60 percent of the demand for heroin on illegal markets. Heavily engaged in both drug dealing and other forms of crime, they also served as a link between wholesalers and users. As these hard-core users found a steady, legal means for their addiction, their illicit drug use was reduced as well as their need to deal in heroin and engage in other criminal activities.

The heroin substitution program had three effects on the drug market:

- It substantially reduced the consumption among the heaviest users, and this reduction in demand affected the viability of the market. (For example, the number of new addicts registered in Zurich in 1990 was 850. By 2005, the number had fallen to 150.)
- It reduced levels of other criminal activity associated with the market. (For example, there was a 90 percent reduction in property crimes committed by participants in the program.)
- By removing local addicts and dealers, Swiss casual users found it difficult to make contact with sellers."

### Case Study Two: United Kingdom<sup>15</sup>

Research carried out in the UK into the effects of their policy of diversion from custody into treatment programs clearly demonstrated a reduction in offending following treatment intervention. In addition to self-reports, the researchers in this case also referred to police criminal records data. The research shows that the numbers of charges brought against 1,476 drug users in the years before and after entering treatment reduced by 48 percent.

### Case Study Three: The Netherlands<sup>16,17,18</sup>

Of all EU-15 countries, the percentage of people who inject heroin is the lowest in the Netherlands and there is no new influx of problematic users. Heroin has lost its appeal to the mainstream youth and is considered a 'dead-end street drug'. The number of problematic heroin users has dropped significantly and the average age of users has risen considerably. Large-scale, low-threshold drug treatment and harm reduction services include syringe access and the prescription of methadone and heroin under strict conditions.

Medically prescribed heroin has been found in the Netherlands to reduce petty crime and public nuisance, and to have positive effects on the health of people struggling with addiction. In 2001, the estimated number of people in the Netherlands dependent on heroin was 28-30,000. By 2008, that number had fallen to 18,000. The Dutch population of opiate users is in the process of aging – the proportion of young opiate users (aged 15-29) receiving treatment for addiction has also declined.

# PRINCIPLES

(Continued)

3. **The development and implementation of drug policies should be a global shared responsibility, but also needs to take into consideration diverse political, social and cultural realities. Policies should respect the rights and needs of people affected by production, trafficking and consumption, as explicitly acknowledged in the 1988 Convention on Drug Trafficking.**

The UN drug control system is built on the idea that all governments should work together to tackle drug markets and related problems. This is a reasonable starting point, and there is certainly a responsibility to be shared between producing, transit and consuming countries (although the distinction is increasingly blurred, as many countries now experience elements of all three).

However, the idea of shared responsibility has too often become a straitjacket that inhibits policy development and experimentation. The UN (through the International Narcotics Control Board), and in particular the US (notably through its 'certification' process), have worked strenuously over the last 50 years to ensure that all countries adopt the same rigid approach to drug policy – the same laws, and the same tough approach to their enforcement. As national governments have become more aware of the complexities of the problems, and options for policy responses in their own territories, many have opted to use the flexibilities within the Conventions to try new strategies and programs, such as decriminalization initiatives or harm reduction programs. When these involve a more tolerant approach to drug use, governments have faced international diplomatic pressure to 'protect the integrity of the Conventions', even when the policy is legal, successful and supported in the country.

A current example of this process (what may be described as 'drug control imperialism'), can be observed with the proposal by the Bolivian government to remove the practice of coca leaf chewing from the sections of the 1961 Convention that prohibit all non-medical uses. Despite the fact that successive studies have shown<sup>19</sup> that the indigenous practice of coca leaf chewing is associated with none of the harms of international cocaine markets, and that a clear majority of the Bolivian population (and neighboring countries) support this change, many of the rich 'cocaine consumer' countries (led by the US) have formally objected to the amendment.<sup>20</sup>

The idea that the international drug control system is immutable, and that any amendment – however reasonable or slight – is a threat to the integrity of the entire system, is short-sighted. As with all multilateral agreements, the drug conventions need to be subject to constant review and modernization in light of changing and variable circumstances. Specifically, national governments must be enabled to exercise the freedom to experiment with responses more suited to their circumstances. This analysis and exchange of experiences is a crucial element of the process of learning about the relative effectiveness of different approaches, but the belief that we all need to have exactly the same laws, restrictions and programs has been an unhelpful restriction.

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## UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

The implementation of the war on drugs has generated widespread negative consequences for societies in producer, transit and consumer countries. These negative consequences were well summarized by the former Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Antonio Maria Costa, as falling into five broad categories:

1. The growth of a 'huge criminal black market', financed by the risk-escalated profits of supplying international demand for illicit drugs.
2. Extensive policy displacement, the result of using scarce resources to fund a vast law enforcement effort intended to address this criminal market.
3. Geographical displacement, often known as 'the balloon effect', whereby drug production shifts location to avoid the attentions of law enforcement.
4. Substance displacement, or the movement of consumers to new substances when their previous drug of choice becomes difficult to obtain, for instance through law enforcement pressure.
5. The perception and treatment of drug users, who are stigmatized, marginalized and excluded.<sup>27</sup>

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4. **Drug policies must be pursued in a comprehensive manner, involving families, schools, public health specialists, development practitioners and civil society leaders, in partnership with law enforcement agencies and other relevant governmental bodies.**

With their strong focus on law enforcement and punishment, it is not surprising that the leading institutions in the implementation of the drug control system have been the police, border control and military authorities directed by Ministries of Justice, Security or Interior. At the multilateral level, regional or United Nations structures are also dominated by these interests.

Although governments have increasingly recognized that law enforcement strategies for drug control need to be integrated into a broader approach with social and public health programs, the structures for policymaking, budget allocation, and implementation have not modernized at the same pace.

These institutional dynamics obstruct objective and evidence-based policymaking. This is more than a theoretical problem – repeated studies<sup>28,29</sup> have demonstrated that governments achieve much greater financial and social benefit for their communities by investing in health and social programs, rather than investing in supply reduction and law enforcement activities. However, in most countries, the vast majority of available resources are spent on the enforcement of drug laws and the punishment of people who use drugs.<sup>28</sup>

The lack of coherence is even more marked at the United Nations. The development of the global drug control regime involved the creation of three bodies to oversee the implementation of the conventions – the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). This structure is premised on the notion that international drug control is primarily a fight against crime and criminals. Unsurprisingly, there is a built-in vested interest in maintaining the law enforcement focus and the senior decisionmakers in these bodies have traditionally been most familiar with this framework.

Now that the nature of the drug policy challenge has changed, the institutions must follow. Global drug policy should be created from the shared strategies of all interested multilateral agencies – UNODC of course, but also UNAIDS, WHO, UNDP, UNICEF, UN Women, the World Bank, and the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights. The marginalization of the World Health Organization is particularly worrisome given the fact that it has been given a specific mandate under the drug control treaties.



# RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Break the taboo. Pursue an open debate and promote policies that effectively reduce consumption, and that prevent and reduce harms related to drug use and drug control policies. Increase investment in research and analysis into the impact of different policies and programs.<sup>25</sup>

Political leaders and public figures should have the courage to articulate publicly what many of them acknowledge privately: that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that repressive strategies will not solve the drug problem, and that the war on drugs has not, and cannot, be won. Governments do have the power to pursue a mix of policies that are appropriate to their own situation, and manage the problems caused by drug markets and drug use in a way that has a much more positive impact on the level of related crime, as well as social and health harms.

2. Replace the criminalization and punishment of people who use drugs with the offer of health and treatment services to those who need them.

A key idea behind the 'war on drugs' approach was that the threat of arrest and harsh punishment would deter people from using drugs. In practice, this hypothesis has been disproved – many countries that have enacted harsh laws and implemented widespread arrest and imprisonment of drug users and low-level dealers have higher levels of drug use and related problems than countries with more tolerant approaches. Similarly, countries that have introduced decriminalization, or other forms of reduction in arrest or punishment, have not seen the rises in drug use or dependence rates that had been feared.

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## DECRIMINALIZATION INITIATIVES DO NOT RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN DRUG USE

### Portugal

In July 2001, Portugal became the first European country to decriminalize the use and possession of all illicit drugs. Many observers were critical of the policy, believing that it would lead to increases in drug use and associated problems. Dr. Caitlin Hughes of the University of New South Wales and Professor Alex Stevens of the University of Kent have undertaken detailed research into the effects of decriminalization in Portugal. Their recently published findings<sup>26</sup> have shown that this was not the case, replicating the conclusions of their earlier study<sup>27</sup> and that of the CATO Institute<sup>28</sup>.

Hughes and Stevens' 2010 report detects a slight increase in overall rates of drug use in Portugal in the 10 years since decriminalization, but at a level consistent with other similar countries where drug use remained criminalized. Within this general trend, there has also been a specific decline in the use of heroin, which was in 2001 the main concern of the Portuguese government. Their overall conclusion is that the removal of criminal penalties, combined with the use of alternative therapeutic responses to people struggling with drug dependence, has reduced the burden of drug law enforcement on the criminal justice system and the overall level of problematic drug use.

### Comparing Dutch and US Cities

A study by Reinarman, et. al. compared the very different regulatory environments of Amsterdam, whose liberal "cannabis cafe" policies (a form of de facto decriminalization) go back to the 1970s, and San Francisco, in the US, which criminalizes cannabis users. The researchers wished to examine whether the more repressive policy environment of San Francisco deterred citizens from smoking cannabis or delayed the onset of use. They found that it did not, concluding that:

"Our findings do not support claims that criminalization reduces cannabis use and that decriminalization increases cannabis use... With the exception of higher drug use in San Francisco, we found strong similarities across both cities. We found no evidence to support claims that criminalization reduces use or that decriminalization increases use."<sup>29</sup>

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### Australia

The state of Western Australia introduced a decriminalization scheme for cannabis in 2004, and researchers evaluated its impact by comparing prevalence trends in that state with trends in the rest of the country. The study was complicated by the fact that it took place in a period when the use of cannabis was in general decline across the country. However, the researchers found that this downward trend was the same in Western Australia, which had replaced criminal sanctions for the use or possession of cannabis with administrative penalties, typically the receipt of a police warning called a 'notice of infringement'. The authors state:

"The cannabis use data in this study suggest that, unlike the predictions of those public commentators who were critical of the scheme, cannabis use in Western Australia appears to have continued to decline despite the introduction of the Cannabis Infringement Notice Scheme."<sup>26</sup>

### Comparisons Between Different States in the US

Although cannabis possession is a criminal offense under US federal laws, individual states have varying policies toward possession of the drug. In the 2008 *Report of the Cannabis Commission* convened by the Beckley Foundation, the authors reviewed research that had been undertaken to compare cannabis prevalence in those states that had decriminalized with those that maintained criminal punishments for possession. They concluded that:

"Taken together, these four studies indicated that states which introduced reforms did not experience greater increases in cannabis use among adults or adolescents. Nor did surveys in these states show more favorable attitudes towards cannabis use than those states which maintained strict prohibition with criminal penalties."<sup>27</sup>

In the light of these experiences, it is clear that the policy of harsh criminalization and punishment of drug use has been an expensive mistake, and governments should take steps to refocus their efforts and resources on diverting drug users into health and social care services. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that sanctions should be removed altogether – many drug users will also commit other crimes for which they need to be held responsible – but the primary reaction to drug possession and use should be the offer of appropriate advice, treatment and health services to individuals who need them, rather than expensive and counterproductive criminal punishments.

3. Encourage experimentation by governments with models of legal regulation of drugs (with cannabis, for example) that are designed to undermine the power of organized crime and safeguard the health and security of their citizens.

The debate on alternative models of drug market regulation has too often been constrained by false dichotomies – tough or soft, repressive or liberal. In fact, we are all seeking the same objective – a set of drug policies and programs that minimize health and social harms, and maximize individual and national security. It is unhelpful to ignore those who argue for a taxed and regulated market for currently illicit drugs. This is a policy option that should be explored with the same rigor as any other.<sup>28</sup>

If national governments or local administrations feel that decriminalization policies will save money and deliver better health and social outcomes for their communities, or that the creation of a regulated market may reduce the power of organized crime and improve the security of their citizens, then the international community should support and facilitate such policy experiments and learn from their application.

Similarly, national authorities and the UN need to review the scheduling of different substances. The current schedules, designed to represent the relative risks and harms of various drugs, were set in place 50 years ago when there was little scientific evidence on which to base these decisions. This has resulted in some obvious anomalies – cannabis and coca leaf, in particular, now seem to be incorrectly scheduled and this needs to be addressed.

## DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN LEVELS OF CONTROL AND LEVELS OF HARM


In a report published by *The Lancet* in 2007, a team of scientists<sup>23</sup> attempted to rank a range of psychoactive drugs according to the actual and potential harms they could cause to society. The graph at right summarizes their findings and contrasts them with the seriousness with which the drugs are treated within the global drug control system.

While these are crude assessments, they clearly show that the categories of seriousness ascribed to various substances in international treaties need to be reviewed in the light of current scientific knowledge.

### UN CLASSIFICATION

- Most Dangerous
- Moderate Risk
- Low Risk
- Not Subject to International Control

### INDEPENDENT EXPERT ASSESSMENTS OF RISK



# RECOMMENDATIONS

(Continued)

## 4. Establish better metrics, indicators and goals to measure progress.

The current system of measuring success in the drug policy field is fundamentally flawed.<sup>26</sup> The impact of most drug strategies are currently assessed by the level of crops eradicated, arrests, seizures and punishments applied to users, growers and dealers. In fact, arresting and punishing drug users does little to reduce levels of drug use, taking out low-level dealers simply creates a market opportunity for others, and even the largest and most successful operations against organized criminals (that take years to plan and implement) have been shown to have, at best, a marginal and short-lived impact on drug prices and availability. Similarly, eradication of opium, cannabis or coca crops merely displaces illicit cultivation to other areas.

A new set of indicators is needed to truly show the outcomes of drug policies, according to their harms or benefits for individuals and communities – for example, the number of victims of drug market-related violence and intimidation; the level of corruption generated by drug markets; the level of petty crime committed by dependent users; levels of social and economic development in communities where drug production, selling or consumption are concentrated; the level of drug dependence in communities; the level of overdose deaths; and the level of HIV or hepatitis C infection among drug users. Policymakers can and should articulate and measure the outcome of these objectives.

The expenditure of public resources should therefore be focused on activities that can be shown to have a positive impact on these objectives. In the current circumstances in most countries, this would mean increased investment in health and social programs, and improved targeting of law enforcement resources to address the violence and corruption associated with drug markets.<sup>26</sup> In a time of fiscal austerity, we can no longer afford to maintain multibillion dollar investments that have largely symbolic value.

## 5. Challenge, rather than reinforce, common misconceptions about drug markets, drug use and drug dependence.

Currently, too many policymakers reinforce the idea that all people who use drugs are ‘amoral addicts’, and all those involved in drug markets are ruthless criminal masterminds. The reality is much more complex. The United Nations makes a conservative estimate that there are currently 250 million illicit drug users in the world, and that there are millions more involved in cultivation, production and distribution. We simply cannot treat them all as criminals.

To some extent, policymakers’ reluctance to acknowledge this complexity is rooted in their understanding of public opinion on these issues. Many ordinary citizens do have genuine fears about the negative impacts of illegal drug markets, or the behavior of people dependent on, or under the influence of, illicit drugs. These fears are grounded in some general assumptions about people who use drugs and drug markets, that government and civil society experts need to address by increasing awareness of some established (but largely unrecognized) facts. For example:

- The majority of people who use drugs do not fit the stereotype of the ‘amoral and pitiful addict’. Of the estimated 250 million drug users worldwide, the United Nations estimates that less than 10 percent can be classified as dependent, or ‘problem drug users’.<sup>26</sup>
- Most people involved in the illicit cultivation of coca, opium poppy, or cannabis are small farmers struggling to make a living for their families. Alternative livelihood opportunities are better investments than destroying their only available means of survival.
- The factors that influence an individual’s decision to start using drugs have more to do with fashion, peer influence, and social and economic context, than with the drug’s legal status, risk of detection, or government prevention messages.<sup>27,28</sup>
- The factors that contribute to the development of problematic or dependent patterns of use have more to do with childhood trauma or neglect, harsh living conditions, social marginalization, and emotional problems, rather than moral weakness or hedonism.<sup>29</sup>

## RECOMMENDATIONS

(Continued)

- It is not possible to frighten or punish someone out of drug dependence, but with the right sort of evidence-based treatment, dependent users can change their behavior and be active and productive members of the community.<sup>42</sup>
- Most people involved in drug trafficking are petty dealers and not the stereotyped gangsters from the movies – the vast majority of people imprisoned for drug dealing or trafficking are ‘small fish’ in the operation (often coerced into carrying or selling drugs), who can easily be replaced without disruption to the supply.<sup>43,42</sup>

A more mature and balanced political and media discourse can help to increase public awareness and understanding. Specifically, providing a voice to representatives of farmers, users, families and other communities affected by drug use and dependence can help to counter myths and misunderstandings.

6. **Countries that continue to invest mostly in a law enforcement approach (despite the evidence) should focus their repressive actions on violent organized crime and drug traffickers, in order to reduce the harms associated with the illicit drug market.**

The resources of law enforcement agencies can be much more effectively targeted at battling the organized crime groups that have expanded their power and reach on the back of drug market profits. In many parts of the world, the violence, intimidation and corruption perpetrated by these groups is a significant threat to individual and national security and to democratic institutions, so efforts by governments and law enforcement agencies to curtail their activities remain essential.

However, there is a need to review our tactics in this fight. There is a plausible theory put forward by MacCoun and Reuter<sup>44</sup> that suggests that supply reduction efforts are most effective in a new and undeveloped market, where the sources of supply are controlled by a small number of trafficking organizations. Where these conditions exist, appropriately designed and targeted law enforcement operations have the potential to stifle the emergence of new markets. We face such a situation now in West Africa. On the other hand, where drug markets are diverse and well-established, preventing drug use by stopping supply is not a realistic objective.

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### DRUGS IN WEST AFRICA: RESPONDING TO THE GROWING CHALLENGE OF NARCOTRAFFIC AND ORGANIZED CRIME

In just a few years, West Africa has become a major transit and re-packaging hub for cocaine following a strategic shift of Latin American drug syndicates toward the European market. Profiting from weak governance, endemic poverty, instability and ill-equipped police and judicial institutions, and bolstered by the enormous value of the drug trade, criminal networks have infiltrated governments, state institutions and the military. Corruption and money laundering, driven by the drug trade, pervert local politics and skew local economies.

A dangerous scenario is emerging as narco-traffic threatens to metastasize into broader political and security challenges. Initial international responses to support regional and national action have not been able to reverse this trend. New evidence<sup>44</sup> suggests that criminal networks are expanding operations and strengthening their positions through new alliances, notably with armed groups. Current responses need to be urgently scaled up and coordinated under West African leadership, with international financial and technical support. Responses should integrate law enforcement and judicial approaches with social, development and conflict prevention policies – and they should involve governments and civil society alike.

We also need to recognize that it is the illicit nature of the market that creates much of the market-related violence – legal and regulated commodity markets, while not without problems, do not provide the same opportunities for organized crime to make vast profits, challenge the legitimacy of sovereign governments, and, in some cases, fund insurgency and terrorism.

This does not necessarily mean that creating a legal market is the only way to undermine the power and reach of drug trafficking organizations. Law enforcement strategies can explicitly attempt to manage and shape the illicit market by, for example, creating the conditions where small-scale and private 'friendship network' types of supply can thrive, but cracking down on larger-scale operations that involve violence or inconvenience to the general public. Similarly, the demand for drugs from those dependent on some substances (for example, heroin) can be met through medical prescription programs that automatically reduce demand for the street alternative. Such strategies can be much more effective in reducing market-related violence and harms than futile attempts to eradicate the market entirely.

On the other hand, poorly designed drug law enforcement practices can actually increase the level of violence, intimidation and corruption associated with drug markets. Law enforcement agencies and drug trafficking organizations can become embroiled in a kind of 'arms race', in which greater enforcement efforts lead to a similar increase in the strength and violence of the traffickers. In this scenario, the conditions are created in which the most ruthless and violent trafficking organizations thrive. Unfortunately, this seems to be what we are currently witnessing in Mexico and many other parts of the world.

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## LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE

A group of academics and public health experts based in British Columbia have conducted a systematic review of evidence<sup>45</sup> relating to the impact of increased law enforcement on drug market-related violence (for example, armed gangs fighting for control of the drug trade, or homicide and robberies connected to the drug trade).

In multiple US locations, as well as in Sydney, Australia, the researchers found that increased arrests and law enforcement pressures on drug markets were strongly associated with increased homicide rates and other violent crimes. Of all the studies examining the effect of increased law enforcement on drug market violence, 91 percent concluded that increased law enforcement actually increased drug market violence. The researchers concluded that:

"The available scientific evidence suggests that increasing the intensity of law enforcement interventions to disrupt drug markets is unlikely to reduce drug gang violence. Instead, the existing evidence suggests that drug-related violence and high homicide rates are likely a natural consequence of drug prohibition and that increasingly sophisticated and well-resourced methods of disrupting drug distribution networks may unintentionally increase violence."<sup>46</sup>

In the UK also, researchers have examined the effects of policing on drug markets, noting that:

"Law enforcement efforts can have a significant negative impact on the nature and extent of harms associated with drugs by (unintentionally) increasing threats to public health and public safety, and by altering both the behavior of individual drug users and the stability and operation of drug markets (e.g. by displacing dealers and related activity elsewhere or increasing the incidence of violence as displaced dealers clash with established ones)."<sup>47</sup>

## RECOMMENDATIONS

(Continued)

### 7. Promote alternative sentences for small-scale and first-time drug dealers.

While the idea of decriminalization has mainly been discussed in terms of its application to people who use drugs or who are struggling with drug dependence, we propose that the same approach be considered for those at the bottom of the drug selling chain. The majority of people arrested for small-scale drug selling are not gangsters or organized criminals. They are young people who are exploited to do the risky work of street selling, dependent drug users trying to raise money for their own supply, or couriers coerced or intimidated into taking drugs across borders. These people are generally prosecuted under the same legal provisions as the violent and organized criminals who control the market, resulting in the indiscriminate application of severe penalties.

Around the world, the vast majority of arrests are of these nonviolent and low-ranking 'little fish' in the drug market. They are most visible and easy to catch, and do not have the means to pay their way out of trouble.<sup>48</sup> The result is that governments are filling prisons with minor offenders serving long sentences, at great cost, and with no impact on the scale or profitability of the market.

In some countries, these offenders are even subject to the death penalty, in clear contravention of international human rights law. To show their commitment to fighting the drug war, many countries implement laws and punishments that are out of proportion to the seriousness of the crime, and that still do not have a significant deterrent effect. The challenge now is for governments to look at diversion options for the 'little fish', or to amend their laws to make a clearer and more proportionate distinction between the different types of actors in the drug market.

### 8. Invest more resources in evidence-based prevention, with a special focus on youth.

Clearly, the most valuable investment would be in activities that stop young people from using drugs in the first place, and that prevent experimental users from becoming problematic or dependent users. Prevention of initiation or escalation is clearly preferable to responding to the problems after they occur. Unfortunately, most early attempts at reducing overall

rates of drug use through mass prevention campaigns were poorly planned and implemented. While the presentation of good (and credible) information on the risks of drug use is worthwhile, the experience of universal prevention (such as media campaigns, or school-based drug prevention programs) has been mixed. Simplistic 'just say no' messages do not seem to have a significant impact.<sup>49</sup>

There have been some carefully planned and targeted prevention programs, however, that focus on social skills and peer influences that have had a positive impact on the age of initiation or the harms associated with drug use. The energy, creativity and expertise of civil society and community groups are of particular importance in the design and delivery of these programs. Young people are less likely to trust prevention messages coming from state agencies.

Successful models of prevention have tended to target particular groups at risk – gang members, children in care, or in trouble at school or with the police – with mixed programs of education and social support that prevent a proportion of them from developing into regular or dependent drug users. Implemented to a sufficient scale, these programs have the potential to reduce the overall numbers of young people who become drug dependent or who get involved in petty dealing.

### 9. Offer a wide and easily accessible range of options for treatment and care for drug dependence, including substitution and heroin-assisted treatment, with special attention to those most at risk, including those in prisons and other custodial settings.

In all societies and cultures, a proportion of individuals will develop problematic or dependent patterns of drug use, regardless of the preferred substances in that society or their legal status. Drug dependence can be a tragic loss of potential for the individual involved, but is also extremely damaging for their family, their community, and, in aggregate, for the entire society.

Preventing and treating drug dependence is therefore a key responsibility of governments – and a valuable investment, since effective treatment can deliver significant savings in terms of reductions in crime and improvements in health and social functioning.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

(Continued)

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Successful models of prevention have tended to target particular groups at risk – gang members, children in care, or in trouble at school or with the police – with mixed programs of education and social support that prevent a proportion of them from developing into regular or dependent drug users. Implemented to a sufficient scale, these programs have the potential to reduce the overall numbers of young people who become drug dependent or who get involved in petty dealing.

### 9. Offer a wide and easily accessible range of options for treatment and care for drug dependence, including substitution and heroin-assisted treatment, with special attention to those most at risk, including those in prisons and other custodial settings.

In all societies and cultures, a proportion of individuals will develop problematic or dependent patterns of drug use, regardless of the preferred substances in that society or their legal status. Drug dependence can be a tragic loss of potential for the individual involved, but is also extremely damaging for their family, their community, and, in aggregate, for the entire society.

Preventing and treating drug dependence is therefore a key responsibility of governments – and a valuable investment, since effective treatment can deliver significant savings in terms of reductions in crime and improvements in health and social functioning.



## ENDNOTES

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## SECRETARIAT

Bernardo Sorj  
Ilona Szabó de Carvalho  
Miguel Darcy de Oliveira

## ADVISORS

**Dr. Alex Wodak**, Australian Drug Law  
Reform Foundation  
[www.adlr.org.au](http://www.adlr.org.au)

**Ethan Nadelmann**, Drug Policy Alliance  
[www.drugpolicy.org](http://www.drugpolicy.org)

**Martin Jelsma**, Transnational Institute  
[www.tni.org/drugs](http://www.tni.org/drugs)

**Mike Trace**, International Drug Policy Consortium  
[www.idpc.net](http://www.idpc.net)

## SUPPORT

Centro Edelstein de Pesquisas Sociais  
Instituto Fernando Henrique Cardoso  
Open Society Foundations  
Sir Richard Branson, founder and chairman of  
Virgin Group (Support provided through  
Virgin Unite)

## BACKGROUND PAPERS

(available at [www.globalcommissionondrugs.org](http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org))

***Demand reduction and harm reduction***  
Dr. Alex Wodak

***Drug policy, criminal justice and mass imprisonment***  
Bryan Stevenson

***Assessing supply-side policy and practice: eradication  
and alternative development***  
David Mansfield

***The development of international drug control: lessons  
learned and strategic challenges for the future***  
Martin Jelsma

***Drug policy: lessons learned and options for the future***  
Mike Trace

***The drug trade: the politicization of criminals and  
the criminalization of politicians***  
Molsés Naim

## FOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCES, SEE:

[www.unodc.org](http://www.unodc.org)  
[www.idpc.net](http://www.idpc.net)  
[www.drugpolicy.org](http://www.drugpolicy.org)  
[www.talktngdrugs.org](http://www.talktngdrugs.org)  
[www.tni.org/drugs](http://www.tni.org/drugs)  
[www.thra.net](http://www.thra.net)  
[www.countthecosts.org](http://www.countthecosts.org)  
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[www.beckleyfoundation.org](http://www.beckleyfoundation.org)  
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## GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY

The purpose of the Global Commission on Drug Policy is to bring to the international level an informed, science-based discussion about humane and effective ways to reduce the harm caused by drugs to people and societies.

### GOALS

- Review the basic assumptions, effectiveness and consequences of the "war on drugs" approach
- Evaluate the risks and benefits of different national responses to the drug problem
- Develop actionable, evidence-based recommendations for constructive legal and policy reform



## **Andean – United States Dialogue Forum**

**Lima, August 2-3, 2011**

ATPDEA Extension Letter Recipients\*

John Barrasco	Senate (R – Wyoming) – Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Max Baucus	Senate (D – Montana) – Committee on Finance
Howard Berman	House of Representatives (D – California) – Committee on Foreign Affairs
John Boehner	House of Representatives (R – Ohio) – Minority Leader of the House
David Camp	House of Representatives (R – Michigan) – Committee of Ways and Means
Hillary Clinton	State Department – Secretary of State
Christopher Dodd	Senate (D – Connecticut) – Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Eliot Engel	House of Representatives (D – New York) – Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Chuck Grassley	Senate (R – Iowa) – Committee on Finance
John Kerry	Senate (D – Massachusetts) – Committee on Foreign Relations

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\* Positions held as of September 2010.

Ron Kirk	Department of Commerce – United States Trade Representative
Sander Levin	House of Representatives (D – Michigan) – Committee of Ways and Means
Richard Lugar	Senate (R – Indiana) – Committee on Foreign Relations
Connie Mack	House of Representatives (R – Florida) – Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Mitch McConnell	Senate (R – Kentucky) – Senate Minority Leader
Robert Menendez	Senate (D – New Jersey) – Committee on Foreign Relations, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs
Nancy Pelosi	House of Representatives (D – California) – Speaker of the House
Harry Reid	Senate (D – Nevada) – Senate Majority Leader
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	House of Representatives (R – Florida) – Committee on Foreign Affairs

THE  
CARTER CENTER



November 18, 2010

To Senator John Kerry

We write to you regarding the renewal and extension of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), set to expire in December of 2010. We are members of a citizen-based dialogue forum seeking to improve understanding between the United States and five Andean countries in Latin America (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) and have participated in discussions with our Andean colleagues about ways to improve employment opportunities for the poor as alternatives to the drug trade.

The ATPDEA is designed to promote economic development in the four Andean countries affected by the problem of drug production and shipment (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) by offering economic alternatives, especially to low income producers.

We recommend that the United States Congress renew the ATPDEA before it expires and do so for a longer period of time (preferably four years) than the previous short-term extensions in order to allow for planning and investment. We further suggest that the Act include explicit incentives for greater trade participation among small and medium-sized agricultural producers, industries, and artisans.

As a result of this program, Andean exports have increased between two and ten-fold in the last decade, depending on the country. Poverty has significantly declined, and small farmers in rural areas have fewer incentives to engage in drug trafficking for a livelihood.

The ATPDEA has been equally important to the United States. Together these four Andean countries represent a population of about 100 million and a market, as of 2009, of \$19 billion for US exporters and of \$15 billion for American investors. This commercial relationship also constitutes an important source of employment for the United States, not only in production, but also in commerce, retail, insurance and other sectors. In the flower business, for example, for each job created in Colombia or Ecuador, one is recruited in the United States.

We hope you will consider extending this important legislation.

Sincerely,

AMERICAS PROGRAM

ONE COPENHILL • 433 FREEDOM PARKWAY • ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30307 • (404) 420-5175 • FAX (404) 410-5196

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS, CHAIRMAN

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## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, STAFF DIRECTOR  
KUNNINGHAM WITERS, JR., RECEPTIONIST/STAFF DIRECTOR

December 10, 2010

The Honorable Jimmy Carter  
The Carter Center  
Americas Program  
453 Freedom Parkway  
Atlanta, GA 30307

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your insightful analysis on the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), its successes to-date, and the best path forward. As you know, significant ATPDEA benefits accrue to both the United States as well as the Andean beneficiary countries, and it is in both our domestic and foreign policy interests that the Act be renewed and extended for the longest period possible.

Renewal of ATPDEA has faced a number of unfortunate obstacles in recent years. I have been working with my colleagues to address ATPDEA renewal before the end of this Congress. If our efforts fall short, retroactive renewal will have to be a top priority in the early months of the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress.

Out of respect for our Andean trade partners' need to develop trade strategies, and in keeping with the objectives of the ATPDEA, the U.S. Congress must act in a timely manner. It is impossible for the beneficiary nations to create effective long-term plans when they are kept in limbo on the status of such a large-scale trade agreement. A delay in the U.S. Congress for ATPDEA renewal is likely to further destabilize the economies that the Act seeks to strengthen.

I would like to thank you for your continued engagement on many important issues concerning our foreign policy. Your wisdom and experience are extremely valuable to me, and I especially appreciate your support and leadership on the ATPDEA. I also applaud the Andean-U.S. Dialogue Forum that you and your excellent Carter Center staff conducted.

Sincerely,



John F. Kerry  
Chairman



THE  
CARTER CENTER



November 18, 2010

To Trade Representative Ron Kirk

We write to you regarding the renewal and extension of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), set to expire in December of 2010. We are members of a citizen-based dialogue forum seeking to improve understanding between the United States and five Andean countries in Latin America (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) and have participated in discussions with our Andean colleagues about ways to improve employment opportunities for the poor as alternatives to the drug trade.

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We hope you will consider extending this important legislation.

Sincerely,

**OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT**



**Office of the United States Trade Representative  
Ambassador Ron Kirk**

600 17<sup>TH</sup> Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20508  
202-395-6890 TEL  
202-395-4549 FAX  
[www.ustr.gov](http://www.ustr.gov)

**DATE:** February 10, 2011

**TOTAL PAGES:** 3 incl. cover

**FROM:** Ambassador Ron Kirk c/o Ken Washington, Correspondence Analyst

**TO:** The Honorable Jimmy Carter and Dr. John Hardman

**RECIPIENT FAX:** (404) 420-5196

**SUBJECT/MESSAGE:** If you receive this transmission incomplete, please contact Ken Washington at (202) 395-9416.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508  
February 9, 2011

The Honorable Jimmy Carter  
Founder  
The Carter Center  
One Copenhill  
453 Freedom Parkway  
Atlanta, GA 30307

Dear President Carter:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing support for an extension of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), as amended by the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act. I fully support your call for the U.S. Congress to extend the program. The objective of the ATPA, enacted in 1991, is to help defeat the scourge of drug trafficking by providing sustainable economic alternatives to drug-crop production in beneficiary countries. The program does so by promoting broad-based economic development, diversification of exports, and consolidation of democracy. Colombia and Ecuador are currently receiving benefits under the program, but the program is due to expire again as of February 13, 2011.

The Administration is working with Congress on this issue and has encouraged Congress to extend the program as soon as possible. We have pointed out that coca, the raw material for cocaine, is grown exclusively in the Andean region of South America. The U.S. International Trade Commission has found that the ATPA continues to have a positive effect on drug-crop eradication and crop substitution, as well as job growth in export-oriented industries, in the Andean region. Colombia, which accounted for 57.5 percent of U.S. imports under ATPA in 2009, has been a particularly staunch ally in the fight against coca production and narco-trafficking. Columbia has recently suffered from severe flooding.

Thank you again for sharing your views on this important matter.

Sincerely,



Ambassador Ron Kirk

## PORTAFOLIO<sup>32</sup>

### Ecuador aplicaría freno a importaciones

marzo 23 de 2011

**El objetivo es reducir la salida de divisas que, de continuar al ritmo que trae, pondría a ese país**

Las exportaciones colombianas al mercado ecuatoriano sufrirían un nuevo remezón tan pronto el Gobierno del vecino país concrete un paquete de medidas que restringiría las importaciones de cualquier origen.

Desde hace varios meses, las autoridades del Ecuador vienen analizando y afinando las decisiones que tomarían para tratar de frenar el drenaje de divisas que, de continuar el ritmo que trae, pondría a su país en una delicada situación para cumplir con sus compromisos internacionales.

Por primera vez el año pasado la balanza comercial ecuatoriana fue deficitaria, pues llegó a 1.033 millones de dólares. “Nuestros niveles de importación están creciendo a una tasa muy peligrosa”, afirmó el vicepresidente de Consultoría y Proyectos de la Corpei, entidad promotora de las exportaciones y la inversión en Ecuador, Eduardo Egas.

Lo racional es que, cuando eso sucede, el Gobierno tome medidas, como restringir las importaciones, agregó el directivo. Y la administración de su país ya ha dado algunos pasos en los sectores automotor, donde aumentó 5 por ciento los aranceles y la telefonía móvil.

Para Colombia, cuyas exportaciones al mercado vecino sufrieron hace dos años los efectos de dos salvaguardias (restricciones), el panorama resulta preocupante, ya que después de Estados Unidos y China, Ecuador es el tercer destino de sus ventas externas, dentro de las cuales se destacan las de vehículos y partes, combustibles minerales y plásticos y manufacturas.

Las limitaciones que se vendrían están siendo analizadas por el Gobierno del presidente Rafael Correa sector por sector, lo que significa que serían diferenciales sectorialmente pero, en principio, iguales para los proveedores de cualquier país del mundo.

La Corpei, algo así como el Proexport de Ecuador, pero de carácter privado, y la Cámara Colombo Ecuatoriana de Industria y Comercio están promoviendo entre los gobiernos y los empresarios de los dos países una propuesta que, señaló Egas, permita manejar no sólo un comercio bilateral mucho más pensado, sino desarrollar nuevos negocios y alianzas empresariales binacionales que le den cabida a la complementación de las dos economías para aprovechar sus respectivos mercados y, además, venderles a los consumidores de otros países.

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<sup>32</sup> Source: <http://www.portafolio.co/negocios/ecuador-aplicaria-freno-importaciones>

Por supuesto, la iniciativa de las dos entidades incluye una variable que consideran clave: la inversión colombiana en Ecuador y viceversa, lo mismo que otros aspectos que, de concretarse, traerían beneficios para los dos países.

Con ello, comentó el directivo, se lograría una mayor competitividad de los aparatos productivos de Colombia y Ecuador y también suplir necesidades o deficiencias coyunturales, que ejemplificó con lo siguiente: por el fuerte periodo de lluvias en Colombia ciertos cultivos, como maíz, arroz, cacao, café, están en problemas que impactan a la industria colombiana que utiliza sus productos como materia prima.

Ecuador, precisó, está en posibilidad de suministrarlos y disminuir sus efectos entre el empresariado local. Ante la pregunta de si con esto se buscaría administrar el comercio bilateral, Egas respondió de manera enfática que no se trata de eso, sino de llegar a un consenso entre las partes, tanto del sector público como del privado, para planificar las oportunidades comerciales a lado y lado de la frontera en beneficio mutuo.

Para el ejecutivo de la Corpei, es indudable que lo anterior conlleva una serie de compromisos para los dos lados: para el caso de Colombia propone desarrollar una serie de programas que den cabida a un mayor ingreso de productos ecuatorianos al mercado colombiano mediante líneas especiales de crédito con recursos colombianos.

La iniciativa de la Corpei y la Cámara Colombo Ecuatoriana, según el vicepresidente de la primera organización, ha sido de buen recibo en el Gobierno, particularmente en el Ministerio de Comercio, y en el sector privado colombiano.

### **Puntos que ayudarían a equilibrar la balanza**

La propuesta presentada por La Corpei, el equivalente a Proexport de Ecuador, pero de carácter privado, y la Cámara Colombo Ecuatoriana de Industria y Comercio tiene varios frentes concretos:

- Promoción de los productos ecuatorianos en Colombia mediante misiones comerciales, ruedas de negocios y promoción directa.
- Acuerdos con cadenas de supermercados colombianas para promocionar bienes ecuatorianos.
- Promoción de productos ecuatorianos que se encadenen en los procesos de exportación de Colombia a terceros países, principalmente a través de la acumulación de origen regional.
- Financiamiento de importaciones originarias de Ecuador a través del Bancóldex, que tendría comunicación directa con las entidades de promoción de exportaciones del Ecuador.
- Creación de un sistema de compensación de pagos bilateral, que elimine los costos financieros de las transacciones internacionales y los riesgos de la tasa de cambio.

- Mejoramiento de la logística con énfasis en la libre circulación del transporte terrestre para lograr mejores tarifas.
- Impulso al turismo binacional, particularmente hacia el Ecuador.
- Promocionar la inversión colombiana en Ecuador, que otorga estímulos para dirigirla hacia determinados sectores.
- Diálogo directo entre los gobiernos de los dos países y los gremios más representativos para una estrategia concertada.

**JORGE CORREA C.**

**REDACCIÓN ECONOMÍA Y NEGOCIOS**